City of Hartford v. Hartford Employees Assoc

• Decision Date: 29 January 2002
• Docket Number: 16507
• Citation: 788 A.2d 60
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF HARTFORD v. HARTFORD MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION ET AL. SC 16507, SC 16508 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

CITY OF HARTFORD v HARTFORD MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION ET AL.

SC 16507, SC 16508

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued November 1, 2001

January 29, 2002

Lisa S. Lazarek, assistant general counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 16507 (defendant state board of labor relations). Stephen F. McEleney, with whom, on the brief, were Richard P. Lawlor and Joanne Heslin Laverty, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 16508 (named defendant).

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Katz, J.

Opinion

This appeal raises several issues of first impression regarding the authority of the state board of labor relations to interpret and enforce grievance settlements pursuant to the Municipal Employees Relations Act (act). The defendants, the Hartford Municipal Employees Association (union) and the state board of labor relations (board), appeal ¹ from the trial court's judgment sustaining the appeal by the plaintiff, the city of Hartford (city), ² from the board's decision determining that the city had committed an unfair labor practice by ''refusing to comply with a grievance settlement'' in violation of General Statutes § 7-470 (a) (6) of the act. ³ On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) a ''grievance settlement'' does not encompass an unappealed step two grievance decision; (2) § 7-470 (a) (6) only requires compliance with a grievance settlement with respect to the specific circumstances giving rise to the dispute and not to future disputes arising from the same provision in the collective bargaining agreement (agreement), despite the parties' clearly expressed intent that the settlement have future application; and (3) the board is barred, under the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, from exercising its jurisdiction over claims arising under § 7470 (a) (6) until a grievance has proceeded through arbitration or has been abandoned. ⁴ We conclude that the board properly exercised jurisdiction and properly determined that the city had committed a prohibited practice in violation of § 7-470 (a) (6). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following relevant facts and procedural history. The city has instituted personnel rules that are incorporated by reference into its agreement with the union. Personnel rule X sets forth normal working hours for city employees as 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. with an unpaid hour for lunch, for a total of seven work hours per day. Personnel rule IV, however, establishes that certain employees, including those employees at the level of civil engineer I and higher, are entitled to work a ''flexible'' schedule.

Prior to May, 1997, employees classified as civil engineer III had been permitted to alter their schedules in two different ways: (1) they could shift the beginning and ending time of their workday while still working a total of seven hours in one day; or (2) they could work less than seven hours in one day and work additional hours on other days to compensate for the lost time to meet the required thirty-five hour total work week. In some instances, the employees sought permission before changing their schedule; on other occasions, they merely informed their supervisor of the change. On May 28, 1997, John Bertoli and Richard St. Pierre, city employees with job classifications of civil engineer III in the city's department of public works, were told by their supervisor that they no longer would be permitted to work flexible schedules. Bertoli and St. Pierre filed a grievance that same day, alleging a violation of the agreement and the city's personnel rules with regard to the flexible schedule policy. The adjustment required to remedy the violation, according to the grievance statement, was for the city to adhere to the flexible schedule provisions in the personnel rules and the agreement.

On July 1, 1997, subsequent to a hearing, the city's representative, Kathleen Morey, a principal administrative analyst, rendered a step two decision on the grievance filed by Bertoli and St. Pierre pursuant to the agreement. ⁵ Morey determined that the grievance presented two distinct issues: hours of work and flexible schedules. With respect to the first issue, Morey concluded that the agreement required employees to work from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and that any permanent change to such hours required prior written approval. Therefore, she denied that part of the grievance. With respect to the second issue, flexible schedules, Morey first determined that, under the agreement, employees at the level of civil engineer I and higher were entitled to work flexible schedules. As a result, she concluded that ''this grievance is sustained, in part, with regard to working flexible schedules. However, it is appropriate that all employees who work a flexible schedule have prior approval from their designated supervisor/ manager before any adjustment to the [seven] hour work day is made.'' (Emphasis in original.) Neither the union nor the employees appealed the decision.

Several months later, Bertoli submitted a request asking for his regular schedule to be changed to 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. The acting director of public works denied the request, noting that his decision was consistent with the 1997 step two grievance decision. The union then filed a complaint with the board alleging that the city's conduct with respect to Bertoli had violated § 7-470 (a) (6) by refusing to comply with a grievance settlement. ⁶ See footnote 3 of this opinion. In July, 1998, while the complaint was pending before the board, Husein Osman, another civil engineer III, was issued a written reprimand after beginning work at 8 a.m. and leaving at 4 p.m. without first receiving permission from his supervisor. Osman filed a grievance, which was denied at steps one through three of the grievance procedure as set forth in the agreement. The union tendered notice to the city, pursuant to step four of the grievance procedure, that it intended to submit the grievance to binding arbitration. Thereafter, the union also amended its unfair practice complaint to the board to include the city's conduct with respect to Osman.

At a hearing conducted by the board in accordance with § 7-471 (5), ⁷ the city argued that the board should dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, the city argued that the union was barred, under the doctrine of res judicata and the board's own deferral policy, ⁸ from bringing an unfair practice claim that would require the board to interpret the same contract provision at issue in the step two grievance decision when the union had failed to appeal from that decision. The board rejected that argument in light of the fact that the union's claim was predicated on its interpretation that the grievance decision sustained its position. The board further noted that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the claim since the union had not discovered that the city's interpretation was contrary to its own until several months after it had accepted the grievance decision, at which point the union could no longer appeal the grievance decision to arbitration.

Turning to the merits, the board agreed with the union that the step two grievance decision interpreted the city's personnel rules as entitling employees to change occasionally their start and end times of work without permission, as long as employees worked a seven hour day. The board examined the portion of the decision that provided that ''it is appropriate that all employees who work a flexible schedule have prior approval . . . before any adjustment to the [seven] hour work day is made''; (emphasis in original); and concluded that it meant that permission was required when an employee wanted to work more or less than seven hours in one day. Consequently, the board concluded that ''the [c]ity violated the [a]ct when it failed to abide by the 1997 grievance settlement by requiring employees to get approval before occasionally flexing the start and end times of their workday.'' The board ordered the city to comply with the 1997 grievance decision and to rescind Osman's written reprimand.

Thereafter, the city appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a). ⁹ The city claimed that the board's decision was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion because it was contrary to the personnel rules and because the board had failed to credit certain testimony presented to it. The city also claimed that the board exceeded its statutory authority by exercising jurisdiction over a matter of contract interpretation while the Osman grievance was pending before the state board of mediation and arbitration.

At a hearing on the matter, the trial court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether § 7-470 (a) (6), which proscribes the refusal to comply with a ''grievance settlement,'' protects only the original parties to the settlement, or whether it also applies prospectively to parties not part of the original settlement. Pursuant to the trial court's order, the parties submitted supplemental briefs on the issue, focusing in particular on the legislative history of § 7-470 (a) (6). The city, however, raised a different issue in its brief. ¹⁰ Specifically, it contended that the legislative history indicated that a step two grievance decision cannot be a per se grievance settlement within the meaning of § 7-470 (a) (6). Instead, according to the city, a settlement exists where the parties reach an agreement as a result of a grievance decision. As the parties in the present case had different interpretations of the decision, the city contended that there was no agreement and, hence, no settlement.

The trial court sustained the city's appeal. The trial court first concluded that the board improperly had determined that the city had committed a prohibited practice. The trial court's conclusion rested on two...