City of Farmington v. Pinon-Garcia
Decision Date | 14 May 2012 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 30,888,Opinion Number: 2012-NMCA-079 |
Parties | CITY OF FARMINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN A. PINON-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Certiorari Granted, August 3, 2012, No. 33,650; Certiorari Granted, August 3, 2012, No. 33,676
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
William Cooke, Deputy City Attorney
Jennifer Breakell, Assistant City Attorney
for Appellee
Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{1} In this case, we address both the standard and scope of review by the district court when a de novo appeal is taken from a lower court case that is not of record. The municipal court dismissed Defendant's charges with prejudice because the arresting officer was unavailable for trial in the lower court. The City of Farmington (City) then filed an appeal to the district court pursuant to Rule 8-703(A) and (J) NMRA. The record indicates that the district court conducted the de novo trial without properly considering the propriety of themunicipal court's dismissal. Defendant was convicted in the district court and filed this appeal. We reverse and remand to the district court for a de novo hearing.
{2} The City charged Defendant with various traffic violations, including driving while intoxicated (DWI), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (2008) (amended 2010). Defendant was arraigned in municipal court. On the day set for trial, the City's main witness, the arresting officer, failed to appear. As a result, the municipal court dismissed Defendant's charges with prejudice.
{3} The City filed an appeal in district court seeking a de novo trial. See Rule 8-703(A) and (J). At a pretrial hearing, Defendant sought to have the case dismissed contending that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges. The City responded, contending that it had the right to appeal and that it was entitled to a de novo trial. The district court instructed Defendant to file a motion to dismiss.
{4} Defendant filed his motion to dismiss claiming that the district court could only consider the propriety of the municipal court's dismissal and arguing that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges. The City responded claiming that it was entitled to a trial de novo in district court. The City also contended that, given the need for a de novo trial, the district court need not be concerned with the propriety of the municipal court's dismissal so long as Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy is not violated. The district court denied Defendant's motion and set the matter for trial on the merits. Defendant was convicted, and this appeal timely followed his conviction.
{5} The parties agree that the City was entitled to appeal to the district court in this matter. See Rule 8-703(A) ( ); City of Las Cruces v. Sanchez, 2007-NMSC-042, ¶ 20, 142 N.M. 243, 164 P.3d 942. They disagree, however, as to the proper scope of the district court's review, and to what extent the district court should consider the propriety of a municipal court's dismissal.
{6} Defendant makes three arguments, contending: (1) the district court should have conducted some review of the propriety of the dismissal; (2) the district court's review should have been for abuse of discretion; and (3) the district court abused its discretion because dismissal was appropriate in light of the municipal court's needs and the City's failures. The City contends that the district court's standard of review is de novo and also claims that the district court adequately considered the propriety of the municipal court's dismissal before denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.
{7} We agree with the City that de novo review is appropriate on all issues but remand so that the district court can conduct a de novo hearing on whether the municipal court erred in dismissing the charges with prejudice and to insure that Defendant's right to be free fromdouble jeopardy is not violated. Because we are remanding, we will not consider Defendant's third contention that the municipal court was justified in dismissing the charges.
{8} The questions of whether the City was entitled to a de novo trial in district court and whether the district court was required to consider the propriety of the municipal court's dismissal are questions of law which we review de novo. State v. Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824 ().
{9} It is well-established that, except as otherwise provided by law, appeals from lower courts, including the municipal court, are subject to de novo review. See e.g., N.M. Const. art. VI, § 27 (); NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1 (1955) (); Rule 8-703(J) (); Sanchez, 2007-NMSC-042, ¶ 7. Despite this constitutional, statutory, and case authority that mandates de novo review, Defendant claims that the district court should have reviewed the municipal court's dismissal of his case under an abuse of discretion standard of review. He further argues that the municipal court's actions were supported by law because dismissal is an appropriate sanction when the prosecution fails to secure the presence of a witness at trial and, therefore, its ruling should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
{10} As Defendant acknowledges in his reply brief, there are no rules, statutes, or case authorities supporting his position that abuse of discretion is the proper standard. Cf. State v. Begay, 2010-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 16-24, 148 N.M. 685, 241 P.3d 1125 ( ); State v. Garcia, 2003-NMCA-045, ¶ 5, 133 N.M. 444, 63 P.3d 1164 ( ). Additionally, the authorities Defendant does cite in support of his position are inapplicable because they all relate to the standard of review when a court sits as an appellate court in review of proceedings from a court of record. See State v. Candelaria, 2008-NMCA-120, ¶¶ 10, 12, 144 N.M. 797, 192 P.3d 792 ( ); see also Sims v. Ryan, 1998-NMSC-019, ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782 ( ); Rest. Mgmt. Co. v. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc., 1999-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 1, 8, 127 N.M. 708, 986 P.2d 504 ( ). In this case, however, the district court is not being asked to review a matter of record. As a result, de novo review is necessary. See Begay, 2010-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 19-24 ( ); Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, ¶ 9 ( ).
{11} We rely in part on this Court's opinion in State v. Hicks, 105 N.M. 286, 731 P.2d 982 (Ct. App. 1986) to reject Defendant's contention that abuse of discretion is the proper standard for the district court to apply. In Hicks, the metropolitan court dismissed the complaint filed against the defendant because it had not been filed in a timely manner. Id. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983. The district court affirmed the dismissal after finding that the metropolitan court did not abuse its discretion. Id. On appeal, this Court agreed with the state that the district court erred in applying an appellate standard of review. Id. We applied Article VI, Section 27 to reject the defendant's argument that de novo review did not apply merely because the proceedings below were not a "trial" and held that the district court should have made an independent determination of whether dismissal was proper. Hicks, 105 N.M. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983; see also Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, ¶¶ 19-20 ( ).
{12} While acknowledging the holding in Hicks, Defendant asks us to overturn our previous decisions as out of step with the standard of review normally applied to discretionary decisions. We decline to do so and disagree with Defendant's assertion that recent case law suggests applying a different standard of review even if the lower court is not of record. To the contrary, this Court's decision in Begay is a recent conformation of the long-held position that review from lower courts that are not courts of record must be done on a de novo basis. See Begay, 2010-NMCA-089, ¶¶ 19-24. Th...
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