City of Detroit v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 August 1977
• Docket Number: Docket No. 27501
• Citation: 258 N.W.2d 521,77 Mich.App. 465
• Parties: CITY OF DETROIT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 521

258 N.W.2d 521

77 Mich.App. 465

CITY OF DETROIT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 27501.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 22, 1977.

Released for Publication Oct. 27, 1977.

Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile by Lawrence R. Van Til, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Kermit G. Bailer, Corp. Counsel, Victor G. Marrocco, Carl Rashid, Jr., Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before V. J. BRENNAN, P. J., and WALSH and O'BRIEN, ^* JJ.

O'BRIEN, Judge.

Appellant, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, timely filed its 1975 personal property statement with the City of Detroit's Finance Department, Assessments Division, on February 17, 1975. The personal property statement appellant filed listed its personal property and reported appellant's opinion as to its value. Pursuant to the provisions of the General Property Tax Act, 1893 P.A. 206, as amended, M.C.L.A. § 211.1 et seq.; M.S.A. § 7.1 et seq., appellee, City of Detroit's Board of Assessors, then assessed appellant's personal property and the Common Council Board of Review examined and approved the assessment rolls. Appellee assessed appellant's personal property at $1,687,200. Upon examination and approval by the Board of Review the assessment became final, absent an appeal or a general review of appellee's assessments by the State Tax Commission, neither of which occurred.

After the assessment rolls were completed appellee's Assessments Division decided to conduct an audit of appellant's books and records. The audit resulted in a disagreement as to the true cash value of appellant's inventory. The disagreement centers on whether depreciation is an element of inventory costs.

The City of Detroit, on December 9, 1975, then filed a petition with the Tax Tribunal requesting an increase in appellant's personal property assessment by $20,160. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Tax Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the petition and that jurisdiction to consider increases in assessments under the General Property Tax Act was an administrative matter which remained vested in the State Tax Commission and was not transferred to the Tax Tribunal by the Tax Tribunal Act. The motion to dismiss was denied by the Tax Tribunal on January 15, 1976.

Appellant filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court, which was denied by an order entered on April 20, 1976. Appellant thereafter filed an application for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court which remanded the case to this Court "for consideration as on leave granted". 397 Mich. 835 (1976).

The first issue raised in this appeal is: Does the Tax Tribunal Act, 1973 P.A. 186, violate Const.1963, Art. 4, § 25 by altering existing laws without republishing them?

It is the defendant's position that Art. 4, Section 25 was designed to give the public notice of how and whether a newly enacted statute amends or repeals prior law.

The plaintiff argues that defendant has no standing to raise the issue as there has been no adverse effect on defendant by the invocation of the Tax Tribunal Act.

Turning to the merits, Const.1963, art. 4, § 25 provides that:

"No law shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length."

This constitutional provision has previously been the subject of Supreme Court scrutiny. In Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich. 441, 469-470, 208 N.E.2d 469 (1973), the Supreme Court noted after examining the 1963 and 1850 Constitutions:

"Except for some punctuation and some rearrangement of words in the latter half of the provision, this language has continued through to this date (also see 1908 Const., art. 5, §§ 21, 22)."

The Supreme Court then set forth the procedure to be followed in examining constitutional provisions with specific application to art. 4, § 25:

"The first consideration given to determining the meaning of constitutional language simply should be to read it. It is especially important that we do so in this matter before the Court because interpretations over the years seem to be leading away from the 'plain and simple language' of the section.

"The language of § 25 is quite clear. It says succinctly and straightforwardly that no law (meaning statutory enactment) shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The constitutional language then proceeds to state how it shall be done (i. e., the section(s) of the act in question shall be amended by reenacting and republishing at length).

"There are only two sentences in § 25. Although the second word is 'law', it is obvious from the reading of the entire section that 'law' means act or section of an act. Section 25 is worded to prevent the revising, altering or amending of an act by merely referring to the title of the act and printing the amendatory language then under consideration. If such a revision, alteration or amendment were allowed, the public and the Legislature would not be given notice and would not be able to observe readily the extent and effect of such revision, alteration or amendment." 389 Mich. at 470, 208 N.W.2d at 476.

An examination of the Tax Tribunal Act, 1973 P.A. 186; M.C.L.A. § 205.701 et seq.; M.S.A. § 7.650(1) et seq., shows that no law was revised, altered, or amended merely by title. No other law was mentioned in the Act. However, the inquiry cannot stop there.

In the advisory opinion, the Supreme Court went on to state:

"A second consideration in determining the meaning of constitutional language is the analysis of precedent. How have the courts interpreted this language? In pursuing precedent, those cases decided at a time proximate to the ratification of the constitution are important in that they better reflect the meaning of the language of the constitution at the time it was written." 389 Mich. at 470, 208 N.W.2d at 476.

The Supreme Court's discussion of precedent and its application to the "no-fault" law are particularly instructive in light of appellant's argument:

"In this instance, the most important source case is People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (1865). As noted above, the language of § 25 first appeared in the 1850 Constitution. In Mahaney, the Court, speaking through Justice Cooley, had to resolve several challenges to the enactment of a law 'to establish a police government for the City of Detroit'. (p. 490.) The act called for a transfer of duties of various public officials and repealed all inconsistent acts. The legislation was quite broad for it not only instituted a police government but modified 'the powers and duties of sheriffs, constables, water and sewer commissioners, marshals, mayors and justices, and imposes new duties upon the executive and the citizen'. (p. 497.)

"Much of Justice Cooley's discussion in Mahaney is particularly pertinent to the present case. An example is this statement found on pp. 496, 497:

" 'If, whenever a new statute is passed, it is necessary that all prior statutes modified by it by implication should be re-enacted and published at length as modified, then a large portion of the whole code of laws of the state would require to be republished at every session, and parts of it several times over, until from the mere immensity of the material, it would be impossible to tell what the law was.'

"From the arguments presented to this Court, it appears that over 200 statutes might be related in some way to 1972 PA 294. It is conceded that there are others related but not even shown on the computer printouts. To hold that each of these possibly hundreds of acts or portions thereof, in addition to the subject act, must be reenacted and republished clearly illustrates the unreasonableness of such an interpretation. To require such a recital would result in the ultimate of confusion.

"Further, the constitutional division of powers mandates that the courts not interfere with legislative action by fabricating standards not constitutionally required. Considerations of practicality and common sense indicate that the Legislature must be allowed sufficient discretion at this point, provided that such discretion is exercised within constitutional limitations.

"Justice Cooley stated further in Mahaney :

" 'This constitutional provision must receive a reasonable construction, with a view to give it effect. The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that the legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws.' (p. 497.)

"To continue the language from Mahaney at p. 497:

" 'An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation.'

"1972 PA 294 does not violate these standards set forth in this reference. It does not revise, alter or amend in such prohibited fashion.

"Mahaney then ruled:

" 'But an act complete in itself is not within the mischief designed to be remedied by this division and cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating the plain intent.' (p. 497.) (Emphasis added.)

"The subject act details all that is required for institution of a 'no-fault' system of motor vehicle insurance. It is an act complete within itself. It falls squarely within the rule set forth in Mahaney." (Footnotes omitted.) 389 Mich. at 471-473, 208 N.W.2d at 476-478.

It is clear that the Tax Tribunal Act is also "an act complete within...