State v. Queen
| Citation | 482 P.3d 1117 |
| Decision Date | 19 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 120,643,120,643 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas. Appellee, v. Danny W. QUEEN, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.
The Kansas speedy trial statute requires a court to "discharge [a criminal defendant] from further liability to be tried for the crime charged" if that person was held in jail solely on the charged crime and was not brought to trial within 150 days after such person's arraignment on the charge. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402(a). Danny W. Queen seeks discharge from charges of murder and attempted murder because the State did not bring him to trial until 153 days after his arraignment. In seeking discharge from liability, Queen did not then, nor has he ever, asserted that the trial setting violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He relied only on his statutory speedy trial right.
The district court judge denied Queen's request, relying on provisions in the speedy trial statute that allow a judge to extend the 150-day period under certain conditions. Queen appealed, and a Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court, holding that no statutory exceptions applied to extend the speedy trial deadline. The panel also noted that the speedy trial statute unambiguously directs courts to discharge from liability any person not timely brought to trial. The Court of Appeals commented: "The remedy is strong medicine, since it undoes any conviction obtained in a trial impermissibly held after the statutory deadline and precludes any further prosecution of the defendant on those charges." State v. Queen , No. 120,643, 2020 WL 3579872, at *6 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion).
The State timely petitioned for review, which this court granted. This court's jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (). On review, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that no exceptions extended the statutory speedy trial period and, consistent with the Legislature's directive, Queen must be discharged from liability on the charges.
The basic facts of the crime are straightforward: After Queen was kicked out of a Eudora bar, he shot and killed a bouncer, Bo Hopson. He also tried to shoot two other people but failed when his gun jammed.
Queen ended up at the bar after an evening of drinking in celebration of his birthday. Queen became upset when he perceived the female bartender was ignoring him. He shouted profanities and slurs. Bar staff and other patrons, including Hopson, ultimately escorted him outside. Once outside, a scuffle broke out between Queen and others that was quickly broken up. Queen was separated from the group; Hopson remained nearby and asked Queen if he was OK and if he needed a ride. Queen sat by himself, undisturbed, for a few minutes before pulling out a gun and firing, shooting Hopson in the chest. Queen tried to shoot two other patrons, but the gun misfired. Several patrons jumped in and beat Queen into unconsciousness, restraining him until police arrived. Hopson died the next day.
Speedy trial facts
The State charged Queen with premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. Queen was unable to post bond and remained in custody throughout the proceedings. A Douglas County District Court judge arraigned Queen on October 31, 2017, and he pleaded not guilty to all charges. The Douglas County District Court judge then discussed scheduling the trial with the attorneys. The prosecutor told the court it would be difficult to schedule witnesses and jurors during the week of March 19th because that week coincided with spring break for both the University of Kansas and Lawrence public schools.
The judge then had the following discussion with the attorneys:
After scheduling the trial, the court scheduled a pretrial motion hearing for February 23, with a January 31 deadline for filing motions. The court also scheduled a status conference for March 16. No party requested a continuance between the arraignment and the April 2 trial date.
The court and the prosecutor incorrectly stated that the speedy trial deadline was April 30. The correct deadline was March 30. On the morning of the April 2 trial date—153 days after arraignment—Queen filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice based on a speedy trial violation. Queen noted he had continually been in custody, which meant the State had 150 days after arraignment to bring him to trial or the speedy trial statute required the court to release him from custody.
The judge released the jurors and allowed the State to respond. The State cited K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402(e)(4), the so-called crowded docket exception, which allows for a one-time, 30-day continuance if "because of other cases pending for trial, the court does not have sufficient time to commence the trial." The State also argued that the defense acquiesced to the speedy trial violation by affirming that counsel was available for an April 2 trial setting.
The district court judge denied Queen's motion to dismiss. In so doing, the judge acknowledged the error in stating that the April 30 date was the speedy trial date. But the judge also faulted defense counsel for failing to correct the error, saying that attorneys have a duty of candor to correct false statements of law or fact. The judge also said that the crowded docket exception allowed the court to extend the speedy trial period. The judge acknowledged there had been no findings made about the crowded docket when the trial was scheduled, but the fact that the judge had scheduling conflicts was implicit because the trial would have been scheduled earlier had the calendar allowed for it. At the same time, however, the judge said that had the court been aware of the correct speedy trial date, the judge could have rearranged the schedule to accommodate Queen's trial.
The judge rescheduled Queen's trial, and ultimately a jury found Queen guilty of intentional second-degree murder, one count of attempted second-degree murder, and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The district court judge sentenced Queen to 226 months in prison with a postrelease supervision period of 36 months.
The right to a speedy trial predates nationhood, and our country's founders enshrined it in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Likewise, our state founders adopted the right in § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. See In re Trull , 133 Kan. 165, 167, 298 P. 775 (1931) (). This court has described the right as that of an accused to be free from living indefinitely under a cloud of suspicion:
" ‘This constitutional provision, adopted from the old common law, is intended to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecutions suspended over him for an indefinite time; and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, by imposing on the judicial tribunals an obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal accusations.’ " In re Trull , 133 Kan. at 169, 298 P. 775.
Neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial. Instead, to determine whether a delay violates the speedy trial right granted by both Constitutions, courts consider four nonexclusive factors: (1) the delay's length, (2) the cause of the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted the right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. State v. Owens , 310 Kan. 865, 869, 451 P.3d 467 (2019) (citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 [1972] ). Queen has not argued the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial or that he could meet his burden to establish any of these factors.
Queen instead exclusively relies on Kansas' speedy trial statute. Unlike the constitutional provisions, it sets specific time requirements for bringing a defendant to trial within 150 days if a defendant remains in jail and 180 days if a defendant makes bond. The State has the burden of meeting the time requirement, and the defendant does not have to assert the right. State v. Dreher , 239 Kan. 259, 260, 717 P.2d 1053 (1986).
If the State fails to bring the defendant to trial by the deadline, the defendant is "entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402(a). Stated more colloquially, the defendant receives a get out of jail free card. But the statute contains exceptions that allow for extensions of the time requirements for various reasons. These exceptions apply, for example, if the defendant causes the delay or the court orders a competency evaluation, declares a mistrial, grants a continuance because of a problem in securing evidence, or grants a continuance because of the court's crowded docket.
Here, the parties agree that Queen was in custody and the 150-day speedy trial period in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402(a) thus applies. They also agree the State did not bring him to trial until 153 days after his arraignment. This means the court must order Queen's release from prison and his discharge from the charges unless an exception applies. The district court judge determined two exceptions applied. First, ...
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State v. Foster
...the court cannot accommodate a new trial date within the speedy trial deadline before the provision can apply. Cf. State v. Queen , 313 Kan. 12, 22, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021).Another panel of this court has interpreted the crowded docket exception the same way we do, under almost identical circu......
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State v. Shockley
...of that burden defined by statute. The burden does not shift even when a delay is attributed to the court. State v. Queen , 313 Kan. 12, 24-25, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021). When the defendant chooses to modify the parameters of that burden, as he often has good reason to do, he must be clear.The d......
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State v. Bates
...as such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might regard as sufficient to support a conclusion. State v. Queen , 313 Kan. 12, 20, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021). Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess credibility of witnesses when assessing the district court's findings......
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State v. Foster
...cannot accommodate a new trial date within the speedy trial deadline before the provision can apply. Cf. State v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12, 22, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021). Another panel of this court has interpreted the crowded docket exception the same way we do, under almost identical circumstances. ......