City of Greenville v. Peterson
| Decision Date | 10 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 17845,17845 |
| Citation | 122 S.E.2d 826,239 S.C. 298 |
| Parties | CITY OF GREENVILLE, Respondent, v. James Richard PETERSON, Yvonne Joan Eddy, Helen Angela Evans, David Ralph Strawder, Harold James Fowler, Frank G. Smith, Robert Crockett, James Carter, Doris Delores Wright and Rose Marie Collins, Appellants. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Jenkins & Perry, Columbia, Willie T. Smith, Jr., Greenville, for appellants.
W. H. Arnold, H. F. Partee, Greenville, for respondent.
Defendants were convicted of the charge of trespass after notice in violation of Section 16-388, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, as amended, and appeal. By agreement of counsel, all bail bonds were continued in effect pending disposition of this appeal.
On August 9, 1960, in response to a call, law enforcement officers were dispatched to the S. H. Kress Store in Greenville, South Carolina, a member of a large chain of stores operated throughout the United States and described as a junior department store. Upon arrival they found the ten defendants and four others who were under sixteen years of age, all Negroes, seated at the lunch counter. There is testimony to the effect that because of the local custom to serve white persons only at the lunch counter the manager of the store announced that the lunch counter was closed, the lights were extinguished, and all persons were requested to leave. The white persons present left, but all Negroes refused to leave; and those above the age of sixteen were thereupon charged with trespass after notice as provided in the aforementioned section of the Code, which provides:
'Any person:
'Shall, on conviction, be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or be imprisoned for not more than thirty days.'
Defendants contend, first, error in refusing to dismiss the warrant upon the ground that the charge contained therein was too indefinite and uncertain as to apprise the defendants as to what they were actually being charged with.
Defendants were arrested in the act of committing the offense charged, they refused the manager's request to leave after the lunch counter had been closed and the lights extinguished, and there could have been no question in defendants' minds as to what they were charged with. Further, there was at that time no claim of lack of sufficient information, and upon trial there was no motion to require the prosecution to make the charge more definite and certain. Defendants rely upon State v. Randolph et al., 239 S.C. 79, 121 S.E.2d 349, where this Court held that it was error to refuse defendants' motion to make the charge more definite and certain in a warrant charging breach of the peace. It was pointed out in that case that breach of the peace embraces a variety of conduct and defendants were entitled to be given such information as would enable them to understand the nature of the offense. This is not true in instant case where the charges were definite, clear and umambiguous; further, no motion was made to require the prosecution to make the charge more definite and certain. There is no merit in this contention.
Defendants next contend that their arrest and conviction was in furtherance of a custom of racial segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Defendants entered the place of business of the S. H. Kress Store and seated themselves at the lunch counter, they contend, for the purpose of being served, although four of them had no money and there is no testimony that such service was to be paid for by others.
The testimony reveals that the lunch counter was closed because it was the custom of the S. H. Kress Store in Greenville, South Carolina, to serve whites only and after all persons had left or been removed the lunch counter was repoened for business. The statute with no reference to segregation of the races applies to 'Any person: * * * Who * * * fails and refuses, without good cause or excuse, to leave immediately upon being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession, or his agent or representative, * * *.' The act makes no reference to race or color and is clearly for the purpose of protecting the rights of the owners or those in control of private property. Irrespective of the reason for closing the counter, the evidence is conclusive that defendants were arrested because they chose to remain upon the premises after...
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City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 17856
...the information he is entitled to have under the provisions of Section 18 of article 1." In the recent case of City of Greenville v. Peterson et al., S.C., 122 S.E.2d 826, (filed November 10, 1961), the appellants there were arrested, charged and convicted of trespass, in violation of Secti......
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Peterson v. City of Greenville Lombard v. State of Louisiana Gober v. City of Birmingham Avent v. State of North Carolina Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham
...serve 30 days in jail. An appeal to the Greenville County Court was dismissed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826. We granted certiorari to consider the substantial federal questions presented by the record. 370 U.S. 935, 82 S.Ct. 1577, 8 L.Ed.2d ......
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Barr v. City of Columbia
...S.E.2d 247, rev'd on another point sub nom. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697; City of Greenville v. Peterson, 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826, rev'd on another point, 373 U.S. 244, 83 S.Ct. 1133, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (allegation of failure to establish corpus deli......
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City of Columbia v. Barr
...... The questions designated 1, A and B, must be decided adversely to appellants under City of Greenville v. Peterson, filed November 10, 1961, S.C., 122 S.E.2d 826, and City of Charleston v. Mitchell, filed December 13, 1961, S.C., 123 S.E.2d 512. Each ......
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CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND COMPUTER CRIME.
...the reason to be a condition that applies to all--much like a platform's terms of service. Id. (342.) City of Greenville v. Peterson, 122 S.E.2d 826, 828 (S.C. 1961) (holding selective right of private individual to exclude includes right to exclude based on race), rev'd on other grounds, 3......