City of Folly Beach v. State ex rel. Connelly
| Docket Number | 2023-UP-284,Appellate Case 2020-000937 |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Parties | City of Folly Beach; Coastal Conservation League; Save Folly Beach, Inc.; John Collins; Matt Napier; Paula Stubblefield; Troy Bode; and Carol Kruer, Appellants, v. State of South Carolina; Amy Connelly; Jeffrey H. Morris; Michael Vandaele; Stephen Rawe; Juan Enterprises, LLC; Juanita A. Wright; Debbie's Folly, LLC; and Vernon Keller Staubes, Jr., as personal representative of the Estate of Vernon Staubes, Defendants, Of which State of South Carolina; Jeffrey H. Morris; Michael Vandaele; Stephen Rawe; Juan Enterprises, LLC; Juanita A. Wright; and Vernon Keller Staubes, Jr., as personal representative of the Estate of Vernon Staubes, are Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard May 11, 2023
Appeal From Charleston County Mikell R. Scarborough Master-in-Equity Amy Elizabeth Armstrong and Leslie S. Lenhardt, both of S.C Environmental Law Project, of Pawleys Island; and Michael Gary Corley, of S.C. Environmental Law Project, of Greenville, for Appellants.
Mary Duncan Shahid and Robert Bruce Wallace, both of Maynard Nexsen, of Charleston, for Respondents Jeffrey H. Morris and Stephen Rawe.
Angelica M. Colwell, of Maynard Nexsen, of Charleston, for Respondent Stephen Rawe.
Gregory Jacobs English, of Wyche Law Firm, of Greenville, for Respondent Juanita A Wright.
Rita Bolt Barker, of Wyche Law Firm, of Greenville, for Respondents Juan Enterprises, LLC, and Juanita A Wright.
Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent State of South Carolina.
Kerry W. Koon, of Kerry W. Koon, Attorney at Law, of Charleston, for Respondent Vernon Keller Staubes, Jr., as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Vernon Staubes.
The City of Folly Beach; Coastal Conservation League; Save Folly Beach, Inc.; John Collins; Matt Napier; Paula Stubblefield Troy Bode; and Carol Kruer (collectively, Appellants) appeal the Master-in-Equity's dismissal of their declaratory judgment action in which they sought a determination that the boundary between public and private property on oceanfront property on Folly Beach is the high water line as it existed before the latest beach renourishment in 2018 and that the State of South Carolina owns portions or all of certain super-beachfront lots. Appellants also sought injunction prohibiting development of these lots.[1] On appeal, Appellants argue the master erred in (1) finding they did not have standing to present their claims to the court; (2) finding they failed to allege a viable cause of action; and (3) dismissing the case because he found they failed to name indispensable parties to the case. We reverse and remand.
Appellants argue the master erred in finding they lacked standing to bring this declaratory judgment action. We agree.
"A motion to dismiss for lack of standing challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction." S.C. Pub Int. Found. v. Wilson, 437 S.C. 334, 340, 878 S.E.2d 891, 894 (2022). "Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which ourt is free to decide with no particular deference to the circuit court." Id. Thus, the appellate court "review[s] the circuit court's findings de novo." Id. "In its most basic sense, '[s]tanding refers to a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.'" Pres. Soc'y of Charleston v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 430 S.C. 200, 209, 845 S.E.2d 481, 486 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Boulware, 422 S.C. 1, 7, 809 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2018)). "To have standing, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit." Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 S.C. 594, 600, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001). "In other words, one must be a real party in interest." Id. "A real party in interest is one who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as opposed to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the action." Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Charleston Cnty. Election Comm'n, 336 S.C. 174, 181, 519 S.E.2d 567, 571 (1999) (quoting Anchor Point, Inc. v. Shoals Sewer Co., 308 S.C. 422, 428, 418 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1992)).
We hold Appellants established they have constitutional standing to bring this action. See Pres. Soc'y of Charleston, 430 S.C. at 209-10, 845 S.E.2d at 486 ("Standing may be acquired (1) by statute, (2) under the principle of 'constitutional standing,' or (3) via the 'public importance' exception to general standing requirements."). For constitutional standing, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing three elements: (1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'"; (2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court'"; (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc., 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291 (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). "The general rule is that a municipality must allege an infringement of its own proprietary interests or statutory rights to establish standing." Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 255, 478 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1996).
"In order for an injury to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Carnival Corp. v. Hist. Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass'n, 407 S.C. 67, 75, 753 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2014). "[C]oncerns reflecting aesthetic or recreational interests have been recognized as 'judicially cognizable injur[ies] in fact.'" Town of Arcadia Lakes v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Env't Control, 404 S.C. 515, 531, 745 S.E.2d 385, 394 (Ct. App. 2013) () (quoting Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc., 345 S.C. at 602, 550 S.E.2d at 292)); see, e.g., Smiley v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 374 S.C. 326, 328, 332, 649 S.E.2d 31, 32, 34 (2007) (). Additionally, "[a]n economic interest is a legally protected interest." Opternative, Inc. v. S.C. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 433 S.C. 405, 414, 859 S.E.2d 263, 268 (Ct. App. 2021) aff'd, 437 S.C. 258, 878 S.E.2d 861 (2022).
First, we hold Appellant Owners have articulated concrete and particularized injuries that could be addressed by a determination of the ownership of the super-beachfront lots. See Town of Arcadia Lakes, 404 S.C. at 529, 745 S.E.2d at 392 . Appellants alleged in their complaint that the development of the Respondent Owners' super-beachfront lots would result in irreparable injury to Appellants by depriving them of their right to access property held in public trust and would "specifically impair and threaten their property rights." In their affidavits, Appellants Kruer and Napier related that the residences and seawalls on the developed super-beachfront lots exacerbated the erosion on the public beach. As our supreme court noted, the development of the super-beachfront lots "is threatening the existence of the entire beach in that area of the state." Braden's Folly, LLC, 439 S.C. at 179, 886 S.E.2d at 679. Kruer and Napier also described how development of other super-beachfronts lots made it impossible for them to walk or jog on the beach when the tide was up to the seawalls on the lots. They asserted that if Respondent Owners' super-beachfront lots were developed, they would be excluded from those portions of the public trust that they had enjoyed, including their access to the beach and their ability to use the public beach. They also asserted the view from their properties would be drastically diminished, which would lower their properties' values. Napier further stated Respondents Wright and/or Juan Enterprises erected barricades in the dunes blocking his path to the beach. Kruer and Napier also contended that the determination of the ownership status of the super-beachfront lots was "essential to the continued use and enjoyment" of their properties and to their properties' values. Accordingly, we find Appellant Owners have set forth injuries to their property, aesthetic, or recreational interests. See Town of Arcadia Lakes, 404 S.C. at 531, 745 S.E.2d at 394 ; Opternative, Inc., 433 S.C. at 414, 859 S.E.2d at 268 ().
We hold the City also articulated particularized injuries that could be addressed by this action. Spencer Wetmore, the City's administrator, stated the City's interest...
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