City of Hannibal v. Marion County

• Decision Date: 23 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 53321,53321
• Citation: 745 S.W.2d 842
• Parties: CITY OF HANNIBAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MARION, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 842

745 S.W.2d 842

CITY OF HANNIBAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MARION, et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. 53321.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Four.

Feb. 23, 1988.

Marion F. Wasinger, Hannibal, for plaintiff-appellant.

Branson L. Wood, Hannibal, for defendants-respondents.

CRANDALL, Judge.

Plaintiff, City of Hannibal (Hannibal), brought this action against defendant, County of Marion (County), regarding road taxes paid to the County. Hannibal appeals from the judgment of the trial court which declared a section of Hannibal's city charter unconstitutional. We reverse and remand. ¹

The pertinent facts, as gleaned from the petition, are that Hannibal adopted a Home Rule Charter pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the Missouri Constitution of 1945. Section 20.25 of that charter reaffirmed that portion of Hannibal's Legislative Charter of 1873 which exempted Hannibal's citizens from the "County Poor and Road Tax." Section 20.25 adopted the following language from the 1873 charter:

The City of Hannibal shall at its own proper expense, make, maintain and keep in repair all streets, roads and bridges within the limits of the City, and provide for the maintenance and support of its own poor, and in consideration thereof the citizens of Hannibal shall be exempt from all county tax for the support of the poor, or for the construction or maintenance of any roads or bridges in any part of Marion County, outside of the limits of said city, or for paying for any right-of-way for the same, and if the County Court of Marion County shall make any expenditure for the support of the poor, or for the construction, maintenance or repairs of any road or bridge, or the right-of-way for the same in any part of said county, outside of the limits of said city, and pay for the same out of the county funds, said county shall pay to the Treasurer of the City of Hannibal for the use of said city, a sum of money which shall bear the same proportion to the amount so expended as the assessed value of all property subject to county taxation in the City of Hannibal shall bear to the assessed value of similar property in the remainder of the county.

In 1956 and again in 1961, Hannibal and County entered into contracts in which Hannibal agreed not to enforce this section of its charter.

In November 1986, Hannibal filed its petition against the County, the County Commissioners, and the Tax Collector. Count I sought declaratory judgment concerning the validity of Section 20.25 of its charter. Count II sought to enjoin the County, the Commissioners, and the Tax Collector from assessing and levying taxes from Hannibal citizens attributable to the construction, maintenance, and repair of roads and bridges in the County. Count III sought to enjoin a certain commissioner for County from voting on any matter relating to this dispute. Count IV sought an accounting and damages for taxes collected by County from Hannibal citizens for the past 30 years and for a proportionate payment of expenditures for road and bridge repairs outside the city limits.

County filed several motions. There was a motion to make Hannibal's petition more definite and certain. There also was a motion to strike which challenged Hannibal's standing to assert the Section 20.25 tax exemption for its citizens. There was a separate motion to dismiss Count III. There was another motion to dismiss which objected to the constitutionality of Section 20.25 with regard to Counts I and IV. That motion also challenged Count II on the basis that Hannibal failed to exhaust its administrative remedies for challenging a tax assessment.

After the motions were argued, the trial court entered a "Memorandum Opinion and Order" in which it denied County's motions as to all issues except the constitutionality of Section 20.25. The trial court entered a judgment in which it stated that Hannibal's "petition states a cause of action for declaratory judgment, but Section 20.25 of the City of Hannibal Charter is constitutionally repugnant for all of the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion...."

Before considering the substantive issues on appeal, we first address the procedural posture of the present case. The only motions which were before the trial court for ruling and which addressed issues pertinent to this appeal were County's motions to dismiss. The court's final judgment, in effect, overruled County's motions to dismiss when it found that Hannibal's petition stated a cause of action for declaratory relief. The trial court also entered judgment in favor of County when it found that Section 20.25 of Hannibal's charter was unconstitutional.

Motions to dismiss can be converted to motions for summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are presented to and considered by the trial court. See Rule 55.27(a). In this case neither the trial court nor the parties treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. We, therefore, address the issues in light of a ruling on a motion to dismiss.

We now address the primary issues raised on appeal. This case focuses on whether Hannibal can enforce two rights conferred by Section 20.25 of Hannibal's charter. Pursuant to that charter provision, Hannibal seeks (1) an exemption from the County poor tax and road tax on behalf of its citizens and (2) a proportionate payment from County to Hannibal for any expenditures that County made on roads and bridges outside the city limits.

Concerning the tax exemption which Hannibal seeks on behalf of its citizens, the pivotal issue is one of standing. In its motion to dismiss Counts I and IV, County alleges that Hannibal "is not the real party in interest and lacks standing to assert the tax exemption...." The trial court implicitly ruled that Hannibal had standing to pursue the exemption claim against County when it held that Hannibal's petition stated a claim for declaratory relief.

In a declaratory judgment action, the standard to be applied in determining whether a party has standing to bring a suit is whether the plaintiff has a legally protectible interest at stake. Cheatham v. Walsh, 669 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Mo.App.1984). The matter of standing does not relate to the legal capacity to sue, but to the interest of an adversary in the subject of the suit as an antecedent to the right to relief. Crigler v. Frame, 632 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Mo.App.1982). It is therefore "jurisdictional in limine and so within the notice of a court, even on appeal, for dismissal." Id.

Rule 52.01 requires that an action be prosecuted in the name of the "real party in interest." Hannibal cites to Rule 87 pertaining to declaratory judgments as the source of its authority to bring this action. Rule 87.05 includes a municipal corporation within the definition of person. Rule 87.02(a) provides that "[a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise...." can bring a declaratory judgment action. Even if we assume that the charter provision has the status of a statute or ordinance within the meaning of the Rule 87, the Rule only confers upon Hannibal the general right to bring a declaratory action. It does not resolve the issue of standing in a particular action.

Hannibal cites to Ferguson Police Officers Ass'n. v. City of Ferguson, 670 S.W.2d 921 (Mo.App.1984) for the proposition that a declaratory judgment action is "peculiarly suited to interpreting and declaring the validity of statutes, ordinances and provisions of a charter...." Id. at 925. The holding in that case, while correct as a general proposition of law, is not germane to the issue of standing in the case sub judice.

State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Litz, 653 S.W.2d 703 (Mo.App.1983), cited by Hannibal, involved an...