State v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 07 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14604,14604
• Citation: 632 A.2d 674,227 Conn. 616
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Donald L. CHAPMAN.

Page 674

632 A.2d 674

227 Conn. 616

STATE of Connecticut v. Donald L. CHAPMAN.

No. 14604.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 11, 1993.

Decided Sept. 7, 1993 ^*.

Callahan and Santaniello, JJ., filed dissenting opinions.

Lawrence J. Tytla, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., for appellant (State).

Ira B. Grudberg, with whom was Thomas W. Ude, Jr., New Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, KATZ and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Donald L. Chapman, was convicted by a jury of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1) ¹ and sentenced to a term of fourteen years, execution suspended after seven years. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury that it could find him guilty of sexual assault in the first degree if it found that he had compelled sexual intercourse either by the use of force or by the threat of use of force. The state had not charged the defendant with having threatened to use force, nor did the state introduce evidence of the threat of use of force. ² The Appellate Court concluded For the purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, we need to concern ourselves only with the following limited facts. The state charged only that the defendant had compelled sexual intercourse by the use of force and introduced evidence to that end. ⁴ The state concedes that it introduced no evidence that the defendant had committed the offense by threatening the use of force against the victim. Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury that "a person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or by the threat of the use of force against such person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury." (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the trial court instructed on the use of a threat as an alternative means of committing the crime on three separate occasions. The defendant took an exception to the instruction on committing sexual assault by threatening the use of force, thereby appropriately preserving this claim for appellate review. See Practice Book § 852; ⁵ State v. Smith, 219 Conn. 160, 592 A.2d 382 (1991); State v. Hill, 201 Conn. 505, 512, 518 A.2d 388 (1986).

                that the trial court had "improperly instructed the jury on a statutory alternative for which there was no supporting evidence" and ordered a new trial.  State v. Chapman, 28 Conn.App. 360, 366, 610 A.2d 1328 (1992).   We granted the state's petition for certification limited to the following issues:  "(1) Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the statutory alternative analysis set forth in State v. Williams, 202 Conn. 349, 363-64 [521 A.2d 150] (1987), applied to alternative language occurring within the same statutory sub[division] and that the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to consider a separate and distinct theory of criminal liability?  (2) Was the Appellate Court correct in its failure to consider whether any error in the trial court's charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?"  State v. Chapman, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 827 (1992).   We conclude that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on a statutory alternative for which the defendant was not charged and for which there was no supporting evidence. 3  We also conclude that the trial [227 Conn. 619] court's instruction violated the defendant's due process rights under the Connecticut constitution and that harmless error analysis is not required.   We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court
                

I

STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS

Sexual assault in the first degree may be committed by two methods under The state claims that the statutory alternative analysis employed in State v. Williams, supra, is not applicable in this case because the two methods of committing sexual assault in the first degree at issue here--use of force and the threat of use of force--are set forth in the same subdivision of the statutory definition. The state argues that the analysis in Williams should apply only when the statutory alternatives are framed in separately numbered statutory subdivisions. We disagree. Whether the legislature has distinguished between methods of achieving a result by placing them in separately labeled subdivisions or within a single subdivision is not determinative for deciding whether to apply the statutory alternative analysis set forth in Williams. We decline to adopt the distinction advanced by the state because it would elevate form over substance by analyzing a statute on the basis of its structure rather than its purpose. See State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125, 545 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895, 109 S.Ct. 235, 102 L.Ed.2d 225 (1988); State v. Gonzalez, 206 Conn. 213, 219, 537 A.2d 460 (1988).

                §  53a-70(a)(1):  (1) by compelling another person to engage in sexual intercourse by "the use of force";  or (2) by compelling another person to engage in sexual intercourse by "the threat of use of force."   We have held on numerous occasions that " '[w]here a person may have been convicted under more than one statutory alternative, the judgment cannot be supported unless the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt under each statutory provision which the trier may have relied upon.'  State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 650-51, 462 A.2d 1021 (1983);  State v. Thompson, 197 Conn. 67, 74, 495 A.2d 1054 (1985);  State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 730, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985);  State v. Reid, 193 Conn. 646, 666, 480 A.2d 463 (1984);  see State v. Silveira, 198 Conn. 454, 459, 503 A.2d 599 (1986).   This rule is based on the principle that jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given by the judge.  State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 156, 376 A.2d 1108 (1977);  State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 567, 353 A.2d 750 (1974)."  State v. Williams, supra.   By instructing the jury on a theory of criminality for which there is no supporting evidence, the trial court implies that there is a factual [227 Conn. 621] dispute for the jury to resolve regarding that theory of criminality.   The trial court's instruction authorizes the jury to consider and to resolve the implied factual dispute.  Id., 202 Conn. at 364, 521 A.2d 150.  "The trial court should submit no issue to the jury which is foreign to the facts in evidence, or upon which no evidence was offered, and it should not submit to the jury considerations which find no support in the evidence."  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Campbell, 225 Conn. 650, 659, 626 A.2d 287 (1993);  see also State v. Williams, supra
                

Instead, we must focus on the underlying purpose of the statutory alternative analysis set forth in State v. Williams, supra, 202 Conn. at 364, 521 A.2d 150 which serves the essential function of ensuring that juries do not convict under a theory of criminality unless the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt under that theory. In view of this underlying purpose, we must turn to the substance of the statutory text to determine whether the use of force and the threat of the use of force are separate statutory alternatives.

Section 53a-70(a) provides that sexual assault may be committed by the "use of force against such other person ... or by the threat of the use of force against such other person ... which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person...." The text of the statute clearly separates "force" from "threat of use of force" by using the disjunctive "or." The "use of the disjunctive 'or' between the two parts of the statute indicates a clear legislative intent of separability." State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 248, 188 A.2d 65 (1963). Thus, in State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 500-501, 461 A.2d 973 (1983), we held that the trial court had impermissibly enlarged the offense charged by incorporating the uncharged disjunctive phrase "remains unlawfully" when explaining the elements of burglary in the first degree. Under General Statutes § 53a-101(a), "[a] person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he enters Similarly, we have consistently held that the "use of force" and the "threat of use of force" are "two methods of committing the same crime." State v. Secore, 194 Conn. 692, 698, 485 A.2d 1280 (1984); State v. Franko, 199 Conn. 481, 490, 508 A.2d 22 (1986); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 611, 628-29, 458 A.2d 369 (1983); see also 5 Connecticut Practice, D. Borden & L. Orland, Criminal Jury Instructions (1986) (suggesting separate jury instructions for the use of force [§ 10.2] and the threat of use of force [§ 10.1].

or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein...." We noted that "a burglary is committed when either type of 'entry' is established"; id., at 501, 461 A.2d 973 and concluded that the trial court had violated the defendant's due process rights under the state and federal constitutions by repeatedly using the disjunctive phrase "remains unlawfully," when the state had not charged the defendant with that theory of liability.

The state argues that the use of force and the threat of force cannot be statutory alternatives, however, because they can occur together and because they cause an identical result--namely, compelled sexual intercourse. We reject both of these arguments. Although an assailant may use force simultaneously with a threat to use force, each method may occur in isolation, as indicated by the plain language of the statute, which delineates the use of force separately from the threat of the use of force, and by the facts of this case. As previously noted, the state concedes that it neither charged nor introduced evidence to show that...