City of Dodge City v. Downing
Decision Date | 21 April 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 72193,72193 |
Citation | 257 Kan. 561,894 P.2d 206 |
Parties | CITY OF DODGE CITY, Kansas, Appellant, v. Gregory A. DOWNING, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. While the State has an obligation to insure that an accused is provided a speedy trial, delays which happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period under K.S.A. 22-3402(2).
2. Where the defendant claims that his or her statutory right to a speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402(2) has been violated, any delay caused by the defendant's filing of a motion to suppress evidence is a delay that is the result of the application of the defendant. Under a plain reading of K.S.A. 22-3402(2), a reasonable period of time for the parties and the court to process the defendant's motion to suppress is charged to the defendant and deducted from the 180 days allotted for bringing the defendant to trial.
Terry J. Malone, City Atty., argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellant.
Leslie Phelps Hess, of Patton, Kerbs & Hess, Dodge City, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
The City of Dodge City (City) appeals from an order of the district court dismissing a criminal case against Gregory A. Downing on the grounds that the case was not brought to trial within the 180 days required by K.S.A. 22-3402(2). The City contends that the court erred by failing to deduct 30 days occasioned by the defendant's motion for suppression of evidence. We agree, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The facts in this case are not disputed. The parties have entered into the following agreed statement of facts pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3.05 (1994 Kan.Ct.R.Annot. 20):
There is no dispute that the time taken to bring the defendant to trial was 204 days. The City argues that the district court erred by not charging the defendant with the time from the date of filing of his motion to suppress until the time set by the court for filing of briefs on the motion, a total of 16 days. The City also argues that the defendant should be charged with a reasonable period of time for the trial court to consider and resolve the motion to suppress. We agree and conclude that the 16 days, as well as 14 days for the court to resolve the defendant's motion, are attributable to the defendant. The deduction of 30 days occasioned by application of the defendant establishes that on May 25, 1994, the scheduled trial date, he would have been brought to trial in 174 days, well within the dictates of K.S.A. 22-3402(2).
K.S.A. 22-3402(2) states:
"If any person charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond shall not be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (3)." (Emphasis added.)
While the State has an obligation to insure that an accused is provided a speedy trial, delays which "happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant" are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period under K.S.A. 22-3402(2). See State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994).
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