City of Garland v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 16 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-86-00611-CV,05-86-00611-CV |
| Citation | 734 S.W.2d 92 |
| Parties | CITY OF GARLAND, Appellant, v. S. Vito VASQUEZ, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
E. Thomas Bishop, Mark M. Donheiser, Dallas, for appellant.
Allan M. Stafford, Garland, for appellee.
Before WHITHAM, BAKER and LAGARDE, JJ.
In this workmen's compensation case, Senobio Vasquez recovered a judgment, after a jury trial, against the City of Garland for a mental injury. In eight points of error, the City of Garland appeals contending that there is no evidence and, alternatively, that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that Vasquez was injured in the course of his employment, that Vasquez received an injury on or about April 16, 1982, that the injury was a producing cause of Vasquez's total incapacity, and that the duration of Vasquez's total incapacity was from April 16, 1982 to January 31, 1983. We hold that Vasquez has not suffered a compensable injury under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act because there is no evidence that he was injured "in the course of his employment." Consequently, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Vasquez take nothing.
Senobio Vasquez was a police officer with the City of Garland. Upon arrival at work each morning, Vasquez was required to look at the police department's bulletin board where his daily assignment was posted. When he arrived at work on April 16, 1982 at approximately 7:30 a.m., Vasquez looked at the bulletin board and saw a notice that a fellow officer had been transferred to a position that Vasquez had wanted.
Vasquez filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board claiming that the bulletin board incident was an "accident" which caused him to suffer a compensable "mental injury" under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act. The Industrial Accident Board issued a final ruling denying Vasquez's claim, and he then filed suit in the district court for a trial de novo of his claim. Vasquez alleged that he would be disabled for a period of at least four-hundred and one weeks and that he had incurred medical and hospital expenses for the treatment of his mental injury.
Special issues one through three, and the jury's answers thereto, are as follows:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Did plaintiff receive an injury on or about April 16, 1982?
If he did, answer Issue No. 2.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2
Was he injured in the course of his employment?
If he was, answer No. 3 and No. 4.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3
Was the injury a producing cause of any total incapacity?
The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's findings that Vasquez recover from the City of Garland $1,595.00 in attorney's fees, $6,380.00 for his total and temporary incapacity, and $1,296.10 for his unpaid medical expenses.
In its third and fourth points of error, the City of Garland contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient, respectively, to support the jury's finding that Vasquez sustained an "injury" as that term is defined in the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act and in the jury instruction that relates to special issue number one. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp.1987) (defining the term "injury"). Under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, mental trauma can produce an accidental injury if there is proof of a definite time, place, and cause. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex.1979). Vasquez testified that he suffered an injury to his brain. He testified that at the time of his alleged injury, he was following a specific job requirement by reviewing the bulletin board. He also testified that he looked at the bulletin board at 7:30 a.m. on April 16, 1982 on the second floor of the Police Department in the squad room. Thus, Vasquez argues that he has satisfied Maksyn by offering proof which traces his injury to a specific time, place, and cause and that therefore, he suffered an accidental injury. In light of our disposition of the City's first point of error, we assume, but do not decide, that the evidence is sufficient to show that Vasquez sustained an accidental mental injury on or about April 16, 1982.
In its first point of error, the City of Garland maintains that there is no evidence to support the jury's finding, in response to special issue number two, that Vasquez was injured in the course of his employment. To be compensable under the workmen's compensation act, an injury must be sustained "in the course of employment." See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8306, § 3b (Vernon 1967) (compensation is paid to an employee who "sustains an injury in the course of his employment") (emphasis added). The trial court submitted an instruction to the jury which relates to special issue number two and which tracks the following language from the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act:
The term "injury sustained in the course of employment"
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shall include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere.
TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967). The definition of "in the course of employment" embraces two elements: 1) the injury must be of such kind and character that it has to do with and originated in the employer's work, and 2) the injury must have been sustained while the employee was engaged in or about the furtherance of the employer's business. See McKim v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1944, writ ref'd); City of Austin v. Johnson, 525 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In determining whether there is some evidence to support the jury's finding that Vasquez was injured in the course of his employment, we consider only the evidence and the inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences the contrary. See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). If there is any evidence of probative force amounting to more than a scintilla, the jury's finding is binding and conclusive. See In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); see also International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 581 (Tex.1963) (). With these principles in mind, we examine the testimony concerning Vasquez's examination of the bulletin board on the morning of April 16, 1982.
The following testimony was elicited from Vasquez on direct examination:
Q. Do you remember what happened after you looked at the bulletin board?
A. Well, when I looked at the bulletin board I found out that I had been passed over for promotion, which was a position in criminal investigation and after that I really don't recall exactly what happened, I just, you know, lost my ability to, I guess, think rationally.
On cross-examination, the following testimony was adduced:
Q. Okay. Now, I believe you testified and correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Vasquez, that you went in there this morning and looked at that bulletin board and we're talking about April the 16th, 1982?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there was some transfer list or promotion list or something up there and you didn't see your name on it, is that right?
A. Yes, sir. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Well, had you applied for a promotion? I'm confused whether it was a promotion or a transfer?
A. It was a transfer, yes, sir. I had applied for it.
Q. Transfer to the Criminal Investigation Division?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And your name wasn't on there?
A. No, sir, it was not.
Q. All right. And what happened to you, did you have a physical injury at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What kind of physical injury did you have? Did you fall down, did you faint?
A. No, sir. It was mental.
Q. It was mental?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And what part of your body are you saying was injured?
A. My brain.
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Q. Do you recall when I took your deposition in my office sometime ago?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Do you remember what you said at that time when I asked you?
A. What happened to me?
Q. Well, if I may, you said, "I was just cut off from my brain"?
A. Yes, sir, I was. I couldn't--I felt like I was in slow motion or some type of injury had happened to me.
Q. Had you been under any other stressful situations in your duties out there, Mr. Vasquez?
A. No, sir, none that I can think of.
Q. It was just this going up there and expecting to get your transfer and you didn't get it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But--is that your testimony?
A. Yes, sir.
The only other person who testified at trial as to the circumstances surrounding the bulletin board incident was Robert T. Wade. Wade was the assistant Chief of Police for the City of Garland at the time of Vasquez's alleged injury. Wade testified that Vasquez's goal was to work in the criminal investigation department and that when there was an opening in that department, "it was almost understood by other members of the department that Vasquez would get that job because he was best qualified for it." Wade also testified that everyone, including Vasquez, was shocked when they saw the notice on the bulletin board that a man with far less experience than Vasquez had been transferred to the position. Wade stated that he had heard that Vasquez was so "upset and chagrined" after he saw the transfer notice that he went to a center that...
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