City of Enid v. Perb

• Decision Date: 14 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 101,729.,101,729.
• Citation: 2006 OK 16,133 P.3d 281
• Parties: CITY OF ENID, Oklahoma, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

133 P.3d 281

2006 OK 16

CITY OF ENID, Oklahoma, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 101,729.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

March 14, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

On Appeal from the District Court in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma; The Honorable Daniel L. Owens, District Judge.

¶ 0 The City of Enid filed this action against the Public Employees Relations Board, (PERB), and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME), for declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act. The district court held the Act's classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 for collective bargaining purposes was arbitrary, and that the Act constituted a special law in violation of Okla. Const., art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. The court enjoined PERB from administering the Act. AFSCME and PERB both appealed and we have retained the matter.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES.

Tony G. Puckett, Ronald T. Shinn, Jr., McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, OK, for appellee, City of Enid, Oklahoma.

W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Sandra D. Rinehart, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for co-appellant, Public Employees Relations Board.

James R. Moore, Sue Wycoff, James R. Moore & Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for appellant, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.

Diane Pedicord, Sue Ann Nicely, Oklahoma Municipal League, Oklahoma City, OK, for Amicus Curiae Oklahoma Municipal League.

Larry Derryberry, Caleb J. Muckala, Derryberry Quigley Solomon & Naifeh, Oklahoma City, OK, for Amicus Curiae Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma.

PER CURIAM.

¶ 1 The issue before us concerns the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act (hereinafter the Act).¹ We hold that the Act is a general law of state-wide concern that contains a proper and legitimate classification of municipalities with a population greater than 35,000. This population classification bears a reasonable relationship to the Act's objective codified at 11 O.S.Supp.2005, § 51-201, "to promote orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers and their employees." The Act grants municipal employees of these municipalities the right to organize and choose representation for collective bargaining, and requires these municipal employers to recognize, negotiate and bargain with the employees' chosen representatives.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 The legislature passed the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act during its 2004 session. Administered by the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB),² the Act defines municipal employers as municipalities³ with populations greater than 35,000.⁴ The parties agree that it currently applies to eleven municipalities in Oklahoma. The classification remains fluid. When municipalities reach the requisite number of residents, the Act applies.

¶ 3 Appellant, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee, (hereinafter Union) requested certification from PERB to represent the City of Enid's qualifying employees when the Act became effective (November 1, 2004). PERB gave notice of Union's request to the City of Enid and directed the City of Enid to post the notice on November 4, 2004. PERB's emergency rules provide it must certify Union as representative of the City of Enid's municipal employees unless PERB receives a request from another union within fifteen days. On November 19, 2004, the City of Enid filed an action against PERB and Union for a temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctions, and declaratory judgment that the Act was special legislation which violated Okla. Const. art. 5, §§ 46 and 59, and also violated art. 18, § 3(a).

¶ 4 The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 22, 2004. Subsequently, the City of Enid filed a motion for summary judgment that the court ultimately granted. The basis for summary judgment was the court's determination the Act's classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 for collective bargaining purposes was arbitrary and thus constituted a special law in violation of art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. The court reasoned that it was not impossible to design a general law, and issued a permanent injunction against PERB. We retained the appeal. Oral argument was heard on May 10, 2005.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 The issue of the Act's constitutionality is a legal determination. "An appellate court claims for itself plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to re-examine a trial court's legal rulings." Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22, n. 30, 989 P.2d 448, 456, n. 30. Summary judgment is appropriate where it appears there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Daugherty v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 1984 OK 72, ¶ 5, 689 P.2d 947, 949; Crockett v. McKenzie, 1994 OK 3, ¶ 3, 867 P.2d 463, 464. "[T]he inquiry on appeal concerning the propriety of the entry of summary judgment is limited to potential controversies concerning any issue raised by the pleadings." Wabaunsee v. Harris, 1980 OK 52, ¶ 9, 610 P.2d 782, 785. An order that grants summary relief disposes of legal issues. Therefore, on appeal, the review we conduct is de novo. Brown v. Nicholson, 1997 OK 32, ¶ 5, n. 1, 935 P.2d 319, 321, n. 1; Manley, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22, n. 30, 989 P.2d at 456, n. 30. Accordingly, our standard of review regarding the trial court's order in the instant case is de novo. The burden is on the City of Enid, the entity challenging the Act, to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Act is unconstitutional. See, Hamilton v. City of Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, ¶ 15, 527 P.2d 14, 17, citing and quoting Isaacs v. Oklahoma City, 1966 OK 267, 437 P.2d 229. Otherwise, we will not disturb the presumption of the Act's validity.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶ 6 The City of Enid contends the Act is a special law in violation of Okla. Const., art. 5, § 46, and is unconstitutional under art. 18, § 3(a), which allows charter cities autonomous self-governance under the home rule doctrine. It also argues the Act creates a class that lacks a reasonable relation to the Act's subject, in violation of Okla. const., art. 5, § 59. The district court did not address the art. 18, § 3(a) issue in its summary judgment order, from which the instant matter arises, as it was unnecessary for the district court to reach that issue because that court found the Act unconstitutional as a special law.

A. Oklahoma Const. art. 5, § 46

¶ 7 The question for an art. 5, § 46 inquiry is whether the statute at issue is a special or general law. Section 46 enumerates twenty-eight areas in which the legislature is prohibited from passing local or special laws, unless otherwise allowed by another provision in the Oklahoma Constitution.⁵ As pertinent to our analysis herein the prohibition concerns the regulation of the affairs of municipalities.

¶ 8 Since the Act concerns the regulation of certain labor issues of larger municipalities, we determine that the Act indeed concerns one of the twenty-eight subjects set forth in § 46. We must determine whether the legislation at issue is a special or local law. See e.g., Grant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2000 OK 41, ¶ 5, 5 P.3d 594, 597, citing Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 14, 760 P.2d 816, 822, Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 38, 41 P. 635, 639. A general law "relates to persons or things as a class rather than relating to particular persons or things." Grant, 2000 OK 41, ¶ 5, 5 P.3d at 597, citing Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 14, 760 P.2d at 822. General laws need not operate upon every locality in the state, "but must apply equally to all classes similarly situated, and apply to like conditions and subjects." Grable v. Childers, 1936 OK 273, ¶ 6, 56 P.2d 357, 360. A special law relates to "a part of the entire class of similarly affected persons" and "separate[s] [that part] for different treatment." Grant, 2000 OK 41, ¶ 5, 5 P.3d at 597, citing Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 14, 760 P.2d at 822.

¶ 9 Under Reynolds, we identify the class by tests developed for each particular subject enumerated in art. 5 § 46. Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 18, n. 36, 760 P.2d at 823, n. 36. This Court recognized in Reynolds that civil actions may be classified into specific categories of tort actions of a similar nature for statute of limitation purposes, and that doing so would not a fortiori constitute a special or local law that would violate the strictures contained in § 46. See, Reynolds, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 18, 760 P.2d at 823. The Court stated at footnote 36 that "[t]he test we adopt for identifying the class in measuring the validity of a civil action's limitation by the strictures in § 46 is not necessarily applicable to other subjects enumerated in that section." Reynolds did not concern a population-based statute, and in no way precludes the classification of cities into similarly situated municipalities based on population when the legislature, in its wisdom, has a legitimate, reasonable and rational reason to do so.

¶ 10 The City of Enid asks us to interpret art. 5, § 46 in regard to the collective bargaining Act involved here, as an absolute bar, prohibiting legislative regulation of some but not all municipalities. Such an interpretation is unwarranted and is not consistent with our previous case law as to what is or is not considered a general law.

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