City of Eugene v. Lincoln
Decision Date | 24 July 2002 |
Citation | 183 Or. App. 36,50 P.3d 1253 |
Parties | CITY OF EUGENE, Respondent, v. Chelsea Knox LINCOLN, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Howard S. Lichtig, Port Orford, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Lisa Johnson, Certified Law Student.
Jeffery J. Matthews, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C.
Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and BREWER and SCHUMAN, Judges.
Defendant refused to obey an order to leave the Lane County Fairgrounds where she was protesting the treatment of circus animals and subsequently was convicted in Eugene Municipal Court for violating Eugene's criminal trespass ordinance. On de novo review, the Lane County Circuit Court rejected a variety of constitutional defenses and affirmed the conviction. Defendant appeals, and we reverse.
Although neither the municipal court nor the circuit court made findings, the material facts are not disputed. On March 20, 2000, a circus came to the Lane County Fairgrounds in Eugene. It drew, in addition to patrons, some 30 protestors, including defendant, demonstrating against the allegedly cruel and dangerous treatment of circus animals. At the first of three scheduled performances, protesters formed a corridor along both sides of a line leading from the parking lot to the ticket booth. They carried signs and spoke to patrons, some of whom spoke back. Tensions increased. One patron told a member of the Eugene Police Department, on hand to keep order, that unless the officer did something about the protesters, the patron himself would. This threat was never carried out. Although the exchanges between protesters and patrons became heated, no violence occurred, and the first performance proceeded without fights, arrests, or other incidents.
The Eugene police officers present, in consultation with fairgrounds officials, decided that the situation at the first performance had been so volatile that they would take preemptive measures to prevent violence and harassment when patrons lined up for tickets to the second show, scheduled for three o'clock. Accordingly, they decided to keep protesters behind barriers that created a seven-foot-wide corridor for patrons between the parking lot and the ticket booth. Before patrons or protesters began to arrive, however, the officers and officials decided that this arrangement would probably cause a bottleneck and create more problems than it would fix. They decided instead to require the protesters to move to a spot outside the fairgrounds next to the gate through which most of the cars had to pass in order to enter the fairgrounds parking lot.
When the protesters began to arrive, a fairgrounds official told them of this decision and warned them that, if they did not obey the directive to leave, they would be arrested for trespass. Some protesters obeyed; defendant did not. Instead, she seated herself on the curb just outside of the barricaded corridor where it met the parking lot, partially obstructing the corridor but not blocking it, and, as a protest, read aloud from the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion in one of the Whiffen v. Lloyd Center cases. Once again, a fairgrounds official told her she would be arrested if she did not leave. A police officer told her the same thing. She did not leave and was arrested without a struggle.
The city charged defendant with violation of Eugene City Code (ECC) 4.807, which provides:
"A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises."
To "[e]nter or remain unlawfully" means "[t]o fail to leave premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed to do so by the person in charge." ECC 4.805. The trial took place in Eugene Municipal Court. After losing her motions to dismiss based on state and federal free speech and equal protection grounds, as well as a motion to present the jury with arguments explaining and urging "jury nullification," defendant was convicted. She appealed to the Lane County Circuit Court, where her case was tried de novo. Once again she made and lost her constitutional motions. Subsequently, she waived her right to a jury trial and was convicted and sentenced to one day in jail. On appeal, she renews her constitutional and jury nullification arguments.
We begin with defendant's free speech argument, in particular with her argument based on Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157, 160, 838 P.2d 558 (1992) ( ). That section provides:
"No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."
ECC 4.805 and ECC 4.807 together amount to a law addressing a harm that the city may regulate (remaining on public property contrary to an official's lawful request to leave) without specifying that the harm could be caused by expression; indeed, the ordinances do not refer to expression at all. Therefore, under the familiar analytical framework first set out in State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982), the ordinances are not facially unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, which is to say that the city's lawmakers did not violate Article I, section 8, by enacting them. The only Article I, section 8, claim that defendant can assert is that the city's officers and prosecutors violated her rights under that section in applying the ordinances against her under the circumstances of this particular case. Robertson, 293 Or. at 417, 649 P.2d 569. She could also raise a facial challenge, not under Article I, section 8, but alleging that the ordinances are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the federal Due Process Clause or state guarantees against unequal treatment or ex post facto laws. Id. at 408-09, 649 P.2d 569. Defendant, however, explicitly disavows all facial challenges.
The decision not to challenge the ordinances facially, however, opens the door to the city's argument that this court is left with no basis for overturning the conviction. This argument rests on ORS 221.360, which provides:
According to the city's interpretation of the last sentence, an issue as to whether an ordinance is applied constitutionally is not "an issue as to the constitutionality of the * * * ordinance"; rather, it is an issue as to the constitutionality of particular governmental action in a particular situation. Therefore, the city contends, because defendant concedes the only issue we are allowed to decide, we must affirm.
We are not persuaded. The distinction between "facial" and "as-applied" challenges is based not on the validity of the government action involved but on whether the agent of the invalid action happens to be legislative as opposed to executive. A facial challenge asserts that lawmakers violated the constitution when they enacted the ordinance; an as-applied challenge asserts that executive officials, including police and prosecutors, violated the constitution when they enforced the ordinance. Both challenges equally attack the constitutionality of the ordinance. In fact, we have frequently reviewed as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of municipal ordinances where the challenge arose first in municipal court, most recently in City of Eugene v. Lee, 177 Or. App. 492, 494, 34 P.3d 690 (2001). In that case, we explicitly said that we could, "pursuant to ORS 221.360, * * * review * * * the constitutionality of [an] ordinance as applied to defendant."
Further, even if the word "constitutionality" in the last sentence of ORS 221.360 means "facial constitutionality," our decisional authority would not be limited in this case. The mandate to limit our review to constitutional issues is conditional and not absolute: The limits apply only "[w]here the right of appeal * * * depends upon there being involved an issue as to the constitutionality of the * * * ordinance." Id. To understand this limitation, we must note two inferences to be drawn from ORS 221.360 and ORS 221.359. The first is that some cities could have ordinances "prohibiting appeals from the municipal court because of the amount of the penalty." ORS 221.360.1 The second inference is that the phrase "appellate court" in these statutes refers not only to the Court of Appeals but also to the circuit court when it hears an appeal from municipal court. See, e.g., ORS 221.359(1)(b) ( ). With those inferences in mind, the meaning of the last sentence in ORS 221.360 and its function in the appellate process from municipal court convictions becomes clear.
ORS 221.359 provides generally that a conviction in municipal court for violating an ordinance can be appealed to circuit court:
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