City Of Griffin v. Southeastern Textile Co
| Decision Date | 10 June 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 32336.,32336. |
| Citation | 79 Ga.App. 420,53 S.E.2d 921 |
| Parties | CITY OF GRIFFIN. v. SOUTHEASTERN TEXTILE CO. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where the charter of a city provides that a tax assessment may be appealed from the taxing authorities of the city to the superior court, there to be disposed of as other appeal cases, such appeal is a de novo investigation and brings up the whole record, to be tried anew in the superior court. See Code, § 6-501 and City of Macon v. Ries, 179 Ga. 320 et seq., 176 S.E. 21.
2. (a) Where the trial judge states fully and accurately throughout his charge the law applicable to the issues involved, the failure to call to the attention of the jury in specific terms the contentions of the parties as shown by the pleadings, is not error. See Bray v. C. I. T. Corp., 51 Ga. App. 196(3), 179 S.E. 925, and cases there cited.
(b) Where the issue to be determined by the jury is the value of real property, the assessed valuation of other property in the same locality, of like kind and quality, is admissible as a circumstance to show the value of the property in question, although the assessments of such other property are not referred to in the pleadings. The weight of such evidence is for the jury.
3. Any issue that may be made before the tribunal originally hearing a case, may also be made on an appeal thereof to the superior court, where such appeal is a de novo investigation. See Code, § 6-501.
4. The verdict is supported by the evidence and having the approval of the trial court, will not be disturbed. See Many cases cited under Code, § 70-202, catchword "Approval."
Error from Superior Court, Spalding County; Chester A. Byars, Judge.
Proceeding by Southeastern Textile Company to review a decision of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Griffin denying an appeal from a tax assessment. A judgment was entered reducing the assessed value of the property, and the case was, by bill of exceptions, appealed to the Supreme Court and transferred to the Court of Appeals, 50 S.E.2d 322.
Judgment affirmed.
The defendant in error, Southeastern Textile Co., herein referred to as the defendant, appealed from the assessment of the tax assessors of the plaintiff in error, City of Griffin, herein referred to as the plaintiff, by which a building of the defendant was assessed for city taxes for the year 1948 in the sum of $43,500. Upon this appeal being denied by the Board of Commissioners of the City of Griffin the matter was appealed to the Superior Court of Spalding County and there the issues were tried by a jury whose verdict reduced the assessment fixed by the assessors of the city and upheld by the city commissioners, in the sum of $10,000, or from $43,500 to $33,500. The judgment of the court was accordingly entered and the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the general grounds which was later amended by adding 10 special grounds. The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial as amended, and the case was, by bill of exceptions, appealed to the Supreme Court, it being the contention of the plaintiff that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction because a part of ground 5 of the amended motion for a new trial raised for the first time in connection with this case the constitutionality of Section 28, Ga.Laws 1921, p. 959, same being the provision of the charter of the City of Griffin authorizing the procedure followed in this case. The Supreme Court in holding that this constitutional question could not be raised for the first time by a motion for a new trial transferred the case to this Court.
Hall & Bloch, Macon, Beck, Goodrich & Beck, Griffin, for plaintiff in error.
Cumming, Cumming & Cumming, Griffin, for defendant in error.
TOWNSEND, Judge (after stating the foregoing facts.)
1. Parts of special grounds 5 and 6 of the amended motion for a new trial contend that the trial court erred in charging the jury substantially and to the effect that the investigation of the issues in the instant case is a de novo investigation; that the jury is not bound by anything the city tax assessors or city commissioners did; that it is the duty of the jury to pass upon the right and wrong of the transaction and in doing so it is not bound by the former act of either the tax assessors or the city commissioners; that the jury will make up its verdict solely from the evidence and the law as given in charge by the court; that the jury is empowered from this evidence and the law to raise the assessment or to lower it. This is alleged to be error because the plaintiff contends that the assessment placed upon the defendant's property by the official tax assessors of the city and approved by the Board of City Commissioners was prima facie correct and should have been accepted as correct by the jury unless it found that the property had been assessed for more than its fair market value or that there had been an intentional violation of the principle of practical uniformity in assessing the same.
The provision of the charter of the City of Griffin followed by the defendant in appealing from the decision of the assessors in the first instance and from the Board of Commissioners in the second, is embodied in Section 28, Ga.Laws, 1921, p. 971 and provides as follows:
It is to be noted that the last sentence of the foregoing section of the Charter of the City of Griffin provides that "Such appeal shall be disposed of in the Superior Court as other appeal cases." Code, § 6-501 provides as follows: Manifestly the General Assembly in providing that the appeal referred to in Section 28 of Ga. Laws, 1921, p. 971, was to be disposed of in the superior court as other appeal cases intended this disposition to be in accordance with Code, § 6-501 hereinbefore quoted. Under such_ a de novo investigation the excerpts from the charge complained of are without error. See City of Macon v. Ries, 179 Ga. 320 et seq., 176 S.E. 21.
2. Special ground one of the amended motion for a new trial contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury as follows:
Ground 4 of the amended motion for a new trial contends that the trial court erred in admitting over objection of counsel for the plaintiff the evidence of assessments of various tax payers other than the defendant.
The appeal from the assessors to the board of commissioners, which is treated as a part of the pleadings, contains a statement as follows: "As a further basis for our request for review and reduction in our assessment we quote just a few comparative assessments for your information and comparison:
Building Only
Southeastern Textile Co.
It is therefore contended by the plaintiff that the excerpt of the charge complained of in ground one of the amended motion for a new trial was harmful error because the pleadings, a part of which are herein set forth, did exist and would have meant something to the jury because the issues to be decided by them were confined to the issues raised by the defendant before theboard of commissioners by the appeal which constitutes a part of the pleadings.
It is also contended by ground 4 of the amended motion for a new trial that the admission in evidence of assessments of other tax payers not listed among the tax payers shown in the foregoing excerpt from the appeal is error because said evidence is not germane to any issue raised by the pleadings and is not authorized by them.
(a) As to ground one the trial judge stated fully and accurately elsewhere in his charge the law applicable to the issues involved. In Bray v. C. I. T. Corp., 51 Ga. App. 196(3), 179 S.E. 925, 926, it is held...
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