City of East Cleveland v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 11 January 1974
• Parties: , 69 O.O.2d 6 CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND, Appellee, v. PALMER, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 10

40 Ohio App.2d 10

317 N.E.2d 246, 69 O.O.2d 6

CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND, Appellee, v. PALMER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Jan. 11, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Codified Ordinance 351.14(a) of the City of East Cleveland imposing an overnight parking ban represents a constitutional exercise of power of local self-government sanctioned under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio.

2. A municipality may adopt and enforce local parking regualtions without posting signs providing notice of such regulations, R.C. 4511.07.

3. The posting of signs is not a constitutional prerequisite to the adoption and enforcement of a municipal ordinance which bans overnight parking on a community-wide basis.

Warner Jackson, Cleveland, for appellee.

Woodle, Wachtel, Begam & Wolk, Cleveland, for appellant.

JACKSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction and a fine levied for the violation of Section 351.14(a) of the Codified Ordinances of the City of East Cleveland, commonly known as the 'overnight parking ban.' Appellant briefs five errors.

In

this first assignment of error, appellant claims that 'Section 351.14 of the Codified Ordinances of the plaintiff city is unconstitutional and void.' Subsection (a) of Codified Ordinance 351.14 of the City of East Cleveland states:

Parking more than five hours prohibited.

'No vehicle shall park, stop, stand or be permitted to remain on any street in the City longer than five hours between 10:00 p. m. and 8:00 a. m. of the following day, except on streets where it is determined that off-street parking facilities are not adequate and which have been designated by the City Manager. However, on such streets so designated by the City Manager, no vehicle shall park, stop, stand or be permitted to remain for a period in excess of twenty-four consecutive hours.'

Appellant asserts that this ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable because it permits a motor vehicle to be parked in one place for nineteen consecutive hours during the day and early evening when the volume of traffic is the greatest while forbidding the same motor vehicle to be parked in the same place for more than five hours during a time when traffic is very light.

The Constitution of the state of Ohio, Section 3, Article XVIII states:

'Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.'

A duly enacted municipal ordinance is presumed constitutional, and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of such an ordinance is upon the one challenging its validity. Alice Realty, Inc., v. City of Columbus (1957), 76 Ohio Law Abst. 311, 314, 146 N.E.2d 628; Cleveland v. Antonio (1955), 100 Ohio App. 334, 124 N.E.2d 846. Local authorities, charged with the enactment of municipal ordinances, are presumed to be familiar with local conditions and to know the needs of the community. Allion v. City of Toledo (1919), 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 N.E. 237.

A local ordinance is valid unless it clearly bears no real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare or is unreasonable and arbitrary. Ghaster Properties, Inc., v. Preston, Dir. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328; Curtiss v. City of Cleveland (1959), 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682; Benjamin v. City of Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854.

Applying these legal principles we find that appellant has not rebutted the presumption of constitutionality properly given Codified Ordinance 351.14(a). Merely showing that the traffic is lighter between the hours of 10:00 p. m. and 8:00 a. m. does not make the questioned ordinance arbitrary or unreasonable. One valid reason for treating these hours differently, as suggested by the appellee, is that there is a greater incidence of auto tamperings, auto thefts or other related crimes at night than during the day. Other possible justifications for this ordinance are, undoubtedly, too numerous to mention. Suffice it to say that the record does not demonstrate that the questioned ordinance is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable or that it bears no substantial relation to the health, welfare, morals, or safety of the citizens of the community. Consequently, this assignment is not well taken and overruled.

In his second assignment of error appellant contends that '(n)o parking regulation may be enforced and no person may be lawfully charged with a violation of such regulation unless wand until signs have been posted at appropriate places where such regulation is intended to be in effect, reasonably calculated to inform the public of such parking regulation.'

The record reveals that no signs informing persons of the overnight parking ban have been posted in the City of East Cleveland. Appellant submits that the absence of such signs renders the ordinance in question unconstitutional. For the reasons given below, we disagree.

R.C. 4511.07 states, in part:

'Section 4511.01 to 4511.78, inclusive, 4511.99 and 4513.01 to 4513.37, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not prevent local authorities from carrying out the following activities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power:

'(A) Regulating the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles, trackless trolleys, and streetcars; (emphasis added) * * *

'No ordinance or regulation enacted under divisions (D), (E), (F), (G), or (I) of this section shall be effective until signs giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrance to the highway or part thereof affected, as may be most appropriate.

'No ordinance or regulation enacted under division (J) of this section shall be effective until signs giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted wherever a through highway enters a municipal corporation, and at the entrances to highways or streets leading from freeway exits.'

Conspicuously absent from that portion of R.C. 4511.07 requiring the posting of signs is any mention of subsection (A), dealing with parking regulations. Applying the maximum...