City of Harrodsburg v. Devine

Decision Date19 May 1967
PartiesCITY OF HARRODSBURG, Kentucky et al., Appellants, v. Roy DEVINE et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

John L. Keller, Harrodsburg, for appellants.

W. Earl Dean, Dean & Dean, Harrodsburg, James F. Clay, Clay & Clay, Danville, for appellees.

EDWARD P. HILL, Judge.

The validity of section(s) of Ordinance No. 45 of the city of Harrodsburg enacted March 1, 1943, is the question presented by this appeal.

The section of the ordinance under attack is quoted as follows:

'(s) For each slot machine of any description, not prohibited by law, into which are dropped or deposited nickles or coins of other denominations, for the purpose of operating musical, gaming, weighing or other machines, or any other device that operates on the coin-in-the-slot principle, except pay telephones and U.S. postage stamp machines, $10.00 per year.'

This action was filed by appellees, persons who own or permit the operation of merchandise vending machines in their places of business, to enjoin the collection of the license fee required by the ordinance in question. The trial court found the ordinance invalid and enjoined its enforcement. The city has appealed.

The right of municipalities of the class in question in this case to levy taxes is governed by section 181 of the Constitution of Kentucky. It authorizes the Legislature to confer upon the city the power to license trades, occupations, and professions and to levy other taxes not material to this appeal.

The Legislature has conferred by KRS 92.280 and 92.281 blanket authority upon municipalities of the second to sixth class to levy any and all taxes authorized in section 181 of the Constitution.

The appellant City of Harrodsburg contends on this appeal that the ordinance in question is valid under the authority of City of Lexington v. Edgerton, 289 Ky. 815, 159 S.W.2d 1015, 151 A.L.R. 1207.

The appellees endeavoring to uphold the correctness of the judgment of the trial court contend: (1) The ordinance in question is discriminatory; and (2) the penalty for nonpayment of the license tax is unreasonable, confiscatory, and arbitrary.

The position of appellees that the ordinance in question is discriminatory is based upon the following provision of the ordinance: '* * * (T)he license imposed by section * * * (s) shall not apply to such businesses while set up on the fair grounds and operating in connection with and as a part of the annual weekly program of the Mercer County Fair & Horse Show.'

One of the basic rules of taxation is that the power to tax should always be exercised so as to produce as nearly as possible equality and uniformity in the burdens imposed. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 21.

It should be kept in mind that this rule of equality and uniformity applies also to the rate or the amount of the tax imposed. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 31. The ordinance in question provides for an equal license fee for each machine, and the person who desires to operate such a machine in the city has a right to operate it for a full year upon payment of the $10 license fee fixed in the ordinance. The exclusion applies only to the operation of machines for a period of one week or possibly a shorter period, and it would certainly not be a uniform and equal tax as to rate had the city attempted to require a $10 license fee for the operation of these machines for the brief period of one week. Such a tax could well be confiscatory.

The question here presented is whether the exemption of machines 'set up on the fair grounds' and operated 'in connection with and as a part of the annual weekly program of the Mercer County Fair & Horse Show' constituted such discrimination or inequality as to invalidate the licensing ordinance. We do not think it did. We find authority for this view in 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 22, page 537, wherein it is stated:

'In the classification of occupations and privileges for licensing and taxation,...

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3 cases
  • City of Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • April 2, 1971
    ...by KRS 92.280 and 92.281 granted cities (including Lexington) authority to impose license fees or taxes. 1 See City of Harrodsburg v. Devine, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 426 (1967). It has been recognized, and is here conceded, that this authority does not permit such cities to levy excise taxes. See C......
  • Lamar v. Board of Ed. of Hancock County School Dist.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 14, 1971
    ...uniformity of the burden imposed by a tax is one of the basic objectives of taxation and in support thereof cites City of Harrodsburg v. Devine, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 426 (1967). He says that 'The fundamental idea of taxation is that the burden should be borne equally by all persons and that no o......
  • City of Miami v. I. C. Sales, Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 17, 1973
    ...v. O'Connell, 114 Fla. 705, 154 So. 697 ($5 license fee for machines dispensing chewing gum or candy or peanuts); City of Harrodsburg v. Devine, Ky.1967, 418 S.W.2d 426 ($10 per machine on coin operated merchandise vending machines, held valid); Carolina Music Co. v. Query, 192 S.C. 308, 6 ......

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