City of Galveston v. Texas Gen. Land Office

• Decision Date: 20 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 01-04-01096-CV.,01-04-01096-CV.
• Citation: 196 S.W.3d 218
• Parties: THE CITY OF GALVESTON, Texas and Landry's Restaurants, Inc., Appellants, v. The TEXAS GENERAL LAND OFFICE, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

196 S.W.3d 218

THE CITY OF GALVESTON, Texas and Landry's Restaurants, Inc., Appellants, v. The TEXAS GENERAL LAND OFFICE, Appellee.

No. 01-04-01096-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

April 20, 2006.

Barbara Elliott-Roberts, Kevin D. Jewell, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams, & Martin, P.C., Houston, for Appellant.

Jeffee L. Martinez-Vargas, Austin, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HIGLEY, and BLAND.

OPINION

JANE BLAND, Justice.

This declaratory judgment action requires us to construe Texas Local Government Code section 307.042(e),¹ which enabled the City of Galveston ("the City") to sell the Flagship Pier and Hotel — property the Legislature requires be used for public park purposes — to Landry's Restaurants, Inc. ("Landry's"). The City and Landry's contend the trial court erred in interpreting the statute to allow the General Land Office ("GLO") to assess an annual lease payment for Landry's use of the State-owned submerged land beneath the pier and hotel. We agree with the trial court's determination and therefore affirm.

Background

In 1941, the Legislature granted to any coastal city with a population over 60,000 the right to use and occupy, for public park purposes, the State-owned tidelands, water, and bed of the Gulf of Mexico ("State-owned submerged land"). See Act of Feb. 11, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 10, 11 (amended 2001) (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 307.001 (Vernon 2005)). The statute gave eligible cities the right to erect a pier over the State-owned submerged land, and further delineated the types of facilities that the Legislature deemed suitable to build on the pier: a theatre, restaurant, convention hall, dance hall, aquarium, fishing platform, exhibition hall, stadium for aquatic sports, spaces and platforms for concessions, walkways, toilet facilities, and resting facilities for the comfort of the public. See Act of Feb. 11, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 10, 12, amended by Act of May 24, 1961, 57th Leg., R.S., ch. 525, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 1166, 1167, amended by Act of Apr. 30, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 707, 1091-92. The statute authorized eligible cities to borrow money, issue negotiable bonds, and levy taxes to defray the costs both of building the pier and acquiring any privately owned land to be used in connection with the pier. See Act of Feb. 11, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 10, 12 (amended 1987) (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 307.041(a) (Vernon 2005)). As security for any bonds issued, the statute enabled eligible cities to mortgage the pier and any improvements thereon, and under the terms of any such mortgage, to grant to the purchaser under sale or foreclosure a franchise to operate the properties purchased for a 35-year period. See Act of Feb. 11, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 10, 13, amended by Act of May 20, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 671, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1534, 1534, amended by Act of May 11, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 598, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1139, 1140. In 1942, pursuant to this statute, the City constructed a pier commonly known as the Flagship Pier.

In 1961, the Legislature amended the statute by including, among other things, authorization to build a hotel on the pier with bond funds. See Act of May 24, 1961, 57th Leg., R.S., ch. 525, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 1166, 1167 (amended 1987) (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 307.021 (Vernon 2005)). Four years later, the Legislature amended the statute again to extend the permissible franchise period pursuant to a foreclosure sale from thirty-five years to seventy-five years. See Act of May 20, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 671, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1534, 1534 (amended 2001) (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 307.042(c) (Vernon 2005)). The City used bond proceeds to build the Flagship Hotel on the pier. Eventually, the City retired the bonds it had issued for constructing the hotel and pier.

In September 2000, the Galveston City Council adopted a resolution asking the Legislature to amend the statute to enable the City to sell the Flagship Pier and Hotel (together the "Flagship Property"). Galveston, Tex., City Council Resolution 00-045 (Sept. 14, 2000). In 2001, the Legislature amended section 307.042 of the statute to add the following provision:

The municipality may sell the [Flagship Property] if no bonded indebtedness remains outstanding. If the municipality sells the property, the General Land Office may grant to the purchaser a lease of the state-owned tideland, water, and bed beneath the property or, if necessary, a larger area for a period of not more than 99 years after the purchase. The purchaser and the purchaser's heirs, successors, and assigns have the same right of use and occupancy to the state-owned tideland, water, and bed as is granted to the municipality under this chapter. On termination of that period or on cessation of use of the property for that purpose, the right of use and occupancy reverts to the municipality.

Act of May 11, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 598, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1139, 1140 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 307.042(e) (Vernon 2005)).

The City subsequently sold the Flagship Property to Landry's. Following the sale, the GLO sought to enter into a lease with Landry's for the State-owned submerged land beneath the Flagship Property. Landry's and the City (together "appellants") responded by suing for a declaratory judgment,² alleging that the statute precludes the GLO from assessing an annual rental payment against Landry's because the City had never paid rent to the GLO for its use and occupancy of the State-owned submerged land. After considering the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the GLO's motion and denied appellants' motion. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

We review declaratory judgments under the same standards as other judgments and decrees. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 37.010 (Vernon 1997); City of Galveston v. Giles, 902 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). We look to the procedure used to resolve the issue at trial to determine the standard of review on appeal. Giles, 902 S.W.2d at 170. Here, because the trial court resolved the case on competing motions for summary judgment, we review the propriety of the declaratory judgment under the same standards that we apply in reviewing a summary judgment. Lidawi v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Under the traditional standard for summary judgment, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.1999). We view all evidence in a light favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant's favor. Provident Life, 128 S.W.3d at 215. When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we consider both motions, their evidence, and their issues, and we may render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. See CU Lloyd's of Tex. v. Feldman, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998).

Analysis

Statutory interpretation is a question of law. In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.2001). Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and to effectuate the Legislature's intent. Id. at 702. In doing so, we begin with the statute's plain language. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex.2001); Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865-66 (Tex.1999). We begin with the plain language because we assume that the Legislature tried to say what it meant; therefore, the statute's words should be the surest guide to the Legislature's intent. Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 866.

In ascertaining legislative intent, we do not confine our review to isolated statutory words, phrases, or clauses; rather, we examine the entire act. Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co., 44 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex.2001); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005) (instructing courts to read words and phrases in context). We construe words and phrases according to the rules of grammar and common usage. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a). Moreover, words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning must be construed accordingly. Id. § 311.011(b).

The Code Construction Act lists factors that may be considered in construing a statute, whether or not the statute is ambiguous on its face. Id. § 311.023. These factors include, among other things, (1) the statute's objectives, (2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, (3) the statute's legislative history, (4) former statutory provisions, and (5) the consequences of a particular construction. Id. § 311.023(1)-(7). We presume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result. Id. § 311.021(3).

The Statute

Local Government Code section 307.042(e) provides as follows:

The municipality may sell the property described by Subsection (b)³ if no bonded indebtedness remains outstanding.⁴ If the municipality sells the property, the General Land Office may grant to the purchaser a lease of the state-owned tideland, water, and bed beneath the property or, if necessary, a larger area for a period of not more than 99 years after the purchase. The purchaser and the purchaser's heirs, successors, and assigns have the same right of use and occupancy to the state-owned tideland, water, and bed as is granted to the municipality under this chapter. On termination of that period or on cessation of...