City of Henderson v. Spangler
| Decision Date | 14 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 76295-COA,76295-COA |
| Citation | 464 P.3d 1039 |
| Parties | CITY OF HENDERSON; and Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc., Appellants, v. Jared SPANGLER, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Court of Appeals |
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP and Daniel L. Schwartz and Joel P. Reeves, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Greenman Goldberg Raby & Martinez and Lisa M. Anderson and Thaddeus J. Yurek, III, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and BULLA, JJ.
Statistics tell us that most police officers will never be required to draw, much less fire, their service weapon in the line of duty. But even when they don't, they still perform a difficult and hazardous job by merely being present at the scene of danger. This appeal involves a police officer who suffered progressive hearing loss that he believes to have been caused, at least in part, by his job. It's a risk that many officers might eventually suffer, for even on the best of days the typical police officer is exposed to a variety of noises that the rest of us might never experience, from such things as sirens, radio earpieces, shouted commands, and the sound of gunfire—maybe not from the rare occasion of having to draw a weapon against a suspect, but much more routinely by being required to regularly qualify on the shooting range.
This is a workers' compensation appeal. Jared Spangler served as a police officer for the City of Henderson since 2003 and over that time lost much of his hearing, to the point where he was assigned to desk duty. He sought compensation under NRS 617.430 and .440, which entitle employees, including but not limited to police officers, to workers' compensation benefits if they suffer a disability caused by an "occupational disease." The complicating factor in this appeal is that Spangler already had some level of hearing loss, perhaps genetically induced, before he began his service that his years on the job potentially made worse. Because at least part of his current hearing disability was attributable to that original pre-employment loss, the appeals officer denied benefits to Spangler. But NRS 617.366(1) provides that benefits are due when an employee's current condition results from an original condition that preexisted the job that was aggravated or accelerated by an occupational disease contracted from the job. We conclude that the plain text of this statute does not exclude the possibility of benefits under those circumstances, so long as the other requirements set forth in the statute are satisfied. We therefore affirm the order of the district court reversing the appeals officer and remand this matter for further consideration.
In 2005, while working as a police officer for the City of Henderson, Jared Spangler sought workers' compensation benefits, alleging that exposure to various loud noises while on patrol caused ringing in his ears and simultaneous hearing loss. Spangler was examined by Dr. Scott Manthei, who concluded that Spangler's hearing loss was not work related and that a nonindustrial cause (perhaps of genetic origin) was behind his symptoms. The City, through its third-party workers' compensation administrator, denied Spangler's claim based on Dr. Manthei's report. Spangler did not appeal that denial, so that claim is closed and cannot now be revisited.
Still experiencing significant decreased hearing 11 years later, in 2016 Spangler consulted Dr. Amanda Blake, who opined that Spangler's exposure to various work-related sounds—including police sirens, gunfire during range qualifications, and radio chatter from his left ear piece as well as his lapel microphone—caused the increased hearing loss, which she opined was an industrial condition. After this consultation, Spangler filed a second workers' compensation claim alleging that cumulative exposure to loud noise in different work environments over the years all combined to worsen his hearing even more than when he filed his 2006 claim. He also consulted Dr. Roger Theobald to determine the cause of his increased hearing loss, but Dr. Theobald could not conclusively attribute the loss to either Spangler's underlying nonindustrial cause or his work environment. Ultimately, the administrator denied Spangler's second claim because he failed to establish that his increased hearing loss arose out of his employment.
Spangler appealed and, in preparation for his administrative appeal hearing, sought out a third doctor, Dr. Steven Becker, who opined that Spangler's bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus were not work related, but that his work environment was a contributory factor in his increased hearing loss. The appeals officer affirmed the denial, claiming that Spangler failed to establish either an "injury by accident" or an occupational disease that would entitle him to benefits. Spangler then petitioned the district court for judicial review of the appeals officer's decision. The district court granted the petition and reversed. The City and its third-party administrator now appeal from the district court order.
On appeal, the City argues that (1) the appeals officer did not err in interpreting NRS 616A.030's definition of "accident"; (2) the appeals officer's decision under NRS 616C.175(1) is supported by substantial evidence, as Spangler did not establish an "injury by accident"; and (3) the appeals officer's decision under NRS 617.440 is supported by substantial evidence because Spangler's hearing loss is not a compensable occupational disease.
Standard of review
On appeal, this court's role in reviewing an administrative agency's decision in a workers' compensation matter is identical to that of the district court. Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc. , 129 Nev. 780, 784, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013). We do not defer to the district court's decision when reviewing an order deciding a petition for judicial review. Id. Instead, we examine the administrative agency's "fact-based conclusions of law" for clear error or an abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb them if supported by substantial evidence. Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Menditto , 121 Nev. 278, 283, 112 P.3d 1093, 1097 (2005). "Substantial evidence" is defined as "evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," regardless of whether we ourselves would reach the same conclusion had we been in the appeals officer's place. Horne v. State Indus. Ins. Sys. , 113 Nev. 532, 537, 936 P.2d 839, 842 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the appeals officer on a question of fact. Id. However, we review de novo an administrative agency's conclusions of law, including its interpretation of the relevant statutes. Star Ins. Co. v. Neighbors , 122 Nev. 773, 776, 138 P.3d 507, 509-10 (2006).
Broadly speaking, employees may seek workers' compensation benefits for two types of work-induced conditions. An employee may seek compensation for a work-related "injury" under the provisions of NRS Chapters 616A-D, or an employee may seek compensation for an "occupational disease" under the provisions of NRS Chapter 617.
Whether Spangler's hearing loss constitutes a compensable "injury by accident" under NRS Chapters 616A-D
We first address whether Spangler's claim satisfies NRS Chapters 616A-D. Spangler may only recover under these statutes if he suffered an "injury," defined in NRS 616A.265 as "a sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate and prompt result." Moreover, he may only recover compensation for such injuries if they resulted from an "accident," defined as "an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury." NRS 616A.030. The words of this latter statute are plain and unambiguous, so we must follow them as written. Poole v. Nev. Auto Dealership Invs., LLC , 135 Nev. 280, 283, 449 P.3d 479, 482 (Ct. App. 2019). According to the Nevada Supreme Court, these words mean exactly what they say: that "[i]n order for an incident to qualify as an accident, the claimant must show the following elements: (1) an unexpected or unforeseen event; (2) happening suddenly and violently; and (3) producing at the time ... objective symptoms of injury." Bullock v. Pinnacle Risk Mgmt. , 113 Nev. 1385, 1389, 951 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1997).
Spangler's increased hearing loss does not fall within this statutory definition because he cannot identify a single incident which caused hearing loss at the moment it happened, but rather, he only alleges that his hearing worsened gradually and progressively over time, unrelated to any single sudden incident or even a series of sudden incidents. Even if he could tie his hearing loss retrospectively to any such single accident, he does not allege that his symptoms appeared immediately thereafter. The reports of all three physicians whose opinions were presented to the appeals officer (Dr. Blake, Dr. Theobald, and Dr. Becker) agree that Spangler's increased hearing loss and tinnitus resulted from accumulated exposure over time and not from any single sudden and violent incident which immediately induced injury at that moment. Consequently, we must conclude that substantial evidence supports the decision of the appeals officer that Spangler could not establish an "injury by accident" and he cannot recover under NRS Chapters 616A-D.
Whether Spangler's hearing loss constitutes a compensable "occupational disease" under NRS Chapter 617
The more complex question in this case is whether Spangler's hearing loss qualifies as a compensable "occupational disease" under NRS 617.440. NRS Chapter 617 provides benefits to employees who either die or suffer a "disability," whether temporary or permanent and whether total or partial, from an occupational disease. See NRS 617.430. NRS 617.440 lists the requirements for determining whether an employee's...
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