City of Darlington v. Kilgo
| Decision Date | 08 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 23213,23213 |
| Citation | 302 S.C. 40,393 S.E.2d 376 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF DARLINGTON, City of Hartsville, J. Ronald Ward, Cecil Chandler, Pat Howle, Earl Johnson, James Hammons, Roseann W. Harry, Oby G. Lyles, Jr., L.M. Cannarella, T. James Bell, Jr., Pam P. Carrol, William A. Gaskins, Franklin Hines, Mary F. Jordan, T.B. Thomas, Tom Stewart, Marion "Bud" Gandy, Mrs. Guy Beatty, George Beckroge, Bishop Lenist Hunter, Beth Weaver, Mrs. Ann Osborne, Donald Sylvester, Bill Segars, Edward L. Melton, James T. Gainey, Marvin Odom, A.M. Odom, W.R. "Bill" Gunnells, William A. Bramlett, Jr., Jan Bramlett, Robert Hitch, Susan Hitch, Robert B. Moody, Barbara W. Moody, Don A. Parnell, Jack W. Price, Laurie G. Price, Respondents, v. Robert L. KILGO, Jr., Jerrell Sansbury, Rosa Lee Gerald, Robert L. Bryant, Bobbie S. Gardner, Lucious T. Bacote, Richard Griggs, Maxie O. Redic, Jr., and Billy D. O'Neal, Appellants. . Heard |
Margaret C. Pope, Frank W. Cureton and Virginia L. Vroegop, Belton T. Zeigler, Sinkler and Boyd, P.A., Columbia, and Karl H. Smith, Hartsville, for appellants.
Martin S. Driggers, Hartsville, and Paul A. Sansbury, Darlington, for respondents.
Roy D. Bates, Columbia, for amicus curiae Mun. Ass'n of S.C.
This is an appeal of a summary judgment order granting respondents, City of Darlington, City of Hartsville (Cities) and other individuals who live in or near the Cities an injunction against appellants, the Darlington County Administrator and members of the Darlington County Council (County). We affirm.
Darlington County Council passed an ordinance creating a fire district which included all unincorporated areas of Darlington County. The County did not seek an agreement with the Cities prior to adopting this plan. The respondent Cities sued to enjoin implementation of the plan as a violation of S.C.Code § 4-19-10 (1976) because the County's proposed service area includes areas for which the Cities provided fire protection. The Cities moved for summary judgment. The trial court enjoined appellants from creating a fire district which included property within five miles of the Cities' boundaries unless and until the parties executed an agreement. This appeal followed.
In addition to furnishing full fire protection service within their corporate limits, the Cities also contract to provide limited service within a five-mile radius outside their municipal boundaries. Service to these outlying areas is confined to structures under contract or life-threatening fires. The record reflects that the Cities respond to fire calls for non-contract structures, at which time the owner generally agrees to pay the fee.
First, appellants contend § 4-19-10 does not restrict its ability to create a county-wide fire district without an agreement because the Cities' limited fire protection does not qualify the five-mile radius as a "service area" as contemplated by the statute. 1 The County Fire Protection Services Act, Section 4-19-10, provides:
Powers of governing body generally.
The governing body of each county has the following powers:
(a) To establish, operate, and maintain a system of fire protection.
(b) To designate, subject to the provisions of § 4-19-20, the areas of the county where fire protection service may be furnished by the county under the provisions of this chapter (referred to in this chapter as service areas); provided, however, that these service areas shall exclude those areas where fire protection is then being furnished by some other political subdivision unless an agreement be entered into between the county and such other political subdivision for the joint exercise of fire protection powers within the service area of such political subdivision and the sharing of the costs thereof.
... (Emphasis Added.)
In its findings preceding reenactment of the County Fire Protection Services Act in 1984, the South Carolina legislature made clear its intent by stating that "[t]he General Assembly has determined to reenact this legislation under which counties may provide fire protection services within the unincorporated areas of such counties where no fire protection services are presently offered by any existing special purpose district or municipality ..." Act No. 408, 1984 S.C. Act 1818. (Emphasis added.) As noted in § 5-7-60, municipalities may only provide service outside their corporate limits by contract.
The trial court concluded that legislative intent was to allow municipalities to continue to offer fire protection service in areas previously served under contract, and that such areas could not be included in any county district plan without prior agreement with the municipality. We agree. It is our view that S.C.Code § 4-19-10(b) protects the rights of cities and customers who have contracted for fire protection under § 5-7-60 and that, in the absence of an agreement, newly created county fire districts must exclude areas served by cities under contract. Since the legislature did not qualify the nature or extent of the "fire protection services ... offered," this Court is constrained to hold that the five-mile radius protected by the Cities under contract constitutes a "service area."
Second, appellants assert that S.C.Code Ann. § 5-7-60 prohibits Cities from providing fire protection service to unincorporated areas after the County undertakes service in such areas. Appellants recite language from City of Myrtle Beach 2 that "under no circumstances could the cities have a governmental right to interfere with the creation of such [county created fire] districts." City of Myrtle Beach v. Richardson, 280 S.C. 167, 169, 311 S.E.2d 922, 923 (1984). In the instant case, respondents do not challenge appellant's right to "create" a fire district; they contend that such a district may not include areas presently served by the Cities. 3
Under S.C.Code Ann. § 5-7-60 (1976), South Carolina cities may contract with any individual, corporation, state or political subdivision or agency to furnish fire protection outside the cities' corporate limits. 4 Thus, the question is whether there is a conflict between the County Fire Protection Services Act, § 4-19-10(b), and the Cities' statutory rights under § 5-7-60. This Court finds no conflict between § 4-19-10 and § 5-7-60.
The 1984 County Fire Protection Services Act authorized the creation of such districts and established criteria which must be met for the institution of county fire districts. It is only when an existing municipal service area within the county is affected that an agreement for the joint exercise of fire protection powers must be entered into prior to the creation of a county fire protection district. This provision does not embody veto power, but allows both entities to furnish service with a determination of how the costs thereof shall be shared.
It is this Court's conclusion that the legislature balanced the county residents' interest in having full fire protection with the municipalities' interest in continuing service it has been providing by requiring an agreement between the two when the county proposes to institute county-wide protection. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
The respondents City of Darlington, City of Hartsville, and several individuals living either in or near these municipalities brought this action against the Darlington County Administrator and the members of the Darlington County Council to enjoin them from implementing an ordinance that created sometime prior to May 11, 1987, in all unincorporated areas of Darlington County, with the exception of two areas protected by rural fire districts, a fire protection district, called the Darlington County Fire Protection District. The new district embraces unincorporated areas in which Darlington and Hartsville, according to the Statement, "offered fire protection services" pursuant to contracts. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Darlington, Hartsville, and the other respondents and enjoined the County Administrator and the County Council from creating a fire protection district in Darlington County within the "service area[s]" of Darlington and Hartsville, absent agreements between the county and each of the two cities permitting the county to furnish fire protection services in the disputed areas. The County Administrator and the County Council appeal.
Section 5-7-60 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), 1 authorizes, but does not obligate, any municipality in this State to provide its services, except police protection services, by contract to individuals in all areas outside its corporate limits except those designated service areas of another municipality or political subdivision. Acting pursuant to Section 5-7-60, Darlington and Hartsville contracted with various persons to furnish fire protection services in areas outside their municipal limits. These areas are now included in the new fire protection district.
The fire protection services provided by both municipalities in these areas, however, are far from comprehensive. Each municipality offers fire protection services to property outside its municipal limits only where the property lies within five road miles of its fire station; however, each municipality serves only those owners or tenants of property in the area who contract with it and pay it an annual fee. Both municipalities also charge an additional fee when they respond beyond their corporate limits to a fire involving a structure under contract.
Neither Darlington nor Hartsville will respond beyond its corporate limits to either wildfires or automobile fires unless they threaten either structures then under...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Comm'rs of Pub. Works of Laurens v. City of Fountain Inn
...is being provided." Mathis v. Hair , 358 S.C. 48, 53, 594 S.E.2d 851, 854 (Ct. App. 2003) ; see also City of Darlington v. Kilgo , 302 S.C. 40, 43, 393 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1990) (finding when a city had provided limited fire protection to an area outside its boundaries pursuant to a contract, ......
-
Commissioners of Pub. Works of Laurens v. City of Fountain Inn
...It necessarily follows that the requirements of section 5-7-60 must be strictly followed.LCPW relies on City of Darlington v. Kilgo , 302 S.C. 40, 393 S.E.2d 376 (1990). Kilgo is easily distinguished. Kilgo involved a dispute between a county and a city which was resolved with reference to ......
-
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Darlington County
... ... The ordinance and creation of the district was challenged by the City of Darlington in an earlier suit, City of Darlington v. Kilgo, 302 S.C. 40, 393 S.E.2d 376 (1990). The trial judge in Kilgo enjoined the County of ... ...
-
City of Spartanburg v. County of Spartanburg
...existing agreement between City and Draper and this case is clearly distinguishable from our recent decision in City of Darlington v. Kilgo, --- S.C. ----, 393 S.E.2d 376 (1990). The judgment of the circuit court AFFIRMED. HARWELL, CHANDLER, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur. ...