City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Casino Realty, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 44253,44253
• Citation: 313 So.2d 649
• Parties: CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a Municipal Corporation, Etc., Appellant, v. CASINO REALTY, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 649

313 So.2d 649

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a Municipal Corporation, Etc., Appellant, v. CASINO REALTY, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 44253.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 26, 1975.

W. W. Caldwell, Jr., City Atty., and Donald H. Norman, Ross, Norman & Cory, Fort Lauderale, for appellant.

John A. Thabes, Saunders, Curtis, Ginestra & Gore, and Samuel L. Heller, Johnson, Heller & Birnbaum, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before us on direct appeal from a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Rice v. City of Fort Lauderdale et al.; Casino Realty, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale et al., reported at 281 So.2d 36 (Fla.App.1973), which construes a provision of the Constitution of Florida (1968), Article X. Section 6, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution (1973). See Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So.2d 391 (Fla.1973); Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So.2d 407 (Fla.1958).

This action was commenced on March 11, 1969, by a petition in eminent domain under Chapter 74, Florida Statutes, by the City of Fort Lauderdale and the State Road Department of Florida, as the condemning authorities, to acquire certain lands owned by the appellees-condemnees for the widening of U.S. Highway A--1--A within the City of Fort Lauderdale. The relevant history, factual background, questions presented and disposition are clearly set out in the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 281 So.2d 36, presently before us for review. We have heard oral argument, examined the record and considered the briefs and are of the opinion that the District Court correctly decided the issues concerning the introduction into evidence of the lease agreement and attorney's fees. We agree that the property owner should have the right in certain instances to open and close in final argument for the reasons and in the manner set forth in Justice Overton's concurring opinion. We disagree with the holding of that court relative to the construction which it has given to Article X, Section 6, Constitution of Florida (1968). The District Court erred in its initial consideration of Article X, Section 6, in adjudging that each defendant as an owner of a separate interest in a parcel of property sought to be acquired in eminent domain proceedings was entitled to a separate jury verdict, i.e., for the defendants Rice as owners of a one-third interest, and for the defendant Casino as the owner of a two-thirds interest. Article X, Section 6, Florida Constitution (1968) provides '(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.' In construing this provision, the District Court erroneously concluded that '(t)he use of the phrase 'each owner' in the 1968 revision was intended to provide separate damage award where differing ownerships exist in the parcel subject to condemnation. Under the language of Article X, Section 6, supra, each of the defendants as owners of separate interests in the subject property was entitled to separate jury verdicts.' The constitution requires that each owner shall be compensated for the taking of private property, but this constitutional provision does not require a separate jury verdict for the interest of each owner in a parcel of land acquired in an eminent domain proceedings. Each owner has his interest protected under the law which provides the appropriate procedure for the compensation of each of the parties' interest in a parcel of land. The instant condemnation proceeding was commenced on March 11, 1969, and, therefore, Section 73.081 (Florida Statutes, 1969), which provides:

'Form of verdict.--The verdict of the jury shall state an accurate description of each parcel of the property sought to be appropriated; and the amount to be paid therefor, together with any damage to the remainder caused by the taking, including business damages when allowable by statute. The compensation awarded by the jury for each parcel of property sought to be appropriated shall be determined as a whole, irrespective of the separate interests of the various parties, or the various items of damages claimed as to each parcel.'

governed the trial since the 1970 amendment thereto, Chapter 70--284, General Laws, ¹ provides that it would apply to all eminent domain proceedings instituted after October 1, 1970. Section 73.101 entitled 'Form of Judgment' which provides,

'Form of judgment.--The judgment shall recite the verdict in full and shall state that the estate or interest in the property described in the petition and sought to be appropriated by the petitioner shall vest in the petitioner upon the payment of, or securing by deposit of money, the amount found by the verdict of the jury. Where there are conflicting claims to the amount awarded for any parcel, the court, upon appropriate motion, shall determine the rights of the interested parties with respect to the amount awarded for each parcel and the method of apportionment, together with the disposition of any other matters arising from the taking.'

allows the trial court, after the jury has returned a verdict stating the amount to be paid for the parcel of land, to resolve the rights of interested parties in the parcel with respect to the amount awarded and the method of apportionment. This statutory procedure insures compensation to each of the parties for their separate interests in the parcel and satisfies the constitutional mandate of Article X, Section 6, supra, to provide full compensation to each owner.

The decision of the District Court is reversed insofar as it holds that Article X, Section 6, supra, mandates that each of the defendants as owners of separate interests in the subject parcel of land are entitled to separate jury verdicts. The trial judge did not err in this respect. The decision of the District Court is modified in accordance with the concurring opinion of Justice Overton concerning opening and closing arguments and affirmed on the other points on appeal regarding the introduction into evidence and consideration of the lease agreement, and the award of attorney's fees.

Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is affirmed in part, modified in part, and reversed in part, and the cause is hereby remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, C.J., and BOYD and ERVIN (Retired), JJ., concur.

OVERTON, J., concurs specially with opinion with which ADKINS, C.J., and BOYD and ERVIN (Retired), JJ., concur.

OVERTON, Justice (concurring).

I fully agree with Justice ROBERTS' opinion and his treatment of the issues presented therein. On the issue of a property owner's right to open and close in final argument, there is clear conflict between the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in this cause reported in Rice v. City of Fort...