City of Denver v. Coulehan

Decision Date22 December 1894
PartiesCITY OF DENVER et al. v. COULEHAN.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Appeal from district court, Jefferson county.

Action by Jeremiah Coulehan, suing for himself and others, against the city of Denver and others. From a judgment for plaintiff defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Action to enjoin the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes upon certain property in Jefferson county by or for the use of the city of Denver. Trial, and judgment in favor of plaintiff granting the perpetual injunction as prayed for. Defendants appeal. The complaint is very lengthy. The following extracts will be sufficient for an understanding of the opinion 'The plaintiff, suing as well for the behalf of all other owners of taxable property situate within the district of lands aforesaid, similarly situated, as for himself complaining, saith that plaintiff is, and for twenty years and more last past hath been, the owner of those certain premises described as the northeast quarter of section twenty-three (23), township three (3) south, of range sixty-nine (69) west; * * * that by a certain act of the general assembly of the state of Colorado approved on the third day of April, A. D. 1893, entitled 'An act to revise and amend the charter of the city of Denver,' it was and is provided, among other things, that the corporate limits of the said city of Denver should begin, etc. [description, including lands of plaintiff], 'excepting, however, out of the said city, as so established, all towns and cities incorporated and then existing under the general laws of the state, situate within said last mentioned boundaries.' * * * Plaintiff further avers that the plaintiff's land hereinbefore described, and all of the lands hereinbefore mentioned, situate in the said township three (3) south, of range sixty-nine (69) west, and township four (4) south, of range sixty-nine (69) west, are, and always have been, included within the limits of the said county of Jefferson; that the said lands of the plaintiff are agricultural lands, and now are, and for many years last past have been, by plaintiff planted and cultivated for the rearing of grasses, small grains, and small fruits; that the said lands are valuable only as agricultural lands; that the same are not and never have been divided into streets, alleys, lots, blocks, or outlots, nor doth plaintiff propose or intend, nor hath plaintiff ever proposed, intended, or desired, to so subdivide the same into parcels, or sell or expose the same to sale as urban or suburban property, nor are the same valuable for such purpose; that no public buildings or other improvements have ever been erected or made by the said city of Denver upon or within three miles of said lands of plaintiff or said district of lands afore described, situate in said county of Jefferson; that none of the public streets or alleys of the city of Denver extend into or near to the same, or any part thereof, or into or within two miles of any part of the said district of lands aforedescribed; and that neither light, heat, police protection, water, nor other convenience or public service furnished by or under authority of the city of Denver for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof hath ever been extended or afforded to plaintiff or any of the people residing within the said district; nor doth or can plaintiff or the other owners of lands situate within the said district have any, benefit, advantage, or convenience whatsoever of the government of the said city of Denver, or any department thereof; nor are the said lands of plaintiff, nor any of the lands situate within the district aforesaid, in range sixty-nine (69) aforesaid, necessary to be added to the city of Denver for opening streets or ways between other parts of the said city of Denver, or for any other municipal purpose whatsoever; and that the whole purpose of the city of Denver and those active in and about procuring such enlargement of the bounds of said city was and is to enable the authorities of the said city of Denver to levy taxes upon the lands and other taxable property within the said district for raising moneys for discharging the current expenses of the said city, and for discharging the principal and interest of the bonded indebtedness of the said city hereinafter mentioned. * * * Plaintiff further avers that the said district of lands in every part thereof was at the date of the passage of the said act, and still is, separated from the bounds of the said city of Denver, as established prior to the passage of the said act, by a distance of two (2) miles or more, and by certain municipal corporations theretofore and now still existing, to wit, the town of North Denver, the town of Highlands, the town of Colfax, and the town of Barnum, all which, as plaintiff on information and belief avers, at the date of the passage of the said act, and for many years before that, were, and still are, municipal corporations, lawfully organized and existing under the laws of the state of Colorado. * * * Plaintiff is advised by counsel, and therefore avers, that the attempt made by the said enactment to include the said district of lands within the limits of the city of Denver solely for subjecting the same to taxation for the purposes of the said city of Denver, and the attempt by the said enactment to subject the said lands to the burden of the indebtedness heretofore contracted by the said city of Denver for loans as hereinbefore mentioned and the other indebtedness of the said city of Denver, was beyond the authority of the general assembly, and wholly without effect. Nevertheless, plaintiff saith the city council of the said city of Denver thereaten to and will levy upon the lands situate in said district, including the lands of plaintiff, hereinbefore described, taxes for city purposes to an amount not exceeding the limit in the said act provided, to wit, ten mills on the dollar upon the assessed value of said property, and cause the said levy to be certified to the county clerk of the said county of Jefferson; and the said John Vivian, who is the county clerk and recorder of the said county of Jefferson, threatens to and will, unless restrained by the writ of injunction hereinafter prayed, extend the same upon the tax lists of the said county of Jefferson for the now current year and every year hereafter, in the manner directed in the said act, and include the said city taxes in his warrant to the county treasurer of the said county of Jefferson; and the said Robert E. Jones, who is the county treasurer of the said county of Jefferson, will, unless restrained as aforesaid, proceed to levy and collect the said taxes, either by sale of plaintiff's lands aforedescribed or by distraint and sale of plaintiff's personal property. And plaintiff avers that the taxes so levied and assessed as aforesaid will be a cloud on the lands of plaintiff and all other lands situated within the district aforesaid whereupon such taxes shall be levied and assessed as aforesaid, and the levy and assessment of such taxes from year to year in every year hereafter, as the said city of Denver proposes and threatens to do, will be a continuous and constantly recurring injury, irreparable by any action at law. Plaintiff, therefore, as well for and on behalf of the owners of other taxable property within the said district similarly situated as for himself, prays judgment that the said city of Denver, and the said city council thereof, and all and singular the officers, agents, and servants thereof, be strictly restrained and prohibited from levying upon the lands aforedescribed or the other taxable property within the said district, or other lands or taxable property similarly situated to the lands and taxable property of plaintiff aforedescribed within the said district, any assessment or tax whatsoever to meet the expenses of said city of Denver, or for other purpose whatsoever, and from causing any such levy to be certified to the county clerk and recorder of said county of Jefferson; that the said county clerk and J. A. Ferris, assessor, as well as their successors in office, be likewise restrained and enjoined from levying or extending any such tax upon the tax list of the said county of Jefferson in any year, and from including any such taxes in any warrant to the county treasurer of said county; and that the said county treasurer and all and singular his successors in office be in like manner strictly restrained and enjoined from collecting, or assuming to collect, any such city taxes of the city of Denver at any time levied or assessed upon or against any such lands or other taxable property within the said district; and that plaintiff may have such other and further relief or such different relief as to the court shall seem meet, and his costs.'

Syllabus by the Court

The legislature of this state does not have the power to extend or enlarge the territorial limits of a specially chartered town or city by adding thereto noncontiguous lands,--that is, lands entirely separated from the municipality by intervening territory; and the courts may declare the annexation of such noncontiguous territory invalid, and enjoin the collection of municipal taxes upon the property thus sought to be annexed.

A. B. Seaman, City Atty., and Louis K. Pratt, for appellants.

Wells, Taylor & Taylor, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J. (after stating the facts

The city of Denver was organized and existing under and by virtue of a special charter long before and at the time of the adoption of our state constitution. The constitution did not abrogate such charters, nor does it exempt them from legislative amendments. Const. art. 14, § 14; also Id. art. 15, § 2. Brown v. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 P. 455; ...

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  • Green v. Hutson
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1925
    ... ... there is a clear distinction between the meaning of the word ... "town" and the word "city" as it appears ... in the statute. As a general principle of law, as laid down ... in Dillard on ... word "cities" to embrace "towns." Denver ... v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 P. 425, 27 L. R. A. 751; Note ... to Volume 32 Ann. Cas. 1914B, ... ...
  • BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF LARAMIE v. Cheyenne, No. 03-50 to 03-56.
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    ...of compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation." 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations § 69, quoting City of Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 P. 425 (1894). Contiguity, then, is an essential component of the traditional concept of a municipal corporation, which is envisioned......
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    ...of compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation." 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations § 69, quoting City of Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 P. 425 (1894). Contiguity, then, is an essential component of the traditional concept of a municipal corporation, which is envisioned......
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