City of Helena v. Lewis, s. 92-407

• Decision Date: 15 October 1993
• Docket Number: 92-443,Nos. 92-407,s. 92-407
• Citation: 260 Mont. 421,860 P.2d 698
• Parties: CITY OF HELENA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John T. LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant. CITY OF HELENA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Claire BRISENDINE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 698

860 P.2d 698

260 Mont. 421

CITY OF HELENA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John T. LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant.

CITY OF HELENA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Claire BRISENDINE, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. 92-407, 92-443.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs May 20, 1993.

Decided Sept. 20, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1993.

Patrick F. Flaherty, Great Falls, for defendants and appellants.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Atty. Gen., Patricia J. Jordan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert Wood, Asst. City Atty., Helena, for plaintiff and respondent.

GRAY, Justice.

Appellants Claire Brisendine and John Lewis appeal from separate orders of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, finding Claire Brisendine guilty of criminal trespass and disorderly conduct and John Lewis guilty of criminal trespass. The appeals were consolidated pursuant to order of this Court. We affirm.

We phrase the issues on appeal as follows:

1) Did the District Court err in granting the City's motion in limine to prohibit the Defendants from introducing evidence regarding the defenses of necessity and justifiable use of force?

2) Did the District Court properly instruct the jury in Lewis' case?

3) Did the Defendants possess the requisite mental state for conviction under the criminal trespass and disorderly conduct statutes?

4) Did the prosecution wrongfully withhold exculpatory material from the Defendants in violation of Brady v. Maryland?

Claire Brisendine (Brisendine) and John Lewis (Lewis) attended a demonstration at the Intermountain Planned Parenthood Clinic (Clinic) in Helena, Montana, on December 6, 1991. "No trespassing" signs were posted around the perimeter of the property, and a statewide injunction forbidding all but patients and staff from entering the Clinic premises also was posted. People in groups of three, Lewis and Brisendine included, had joined themselves together at the neck with bicycle locks and were sitting in triangular patterns in front of the doorway to the Clinic. The Helena City Police were called to the Clinic and informed the demonstrators that they were trespassing. Both Brisendine and Lewis refused to leave when asked to do so by the Clinic director and the police. The Helena Fire Department arrived and cut off the bicycle locks. Lewis and Brisendine, among others, were arrested. Brisendine was charged in City Court with criminal trespass and disorderly conduct; Lewis was charged with criminal trespass.

After their convictions in City Court, both Brisendine and Lewis appealed to the District Court. Brisendine was represented by counsel in District Court; Lewis appeared pro se throughout the proceedings. In both cases, the City promptly filed a motion in limine requesting the District Court to prohibit Brisendine and Lewis from making any references to the propriety of abortion or any other matters that were not relevant to the charges of criminal trespass and disorderly conduct. In response to the City's motion in limine, Brisendine filed notice of the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force under § 45-3-102, MCA, and also filed a motion to dismiss the charges.

In Brisendine's case, District Court Judge Jeffrey Sherlock granted the City's motion in limine and denied Brisendine's motion to dismiss. At a bench trial held July 31, 1992, Brisendine waived her right to a jury trial and stipulated that she had been on the Clinic's private property and had obstructed ingress and egress to the Clinic. Over the City's objection, Brisendine made an offer of proof, testifying briefly as to the motivations behind her actions. On August 3, 1992, the District Court issued an order finding Brisendine guilty of disorderly conduct and criminal trespass and reinstating the sentence previously imposed by the City Court. Her sentence was stayed pending appeal.

In Lewis' case, District Court Judge Thomas Honzel granted the City's motion in limine. The charge against Lewis proceeded to trial, and the jury found him guilty of criminal trespass. The court sentenced Lewis to 180 days in jail, with 179 days suspended and credit for one day served, imposed a $300 fine, and assessed jury costs. Judgment against Lewis was entered on June 23, 1992. Both Brisendine and Lewis appealed.

On November 5, 1992, this Court granted Lewis' and Brisendine's motion to consolidate the two cases. Although they presented distinct arguments regarding their defenses to the District Court, Brisendine and Lewis have filed a consolidated brief on appeal. Therefore, for purposes of discussing their arguments, Brisendine and Lewis will be referred to collectively as the Defendants.

Did the District Court err in granting the City's motion in limine to prohibit the Defendants from introducing evidence regarding the defenses of necessity and justifiable use of force?

In Brisendine's case, the District Court reasoned that her opposition to the motion in limine centered around her argument that Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, was incorrectly decided. The District Court concluded that the activities at the Clinic were legal, and that it could not overrule Roe v. Wade. For that reason, the court ruled that the defense of necessity was not appropriate, nor was reference to any other matter dealing with the abortion process. In granting the City's lengthy motion in limine, the District Court allowed Brisendine to indicate why she was acting as she did on December 6, 1991, but prohibited her from an "extended foray" into the issues surrounding abortion. In Lewis' case, the District Court also granted an identical motion in limine, but did so without explanation of record.

On appeal, the Defendants primarily challenge the following provision of the motion in limine, which excluded all

"legal arguments" or "legal documents" deemed inadmissible as a matter of law, including but not limited to the "necessity defense," "justifiable use of force" defense, treaties, biblical or moral justification for their actions, arguments that abortion is illegal, Roe v. Wade is bad law, or that the charges filed against the Defendant are unconstitutional.

The Defendants assert that they were improperly "gagged" from referring to their defenses at trial. The City asserts that because the defenses are inapplicable as a matter of law, they are necessarily irrelevant under Rule 402, M.R.Civ.P., and, therefore, properly excluded by the motions in limine.

"The purpose of a motion in limine is to prevent the introduction of evidence which is irrelevant, immaterial, or unfairly prejudicial." Feller v. Fox (1989), 237 Mont. 150, 153, 772 P.2d 842, 844. Accordingly, the authority to grant or deny a motion in limine "rests in the inherent power of the court to admit or exclude evidence and to take such precautions as are necessary to afford a fair trial for all parties." Feller, 772 P.2d at 844, quoting Wallin v. Kinyon Estate (1974), 164 Mont. 160, 165, 519 P.2d 1236, 1238. Thus, we will not overturn a district court's grant of a motion in limine absent an abuse of discretion. See Feller, 772 P.2d at 844; State v. Oman (1985), 218 Mont. 260, 264, 707 P.2d 1117, 1119. Keeping this standard in mind, we review the District Courts' decisions to exclude the evidence regarding their asserted defenses.

This Court recently clarified the applicability of the "necessity" defense in Montana and concluded that the defense has been codified in § 45-2-212, MCA. State v. Ottwell (1989), 240 Mont. 376, 379, 784 P.2d 402, 404. In Ottwell, we explained that the defenses of necessity, justification, compulsion, duress, and the "choice of two evils" have been merged statutorily and labeled "compulsion" under § 45-2-212, MCA. Ottwell, 784 P.2d at 404. Thus, the common law elements and distinctions between the aforementioned defenses are no longer applicable in Montana, with one exception which is inapplicable here. Ottwell, 784 P.2d at 404; see also State v. Pease (1988), 233 Mont. 65, 71, 758 P.2d 764, 768. Therefore, we apply the elements of § 45-2-212, MCA, to the case before us.

Montana's compulsion statute reads:

A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or serious bodily harm if he reasonably believes that death or serious bodily harm will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct.

Section 45-2-212, MCA. The compulsion defense does not include imminent threats of harm to a third party. State v. Spalding (1991), 247 Mont. 317, 321, 806 P.2d 1029, 1032. The statute does not excuse criminal conduct unless the person asserting the defense reasonably believes that death or serious bodily injury will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform the criminal act.

The Defendants have not alleged that they reasonably believed that death or serious bodily injury would be inflicted upon them if they did not trespass on the Clinic's property. Therefore, the defense of compulsion, which the Defendants characterize as the defense of necessity and/or justification, does not apply to this case. We conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that the "necessity" defense was inappropriately raised by the Defendants.

The Defendants rely exclusively on a Kansas district court case, City of Wichita v. Tilson (Kan.Dist.Ct.1992), No. 91 MC 108, to support their argument on appeal. This reliance is misplaced for several reasons. First, the result is based on the court's analysis of the common law defense of "choice of evils," which the court alternatively denominates as "justification by necessity." As explained, these defenses are included in the statutory amalgamation of § 45-2-212, MCA, in Montana; the common law elements are not recognized here. In addition, the case is presently on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court. Moreover, the Kansas Legislature...