City of Hartford v. Champion

• Decision Date: 30 December 1889
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF HARTFORD v. CHAMPION.

20 A. 471

58 Conn. 268

CITY OF HARTFORD

v. CHAMPION.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 30, 1889.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford county; F. B. HALL, Judge.

A. P. Hyde, C. H. Briscoe, and J. P. A ndrews, for appellant. W. F. Henney and J. H. Brocklesby, for appellee.

ANDREWS, C. J. The defendant is an elderly lady of large wealth and never married. She had lived in the city of Hartford quite a number of years prior to 1882 with an only brother, an old man, a bachelor, in feeble health, and who appears to have been her only near relative living. During these years she paid taxes in Hartford. In the year 1882 she did not return any list of her taxable property to the assessors, and thereupon the assessors filled out a list for her, putting therein all the property they had reason to believe was owned by her liable to taxation at its actual valuation, and adding thereto 10 per cent. of such valuation. In the year 1883, upon a like omission by her to return a list, the assessors again filled out a list for her and added thereto 20 per cent.; and again in 1884, and added 30 per cent.; and again in 1885. Taxes were laid on these several assessments, to recover which this suit was brought, pursuant to section 3901 of the General Statutes. The case was tried to a jury and the plaintiff had a verdict. The defendant has appealed.

For the purpose of proving the tax assessed and laid for the year 1884, the plaintiff offered the list for that year made out by the assessors as follows:

"Taxable list of Julia Champion, of Hartford, for 1884:

Insurance stocks...................

$81,763

30 per cent. additional for neglecting to make out sworn list...................

$24,528"

To this the defendant objected, because the insurance stocks named in the list were not itemized so as to indicate the various companies in which they were held, and because the statute authorizing the addition of 30 per cent. was repealed. The court overruled the objections and admitted the list. The ground of the first objection is fully removed by the ruling of the court in the case of Town of Hartford v. Champion, 54 Conn. 436, 7 Atl. Rep. 721. The assessors performed their duty, and made the addition prior to the 31st day of December, 1884. At that time the addition was lawful. The repealing statute invoked by the defendant was not passed until March, 1885, and did not take effect till the 1st day of July of that year. It had no retroactive effect. There was no error in the ruling.

The main contention before the jury was whether or not the defendant, on the 1st day of October in the years 1882, 1883, 1884, and 1885, resided in the city of Hartford, so as to be liable to pay taxes there. The defendant claimed that in the spring of 1882 she removed from Hartford with the intention of not returning to reside there, and took up her residence in the city of Springfield, Mass., where she continued to reside in boarding-houses until the spring of 1883, when she removed to Suffield, Conn., where she has ever since resided. It appeared in the evidence that the defendant had passed some portions of her time during these years in Springfield and in Suffield, and that she had bought a house in the latter town. The plaintiff claimed that these absences from Hartford were not had with a bona fide intention on the part of the defendant to change her residence; but that whatever absences from Hartford on her part were proved, were merely temporary absences, arranged for the purpose of creating the appearance of a residence elsewhere which did not in fact exist, and giving color to her claim that she had ceased to reside in Hartford. Many witnesses were examined by both sides as to the fact of these absences, the circumstances attending them, and the length of her stay; and also as to the length of her abiding in Hartford, and the circumstances of it, the character of her residence there, and generally as to her habits and mode of life and her family relations and connections. Among other witnesses the defendant called Mrs. Porter King, who testified that the defendant had lived at her house in Springfield just the same as the rest of her (the witness') family. On cross-examination counsel for the plaintiff asked this witness if she knew where the defendant got her meals while she was staying at the witness 'house, and if she did not sometimes get her dinners at the depot restaurant. To these inquiries the defendant's counsel objected, but the court overruled the objection and admitted them. We think these questions clearly admissible. It certainly was proper to find out what the witness meant when she stated that the defendant had lived at her house just the same as the rest of her family. The defendant claimed to be residing in Springfield, making it her home there at the boarding-house of Mrs. King. The fact of getting dinners or other meals at the depot restaurant would, if proved, have a very significant bearing on the correctness of that claim. A person temporarily in Springfield would be very likely to get a meal at the depot restaurant, while a person residing there and having a home at a boarding-house would not be likely to do so. In her own testimony in chief the defendant exhibited and testified concerning certain receipts for her board and room while she was in Springfield. On cross-examination she was asked: "Will you tell me why the amounts that were paid do not appear in any of these receipts'?" and various other questions of like nature; to all of which counsel for the defendant objected, but the court admitted them. There was no error in this. The plain tiff claimed that these receipts had been prepared by the defendant to make it appear that she had boarded in Springfield much longer than was the real fact. They had the right to show this if they could.

The defendant, in connection with her testimony in chief, introduced notices which she had received while in Springfield from certain insurance companies in Hartford, to the effect that a non-resident tax had been deducted before transmitting to her the dividends on her stocks. She was asked on cross-examination if she had not received similar notices from Massachusetts companies. She answered that she did not think she ever had. The defendant's counsel objected to this question, for the reason that it assumed a fact which had not been proved; that is, that the law in Massachusetts in this respect was like the law of Connecticut. The court admitted the question. We are not able to see how the defendant was harmed by this question in any aspect of it. If the law of Massachusetts is the same as the law of Connecticut, then the fact that she had received no such notice from Massachusetts corporations would tend to support her claim that she resided in that state. If the law in that state is different from ours, as the defendant claims, then, as she answered that she had not received any such notice, she was not harmed. There was no fact from which any such inference could be made either way.

Nelson King, a witness in behalf of the defendant, testified as to her residence in Suffield, and as to how often and under what circumstances he had seen her there. He was asked on cross-examination respecting a Mr. Burbank, who lived in the house next to the one owned by the defendant. We think these questions were proper to test the memory of the witness, and to test his habits of observation, as well as his accuracy.

During the trial counsel for the defendant presented to the court...