City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co.
Decision Date | 20 November 1981 |
Docket Number | A,No. 54510,No. 514,514,54510 |
Citation | 429 N.E.2d 492,57 Ill.Dec. 594,87 Ill.2d 42 |
Parties | , 57 Ill.Dec. 594 The CITY OF EAST PEORIA, Appellee, v. GROUP FIVE DEVELOPMENT CO. et al. (Community College Districtppellant). |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Mishael O. Gard and Frederick A. Johnson, of Swain, Johnson & Gard, Peoria, for appellant.
Samuel G. Harrod and Daniel M. Harrod, of Harrod Law Firm, P. C., Eureka, for appellee.
The City of East Peoria (City) filed a petition to construct a local improvement for road purposes across land partly owned by the appellant, Community College District No. 514 (District). The circuit court of Tazewell County dismissed the City's petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded (90 Ill.App.3d 729, 46 Ill.Dec. 32, 413 N.E.2d 472), holding that sections 9-2-14 and 9-2-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 24, pars. 9-2-14, 9-2-15) authorized the City to take public property for the purpose of a local improvement. We granted leave to appeal.
There is but one issue: May the City, under the Code, condemn property already devoted to a public use?
Pursuant to an ordinance adopted on January 2, 1979, the City sought to construct a new four-lane highway as a local improvement. Construction of the highway would be financed by a special assessment. The proposed improvement would extend over two miles of land, part of which was owned by the District, a body corporate and politic of the State of Illinois.
The City filed a petition in the circuit court requesting, inter alia, that the court ascertain the just compensation for property to be taken or damaged in connection with the local improvement. One of the party defendants was the District. Pursuant to the District's motion to dismiss, the court dismissed the City's petition on the ground that it lacked authority to condemn public property for local improvements. The city's subsequent motion to vacate this order was denied, and it appealed.
The appellate court held that the legislature could, and did, authorize the taking of public property by one governmental unit from another. It did so on the basis that in 1933, the legislature amended sections of "An Act concerning local improvements" (Act) to include the words "or public" property.
The District argues that property already devoted to a public use cannot be taken unless the legislature expressly, or by necessary implication, indicates this intent.
The City contends that the legislature, by including the words "or public," expressed a clear intent to allow municipalities to condemn property devoted to public use. It asserts there is no other reasonable explanation for including the words "or public."
When originally adopted, the Act provided for the assessment of just compensation where a municipality condemned private property for the purpose of local improvements. The Act was interpreted as only granting authority for the taking of private property. (City of Moline v. Greene (1911), 252 Ill. 475, 479, 96 N.E. 911.) Subsequent cases adhered to this rule. (See, e. g., City of Chicago v. Roth (1929), 334 Ill. 132, 134, 165 N.E. 627.) Since the taking power under the Act was deemed general, public property could not be subject to condemnation. "The general rule is, that such (public) property cannot be taken and appropriated to another and different use unless the legislative intent to so take it has been manifested in express terms or by necessary implication." (City of Moline v. Greene (1911), 252 Ill. 475, 477, 96 N.E. 911; see Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Ells (1962), 23 Ill.2d 619, 620, 179 N.E.2d 679.) Although the Act did not provide for the taking of public property, there was no question that the legislature had authority to allow municipalities to condemn property devoted to a public use. 252 Ill. 475, 477, 96 N.E. 911. See City of Edwardsville v. County of Madison (1911), 251 Ill. 265, 267, 96 N.E. 238.
In 1933, the legislature amended certain sections of the Act so as to insert the words "or public" to modify the word "property." The amended provisions, inter alia, were codified in the 1961 Code as sections 9-2-14 and 9-2-15. These sections provide, in relevant part:
Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 24, 9-2-14.
(Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 24, par. 9-2-15.
It is well settled that, in construing a statute, the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill.2d 136, 139, 5 Ill.Dec. 262, 361 N.E.2d 585.) The intent of the legislature should be determined and given effect. (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill.2d 342, 350, 167...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Estate of Pirie, Matter of
...445 N.E.2d 374), and the statutory language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co. (1981), 87 Ill.2d 42, 57 Ill.Dec. 594, 429 N.E.2d 492.) When the legislative intent can be ascertained from the statutory language, it will be given......
-
Zimmerman for Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie
...reason to know" phrase and replaced it with a willful and wanton misconduct standard. See City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co., 87 Ill.2d 42, 46, 57 Ill.Dec. 594, 429 N.E.2d 492 (1981) ("In ascertaining legislative intent, courts may consider subsequent amendments to a However,......
-
The Vill. of WOODRIDGE v. The Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. HIGH Sch. Dist. 99
...and that a municipality may take public land only when a statute expressly authorizes it. City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co., 87 Ill.2d 42, 45, 57 Ill.Dec. 594, 429 N.E.2d 492 (1981). As we discuss later, however, that express grant of power is found in section 11-61-2 of the......
-
Clayton v. Village of Oak Park
...(Mo.1974), 517 S.W.2d 129, 132), and that the term is to be used in its ordinary sense. (City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co. (1981), 87 Ill.2d 42, 46, 57 Ill.Dec. 594, 429 N.E.2d 492.) The word "business" has been defined as " 'any particular occupation or employment, habitual......