City of Fargo v. Wieland
| Decision Date | 22 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20200100,20200100 |
| Citation | 946 N.W.2d 695 |
| Parties | CITY OF FARGO, a political subdivision of the State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Karen C. WIELAND, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Jane L. Dynes, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Jonathan T. Garaas, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
[¶1] Karen Wieland appeals from a district court's order denying her motion seeking post-judgment interest in an eminent domain action. Wieland contends that post-judgment interest is payable subsequent to a political subdivision's deposit of the full amount of the judgment under N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29 when a property owner appeals from the judgment in eminent domain proceedings. We affirm.
[¶2] On January 19, 2019, the district court entered a judgment awarding Wieland $850,000 as just compensation for the taking of her property. The following day, the City of Fargo deposited $850,000 with the Cass County Clerk of Court. On March 13, 2019, the district court amended the judgment to include an additional $89,044.32 for attorney fees and costs. That same day, the City deposited an additional $89,044.32 with the Cass County Clerk of Court.
[¶3] Wieland appealed from the amended judgment. City of Fargo v. Wieland , 2019 ND 286, 936 N.W.2d 55. In her prior appeal, Wieland argued the eminent domain action should be dismissed because the City failed to pay or deposit post-judgment interest subsequent to the City depositing the full amount of the judgment in court. Id. ¶ 26. We concluded there was no authority that required dismissal of an eminent domain action upon a political subdivision's failure to pay or deposit post-judgment interest subsequent to the deposit of the full amount of the judgment in court. Id. ¶ 28. We affirmed the district court's amended judgment awarding Wieland $939,044.32 for just compensation and attorney's fees in the eminent domain action. Id. ¶ 30. Our decision was limited to Wieland's request to dismiss the proceedings in their entirety.
[¶4] In the prior appeal we noted the existence of a potential issue of whether a landowner who appeals a judgment in eminent domain proceedings, without accepting or withdrawing deposited funds, is entitled to post-judgment interest subsequent to the deposit of the full amount of the judgment in court. Wieland , 2019 ND 286, ¶ 29, 936 N.W.2d 55. Immediately after identifying that potential issue, this Court noted the following: "[b]ecause Wieland has not raised this issue with the district court and briefed it for our review, we decline to expand Wieland's request for relief beyond her argument this action must be dismissed due to the City's failure to pay or deposit post-judgment interest." Id.
[¶5] Following the issuance of the mandate by the Court in the prior appeal, Wieland moved pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29 for payment of the original amended judgment that had been deposited by the City in court, plus any accrued post-judgment interest. The district court denied the request for post-judgment interest after determining the accrual of interest was suspended once the City deposited the original amended judgment amount with the court and that it did not have the authority to further amend the judgment after this Court's affirmance of the original amended judgment without remand on the prior appeal. Wieland appealed the denial of her request for post-judgment interest and now raises the issue we left unaddressed in the prior appeal: whether a landowner who appeals an award in eminent domain proceedings, without accepting or withdrawing deposited funds, is entitled to the payment of post-judgment interest subsequent to the deposit of the full amount of the judgment.
[¶6] The City seeks to dismiss Wieland's appeal, arguing that Wieland's appeal is not authorized by law. Rule 27(f) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the filing of a motion to dismiss an appeal to assert the appeal is not authorized by law. IRET Props. LP v. Williams Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs , 2018 ND 223, ¶ 5, 918 N.W.2d 56. Appeals authorized by law are defined under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02.
[¶7] The City contends that Wieland's appeal is not authorized by law because Wieland's request for post-judgment interest was foreclosed by our prior affirmance of the judgment without remanding any issues back to the district court. Relying on the law of the case doctrine, the City argues the post-judgment interest issue was either resolved, or could have been resolved, in the prior appeal. "Under the law of the case doctrine, when an appellate court has ruled on a legal question and remanded matter to the lower court, the legal question addressed becomes the law of the case and will not be modified on a subsequent appeal in the same case." Thompson v. Johnson, 2019 ND 111, ¶ 12, 926 N.W.2d 120 (citing Riverwood Commercial Park, L.L.C. v. Standard Oil Co., Inc. , 2007 ND 36, ¶ 12, 729 N.W.2d 101 ).
[¶8] In the prior appeal, we declined to expand Wieland's post-judgment interest argument beyond her request for dismissal of an eminent domain proceeding based on a political subdivision's failure to deposit post-judgment interest. Wieland , 2019 ND 286, ¶ 29, 936 N.W.2d 55. However, we recognized the open issue of whether a landowner who appeals an award in eminent domain proceedings, in lieu of accepting or withdrawing deposited funds, is entitled to the payment of post-judgment interest. Id. ¶ 29. At the time of the prior appeal, the district court had not been asked to consider whether the accrual of post-judgment interest was authorized by statute. Wieland's appeal does not raise an issue that had been decided by the district court before the prior appeal and this Court left the issue unaddressed in the prior appeal. Under the circumstances of this case we deny the City's motion to dismiss this appeal as not authorized by law.
[¶9] Wieland contends she is entitled to post-judgment interest on the underlying eminent domain award. The City asserts that it satisfied its obligation to Wieland when it deposited with the court the full amount required by the amended judgment as provided by N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29. Wieland counters that the City's interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29 would place landowners in an untenable position, forcing landowners to choose between withdrawing the deposit and foregoing an appeal except for a claim to greater compensation, or initiating an appeal that preserves all of the potential issues without withdrawing the deposited funds and foregoing the accrual of interest on the deposit or the use of the funds.
[¶10] This Court has previously recognized that a judgment debtor has the "power to suspend the accrual of interest while the appeal was pending by tendering the amount of the original judgment into court." Gonzalez v. Tounjian , 2004 ND 156, ¶ 16, 684 N.W.2d 653. "Any perceived inequity in allowing an appealing party to collect interest during the pendency of an unsuccessful appeal is ameliorated by the ability of the appellee to tender the amount of the judgment into court and thereby stop the accrual of interest." Dick v. Dick , 434 N.W.2d 557, 559 (N.D. 1989). We conclude, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the accrual of interest was suspended by the City's deposit of the judgment amount.
[¶11] Section 32-15-29, N.D.C.C., provides the post-judgment procedure for providing payment to a landowner in eminent domain proceedings, defines when the political subdivision can take possession of the landowner's property, and defines the landowner's rights in the event of an appeal. Section 32-15-29 reads as follows:
At any time after the entry of judgment, whenever the plaintiff shall have paid to the defendant, or into court for the defendant, the full amount of the judgment, the district court in which the proceeding was tried, upon notice of not less than three days, may authorize the plaintiff to take possession of and use the property during the pendency of and until the final conclusion of the litigation and, if necessary, may stay all actions and proceedings against the plaintiff on account thereof. The defendant, who is entitled to the money paid into court for the defendant upon judgment, shall be entitled to demand and receive the same at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order therefor from the court. The court, or a judge thereof, upon application made by such defendant, shall order and direct that the money so paid into court for the defendant be delivered to the defendant upon the defendant's filing a satisfaction of the judgment, or upon the defendant's filing a receipt therefor and an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding except as to the amount of damages that the defendant may be entitled to in the event that a new trial shall be granted. A payment to a defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by the defendant, except the defendant's claim for greater compensation.
N.D.C.C. § 32-15-29.
[¶12] "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal." State v. Foster , 2020 ND 85, ¶ 26, 942 N.W.2d 829 (quoting State v. Haugen , 2007 ND 195, ¶ 7, 742 N.W.2d 796 ). "This Court's primary purpose when interpreting a statute is to determine legislative intent." Herman v. Herman , 2019 ND 248, ¶ 8, 934 N.W.2d 874 (citing State v. Bearrunner , 2019 ND 29, ¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 894 ). "Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears." Id. (citing N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 ). "When the wording of a statute is unambiguous, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Haggard v. Meier , 368 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1985) (citing N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 ). It is improper for the Court to attempt to construe a statutory provision so as to legislate...
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