City of Georgetown v. Deevco, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1970
• Citation: 451 S.W.2d 422
• Parties: The CITY OF GEORGETOWN, Kentucky et al., Appellants, v. DEEVCO, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 422

451 S.W.2d 422

The CITY OF GEORGETOWN, Kentucky et al., Appellants, v. DEEVCO, INC., et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 27, 1970.

J. Clay McKnight, City Atty., Georgetown, for appellants.

E. Durward Weldon, Richard M. Compton, Todd, Compton & Odell, Georgetown, for appellees.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This is an appeal from a judgment invalidating the action taken by the Georgetown Municipal Planning and Zoning Commission when it declined to approve a land-use plan submitted by appellees. The Chancellor's ruling was based on his conclusion that the Commission's order was arbitrary, discriminatory and not supported by substantial evidence.

The property involved is a lot on the corner of U.S. Highway 25 and Hiawatha Trail in the City of Georgetown. It has a frontage of 175 feet on U.S. 25 and 125 feet on Hiawatha Trail. This area is zoned B--2 (Commercial) and a gasoline service station is a permissible use under that classification.

Appellees plan to use this lot for that purpose. Under the zoning regulations they were reguired to submit to the Commission for approval a preliminary plat showing the proposed land use. Such a plat was submitted and it showed two 50 foot entrances on U.S. 25 and one 35 foot entrance on Hiawatha Trail. A hearing was held, at which the only evidence was introduced by the property owner. The uncontradicted evidence was that access to U.S. 25 was an absolute necessity for the proper use of this lot as a service station. The Commission rejected the plan solely on the ground that the entrances on U.S. 25 would create traffic congestion. The property owner offered to minimize the traffic problem by agreeing to pay a substantial sum for traffic control devices and consented to certain other traffic controls. (These conditions were incorporated in the judgment.)

At the outset, neither the record nor the briefs furnish us with any source which empowers the Commission to reject a land-use plan on the ground that it would create traffic problems on the abutting street or streets. Appellants contend the city has police power to regulate the use of its streets, which is true, but the city has not delegated to the Commission authority to prescribe what entrance ways a property owner may utilize. Apparently it is appellants' position that the Commission has some sort of floating power to disapprove a land-use plan if in its opinion traffic problems will be created. These problems are properly taken into consideration when the zoning plan is adopted, but we find no authority granted the Commission to reconsider them every time a property owner seeks to use his land in conformity with the zoning regulations.

Assuming, however, that the Commission has some regulatory control over land use in a zoned area, it cannot deny the right of a property owner to...