City of Edmond v. Wakefield

• Decision Date: 01 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 46746,46746
• Parties: The CITY OF EDMOND, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, and the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension and Retirement Fund for the City of Edmond, Oklahoma, Appellants, v. Harry E. WAKEFIELD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1211

537 P.2d 1211

The CITY OF EDMOND, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, and the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension and Retirement Fund for the City of Edmond, Oklahoma, Appellants, v. Harry E. WAKEFIELD et al., Appellees.

No. 46746.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 1, 1975.

Robert T. Rice, City Atty., Edmond, Jerry Crabb, Asst. City Atty., Oklahoma City, for appellants.

Don J. Harr, Oklahoma City, for appellees.

IRWIN, Justice:

The issue presented concerns the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2.52.220 of the City of Edmond (City). The ordinance provides for the retention of contributions made by policemen to the Police Pension and Retirement Fund (Fund) if policemen resign or are discharged before retirement.

City refused to pay appellees (Policemen), former policemen for City who had either resigned or been discharged, the contributions they had made to the Fund. Policemen brought an action in mandamus to compel the payments on the grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court so found. Judgment was rendered for Policemen and City and Trustees of Fund appeal.

Policemen rely principally upon the following language in 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, § 588b, which states:

'It has been held, at least in the light of the provisions of the particular pension system, that a pension for policemen is a bounty or gratuity, but the contrary has also been held, particularly where the policemen contribute to the pension fund. When services are rendered under a pension statute, it has been held that the pension becomes a part of the contemplated compensation for those services, and in a sense becomes a part of the contract of employment, and, where a city has enforced a pension law and compelled a policeman to contribute to the pension fund for a long period of time, it ought not to be permitted to retain the enforced contribution. * * *.'

Additional language in § 588(b), not cited by Policemen, states:

'The fact that deductions are made from a policeman's salary for the pension fund does not give the policeman a vested right in his contributions to the fund but only the right to receive a pension on such terms and contingencies as the pension system may provide, and he is not entitled to a refund of his contributions where he is separated from the police force under circumstances not entitling him to a pension. It may validly be provided that there will be no refund of the contributions of a policeman who is dismissed from the force.'

Policemen do not claim they were denied any procedural rights and realistically, this appears to be the case. If the ordinance in question deprived no one of constitutionally protected procedural rights, then this Court must concern itself with the issues of the basic fairness and reasonableness of the ordinance. In essence, substantive due process of law, independently of any procedural rights guaranteed by constitutional provisions, is the general requirement that all governmental actions have a fair and reasonable impact on the life, liberty, or property of the person affected. Arbitrary action is thus proscribed. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511--12, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1696--97, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 513--32 n. 4 (1965).

Article II, § 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution, provides that 'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' This section is designed to protect citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state. State v. Parham, Okl., 412 P.2d 142 (1966). Therefore, state statutes which attempt to take away vested property interests (Mitchell v. Williamson, Okl., 304 P.2d 314 (1956)), or work an arbitrary forfeiture of property rights (Williams v. Bailey, Okl., 268 P.2d 868 (1954)), are unconstitutional as violations of due process.

Has City arbitrarily and unreasonably taken Policemen's contributions?

The Police Pension and Retirement System in question was authorized by 11 O.S.1971 § 541 et seq. Section 541k, discussing the refund of contributions, reads as follows:

'* * * Any such city or town is also authorized and empowered to provide in its ordinances relating to its Pension and Retirement System for the return of any contributions made to its Pension and Retirement System by any policeman, pursuant to any agreement made by this Act, or amendments thereto, provided as to contributions by him and other policemen to the funds of such Pension and Retirement System where any such policeman has served in the Police Department of any such city or town for a period of more than one (1) year and contributed to said fund for said period of time and served less than twenty (20) years in police departments of cities and towns of this state having a standard equivalent to that required for eligibility under this Act or amendments thereto. * * *.'

All of the Policemen had served with City for more than one (1) year and have contributed to the pension fund, but none had served a total of twenty (20) years.

City, while adopting a pension system under § 541 et seq., apparently interpreted 'authorized and empowered' as contained in 11 O.S.1971 § 541k to be a discretionary, and not a mandatory, grant of...