Bd. of Selectmen v. Freedom of Info. Com'n

• Decision Date: 05 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18343.,18343.
• Citation: 294 Conn. 438,984 A.2d 748
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF the TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, et al.

984 A.2d 748

294 Conn. 438

BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF the TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, et al.

No. 18343.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 26, 2009.

Decided January 5, 2010.

Frederick L. Dorsey, with whom, on the brief, were Meredith G. Diette and Ashley E. Baron, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, with whom was Daniel P. Hunsberger, for the appellee (named defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

KATZ, J.

The plaintiff, the board of selectmen of the town of Ridgefield (board), appeals¹ from the trial court's judgment dismissing its administrative appeal from the decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission). The commission had found that the board violated General Statutes § 1-225(d),² the notice provision of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., by holding a special meeting at which the board decided to ask for, and subsequently voted to accept, the resignation of a town employee, the defendant Anthony Gaeta, under circumstances not constituting an emergency and therefore not excusing compliance with the notice provisions. On appeal, the board contends that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the emergency meeting provisions of § 1-225(d) were not unconstitutionally vague; (2) agreed with the commission's conclusion that the contested meeting had not been held under emergency circumstances; (3) concluded that the commission had not abused its discretion in declaring the contested board meeting null and void; and (4) relied on evidence outside the factual findings made by the commission and thereby substituted its own judgment for that of the commission. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The commission's decision reflects the following undisputed facts. In January, 2006, the fire chief for the town of Ridgefield (town) announced his retirement, prompting a search for a new fire chief. At that time, Gaeta was the assistant fire chief and had served with the town's fire department for approximately thirty-six years. Gaeta initially had been considered as a candidate for the position, but, on March 27, 2006, he was informed that he was no longer being considered.

On March 29, 2006, Gaeta was involved in a verbal altercation with the town's public works director regarding Gaeta's elimination as a candidate for the fire chief position. The next day, the town's human resources director informed Rudy Marconi, the town's first selectperson, about the altercation. Marconi and Gaeta had been lifelong friends. Marconi asked the human resources director to "`draw up'" a stipend to offer to Gaeta for staying on as "`acting fire chief'" until a permanent replacement could be hired.

On Friday, March 31, Marconi went to Gaeta's office and gave him a memorandum describing the stipend and confirming that Gaeta would become acting fire chief as of the close of business that day.³ During the course of their meeting, both men became angry and used vulgar language. Gaeta threw papers at Marconi, moved toward Marconi and threatened to kill him. In response, Marconi told Gaeta that he was going to call a meeting of the board for 9 a.m. the next morning, that Gaeta should attend, and that Gaeta was "`going to have to answer to the [board].'" Nonetheless, before Marconi left Gaeta's office, he asked Gaeta "`will you take the job as acting chief or not,'" to which Gaeta responded affirmatively.⁴

Immediately after the meeting with Gaeta, Marconi called the second selectperson, Barbara Manners, and described his encounter with Gaeta. Marconi and Manners decided to call an emergency board meeting for 9 a.m. the next morning, April 1, 2006, to "`review [Gaeta's] conduct during the past week and during the entire interview process.'" That evening, an administrative assistant called the other board members and informed them of the emergency meeting, without notifying the press or the public. The board convened at 9 a.m. the next morning, without Gaeta present, and commenced an executive session.⁵ At approximately 11 a.m., the board ended the executive session, voted to ask Gaeta for his resignation and recessed the meeting.

Gaeta then was summoned to the town hall to meet with the board. When he arrived, he was led to a room where Manners was waiting. She informed him that the board was asking for his resignation and that, if he chose not to resign, he would be placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into his conduct. Gaeta responded that neither option was acceptable to him and that instead, he would retire. The board recommenced the meeting and voted to "`accept [Gaeta's] resignation.'"

The record reflects the following undisputed procedural history. On May 3, 2006, Gaeta filed a complaint with the commission in which he alleged, inter alia, that the board had violated § 1-225(d) by improperly conducting an "emergency meeting" under circumstances that had not constituted an emergency. Gaeta claimed that, because there had been no emergency, the board had violated § 1-225(d), which requires public agencies to give twenty-four hours notice to the public before convening a special meeting. In deciding whether the situation had constituted an emergency, the commission, in the absence of a definition of that term in the act, cited to the dictionary definition of "emergency" and drew from the meaning of that term established in Lebanon v. Wayland, 39 Conn.Supp. 56, 61-62, 467 A.2d 1267 (1983), as well as in prior commission decisions examining the term. The commission determined that Gaeta's actions had not created an emergency and that the board therefore had violated the notice provisions of § 1-225(d). Accordingly, the commission declared the board's acceptance of Gaeta's resignation null and void, and ordered the board to comply strictly with the notice provisions of § 1-225(d).

The board subsequently appealed from the commission's decision to the trial court, claiming that the portion of § 1-225(d) providing that "in case of emergency ... any ... special meeting may be held without complying with the [notice requirements of the act]" was unconstitutionally vague. The board also claimed that, even if the statute was constitutional, the commission improperly determined that the events at issue did not constitute an emergency under § 1-225(d). Finally, the board claimed that the commission had abused its discretion by declaring the actions taken at the board meeting null and void. The trial court rejected each of these claims, and dismissed the board's appeal. This appeal followed. On appeal, the board disputes each of the trial court's conclusions and also claims that the trial court improperly relied on factual findings not contained in the commission's decision.⁶

I

We begin, as we must, with the board's nonconstitutional claims. See Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 635 n. 15, 904 A.2d 149 (2006) ("[t]his court has a basic judicial duty to avoid deciding a constitutional issue if a nonconstitutional ground exists that will dispose of the case" [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also State v. Cofield, 220 Conn. 38, 49-50, 595 A.2d 1349 (1991); Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 20, 513 A.2d 660 (1986).

Our review of these claims is guided by well established principles. "[J]udicial review of the commissioner's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [(UAPA), General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189], and the scope of that review is very restricted.... [R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact.... Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jim's Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794, 803-804, 942 A.2d 305 (2008).

Cases that present pure questions of law, however, traditionally invoke a broader standard of review than ordinarily is involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Id., at 804, 942 A.2d 305. We have determined, therefore, that we will defer to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term only when that interpretation of the statute previously has been subjected to judicial scrutiny or to a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation and is reasonable. See Vincent v. New Haven, 285 Conn. 778, 783-84, 941 A.2d 932 (2008); Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 163-64, 931 A.2d 890 (2007).

A

The board first claims that the trial court improperly determined that the commission properly had concluded that the circumstances at issue did not constitute an emergency under § 1-225(d). We disagree.

We begin with the language at issue. "Notice of each special meeting of every public agency ... shall be posted not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting to which such notice refers.... Such notice shall be given not less than twenty-four hours prior to the time of the special meeting; provided, in case of emergency ... any such special meeting may be held without complying with the foregoing requirement for the filing of notice ...." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 1-225(d). The act does not define emergency, and the commission never has promulgated official regulations defining the term. Although this court never has addressed...