City of Glendale v. Dixon, Civil 3883
| Decision Date | 20 December 1937 |
| Docket Number | Civil 3883 |
| Citation | 51 Ariz. 86,75 P.2d 42 |
| Parties | CITY OF GLENDALE, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. J. S. DIXON, Appellee |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. J. C. Niles, Judge. Judgment reversed.
Mr. C A. McKee and Mr. Allan K. Perry, for Appellant.
Mr. L C. McNabb, for Appellee.
This is an action by J. S. Dixon to recover $976.00, the balance alleged to be due him by the City of Glendale for services rendered that municipality, and from a judgment in his favor for $469.50 the defendant city appeals.
The plaintiff alleges that he entered the employ of the defendant March 1, 1933, as a manual or common laborer in its water department and worked for it until July 1, 1934; that under the minimum wage law and the minimum wage scale fixed by the Arizona Highway Commission he was entitled to fifty cents an hour, or $4 for a day of eight hours; that during these sixteen months he worked 5,952 hours because he was required on many occasions to work in excess of eight hours per day; that it was necessary for him to do this to protect property since the defendant procured from the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association in large quantities known as "heads" its irrigating water which had to be used in its entirety to be kept under control and to prevent it from flooding and destroying property; that during this period he earned $2,976 but received from the defendant on account thereof the sum of $2,000 and no more; that there is now due him from the defendant the sum of $976 with interest; that before instituting this suit he filed with the defendant a written demand for the payment of $976, but the defendant neglected and refused to pay the same or any part thereof, or to allow, audit or order the said claim to be paid.
After demurring generally, the defendant city filed an answer in which it admitted the employment of plaintiff and the payment of $2,000 for his services, denied every other allegation in the complaint, and alleged that a part of his cause of action accrued more than one year prior to the filing of his complaint. It pleaded further by way of affirmative defense, that defendant, by resolution, entered into a contract of employment with plaintiff as superintendent of its irrigation department at a monthly salary of $125; that plaintiff accepted the position, performed the duties thereof until June 30, 1934, and demanded and receipted for $62.50 twice each month during this period without making any claim that it was other than full compensation; that he knew when he accepted the position that he was not, under his contract, required to work any specific number of hours per day, and at no time during his employment did he report to defendant the number of hours he devoted to his work during any day or month.
The evidence discloses that plaintiff was employed by the defendant city as a manual or common laborer in its irrigation department from March 1, 1933, to June 30, 1934, and that he received a salary of $125 a month, or a total of $2,000 for these sixteen months; that during the period from September 15, 1933, to July 1, 1934, he worked on an average of twelve hours a day for twenty-eight days a month, or a total of 266 days; that he did this because it was necessary in order to care for the irrigating water which was delivered to the defendant by the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association in large "heads" which had to be carefully looked after to prevent flooding and to protect property; that the city received water usually every ten days in summer and less frequently in winter and that plaintiff worked sometimes twenty-four hours a day when irrigating and many times twelve hours a day or more at that and other work, such, for instance, as tiling its ditches; that the schedule per diem wages fixed by the Arizona Highway Commission for those doing manual or mechanical labor for the state or any of its political subdivisions is fifty cents an hour for eight hours per day. Basing its judgment upon these facts, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to fifty cents an hour for all the time he had worked during this period in excess of eight hours per day, but since the liability of the defendant was one created by statute he could recover only that portion of it that was not barred by the one-year statute of limitations. City of Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P.2d 1175. Thereupon judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $469.50 with interest was rendered and the defendant has appealed.
The statute on which the plaintiff relies and the trial court acted in rendering its judgment is section 1350 of the Revised Code of 1928, chapter 12, section 1, Session Laws of the Eleventh Legislature, 1933, reading as follows:
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McGuire v. City of Dallas
...relies upon the following authorities from other jurisdictions: Lewis v. Ferrari, 34 Cal.App.2d Supp. 767, 90 P.2d 384; City of Glendale v. Dixon, 51 Ariz. 86, 75 P.2d 42; Id., 51 Ariz. 206, 75 P.2d 683; Robinson v. City of Perry, 35 Okl. 475, 130 P. 276; Burns v. City of New York, 121 App.......
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City of Phoenix v. Kidd
... ... R. F. KIDD, Appellee Civil No. 4090 Supreme Court of Arizona July 14, 1939 ... [92 P.2d 514] ... State v. Anklam, ... supra ; City of Glendale v ... Dixon, 51 Ariz. 86, 75 P.2d 42. And this is true ... whether ... ...
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State ex rel. Hartzell v. City of Seattle
...did not come within the classification fixed by the statute for the payment of an additional amount. The statute construed in City of Glendale v. Dixon, supra, similar to the statute mentioned in the last case cited, and the court held that the overtime work performed was not within the mea......