City of Dallas v. Brown, 16193
Decision Date | 13 November 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 16193,16193 |
Citation | 384 S.W.2d 724 |
Parties | CITY OF DALLAS et al., Petitioners, v. Daniel C. BROWN et al. and James P. Donovan, Atty., Respondents. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
H. P. Kucera, City Atty., and N. Alex Bickley, Asst. City Atty., Dallas, for petitioners.
James P. Donovan, Dallas, for respondents.
This cause is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. Donovan et al. v. City of Dallas et al., 377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964), rehearing denied October 12, 1964. Our previous decision in this contempt action is found in City of Dallas v. Brown, Civ.App., (1964), 368 S.W.2d 240. Antecedent facts and history may be found in Atkinson v. City of Dallas, Civ.App., 353 S.W.2d 275, certiorari denied, 370 U.S. 939, 82 S.Ct. 1587, 8 L.Ed.2d 808; City of Dallas v. Brown, Civ.App., 362 S.W.2d 372; and City of Dallas v. Dixon et al., S.Ct., 365 S.W.2d 919.
The Supreme Court of the United States has now said that we were correct in our decision in City of Dallas v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 372, wherein we declined to prohibit respondents from prosecuting their federal court action. Accordingly, the court says that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas in City of Dallas v. Dixon et al., S.Ct., 365 S.W.2d 919 upsetting our judgment was incorrect. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas and vacated our judgment in City of Dallas v. Brown, Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 240, in which we held respondents guilty of contempt. The highest court of the land says that our action rested on the mistaken belief that the writ prohibiting litigation by the federal plaintiffs was 'valid'. That court, in remanding the cause to us, said:
Thus, on this remand we are confronted with the primary question of whether we would have punished respondents for contempt had we known our restraining order was invalid. Should this question be answered in the negative then we are called upon to pass upon respondents' motion for the return to them of all fines and costs previously paid. Such motion poses the question as to our right under the law to order such fines and costs returned once they have been paid into court.
The answer to the first question is found in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court wherein we are advised that respondents had the legal right to prosecute their federal cause of action and that 'the Texas courts were without power to take away this federal right by contempt proceedings or otherwise.' At the time we issued the Writ of Prohibition and found respondents guilty of contempt for violating the provisions thereof we did not know that we did not possess this power. We had in effect been ordered by the Supreme Court of Texas to issue the writ and could not have disobeyed such order. It was a valid and legal order as to us until reversed or vacated by a higher court. At the time we acted no effort had been made to stay the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas directing us to issue the Writ of Prohibition. So, in issuing the Writ of Prohibition and in holding respondents in contempt for violation thereof, we acted perforce what we considered to be a valid order. Accordingly, we now vacate our previous order issuing the Writ of Prohibition. The motion of the City of Dallas to hold respondents in contempt of court for violating the Writ of Prohibition is denied.
The answer to the second question posed presents a problem of ownership and accounting of the funds involved. Of the total number of respondents involved, fifty-nine paid their fines and costs of court. Another (Donovan) served his jail sentence and paid his pro rata share of the court costs. The total amount of fines paid by the fifty-nine respondents was $10,750. The total amount of court costs paid by all respondents was $136.80, making a...
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