City of Highland Park v. Lee

• Decision Date: 06 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 2-96-0679,2-96-0679
• Parties: , 225 Ill.Dec. 459 The CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James LEE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 962

683 N.E.2d 962

291 Ill.App.3d 48, 225 Ill.Dec. 459

The CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James LEE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-96-0679.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Aug. 6, 1997.

Lawrence R. LaLuzerne, Rosing, Smith, Ericksen, Zeit & Stanczak, Ltd., Waukegan, for City of Highland Park.

Alan T. Davis, Fagan, Salon & Associates, Des Plaines, for James Lee.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, James Lee, was arrested and charged with driving with a blood-alcohol concentration above 0.10 (Highland Park Municipal Code § 71.105A1 (19__)), driving under the influence of alcohol (Highland Park Municipal Code § 71.105A2 (19__)), and driving with a revoked license (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (West 1994)). The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence and his petition to rescind the summary suspension of his license. The City of Highland Park (City) now appeals. We affirm.

We initially must address this court's jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal of the court's order to quash and suppress. The City brings the appeal under Supreme Court Rule 604(a), which provides:

"(a) Appeals by the State.

(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.

(2) Leave to Appeal by State. The State may petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315(a).

(3) Release of Defendant Pending Appeal. A defendant shall not be held in jail or to bail during the pendency of an appeal by the State, or of a petition or appeal by the State under Rule 315(a), unless there are compelling reasons for his continued detention or being held to bail.

(4) Time Appeal Pending Not Counted. The time during which an appeal by the State is pending is not counted for the purpose of determining whether an accused is entitled to discharge under section 103--5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963." 145 Ill.2d R. 604(a).

While this rule gives the State the right to pursue interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, it has long been held that this right does not extend to municipalities prosecuting village ordinance violations. See, e.g., Village of Cary v. Pavis, 171 Ill.App.3d 1072, 122 Ill.Dec. 264, 526 N.E.2d 523 (1988). Therefore, in most instances, a municipality cannot take an interlocutory appeal from an order quashing arrest and suppressing evidence.

However, section 16--102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides, in part:

"The State's Attorney of the county in which the violation occurs shall prosecute all violations except when the violation occurs within the corporate limits of a municipality, the municipal attorney may prosecute if written permission to do so is obtained from the State's Attorney." 625 ILCS 5/16--102 (West 1994).

In this case, the charge of driving while license was revoked was brought as a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code and not as a violation of a municipal ordinance. The municipal prosecutor for the City has received written permission to prosecute violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code from the State's Attorney of Lake County. Thus, the municipal prosecutor, acting in the place of the State's Attorney, may appeal from the granting of the defendant's motion to quash and suppress, and this court has jurisdiction to review the trial court's order. Thus, we need not revisit Village of Cary to determine if the appeal of ordinance violations identical to statutory violations ought to be included in the context of Supreme Court Rule 604(a).

Officer Justin Coulter of the Highland Park police department was patrolling a residential neighborhood at about 1 a.m., on June 27, 1995. He observed a Jeep driving approximately one to two miles per hour southbound on Western Avenue. Coulter pulled to within a car length behind the Jeep and saw a woman walking along the passenger side. Coulter could hear the woman and the person inside the Jeep yelling at each other.

After driving about one car length, the Jeep turned left onto Prairie Avenue, leaving the woman on Western Avenue. Coulter approached the woman and ascertained that, although she was upset, she was otherwise unharmed. Coulter left the woman and followed the Jeep, which was still traveling on Prairie Avenue. Coulter did not observe the Jeep violate any laws during the time that he followed the vehicle.

Coulter then activated his emergency lights and curbed the Jeep. During his subsequent conversation with defendant, who was driving the Jeep, Coulter learned that defendant did not have a valid driver's license. Defendant explained that the woman on Western Avenue was his girlfriend and that they had been fighting. He added that after the fight had started his girlfriend had gotten out of the Jeep and had begun walking. Coulter determined that defendant was intoxicated and arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a blood-alcohol concentration above 0.10, and driving with a revoked license.

Defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence and petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license. The parties stipulated that the issue to be presented at the hearing on the motion was whether there was a legal basis for Officer Coulter to stop the defendant. After hearing testimony, the court limited argument to the specific area of the officer's "caretaking" function:

"THE COURT: I think in the interest of expediency the focus is not on the existence of probable cause but the exception that may be appropriate thereto. I think the only exception at this point in time would simply be a caretaking function of the officer. And the question is whether or not Officer Coulter's action falls within the generally acceptable parameters of his caretaking functions under the facts and circumstances. I suggest that any thoughts or arguments be limited to that particular exception to probable cause determination."

The court then found that, while Officer Coulter's actions were not "inappropriate or outrageous," other less intrusive or more appropriate courses of action were available to the officer. Therefore, "by a small margin," the question of reasonableness was to be decided in defendant's favor, and the motion and petition were granted.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress should not be overturned on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Neal, 109 Ill.2d 216, 218, 93 Ill.Dec. 365, 486 N.E.2d 898 (1985). We believe that the trial court's decision to grant defendant's motion and petition was not manifestly erroneous.

The Illinois Supreme Court first adopted the theory of the "community caretaking function" of the police in People v. Murray, 137 Ill.2d 382, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309 (1990). In using this term, the court referred to police-citizen encounters in which there is no coercion or detention and, thus, no seizure. Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 387, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309. A seizure occurs, according to the court, only when a police officer uses some means of physical force or show of authority to in some way restrain the liberty of a citizen. Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 387-88, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309. The appropriate test to determine if a seizure has occurred is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request for the encounter. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398 (1991); People v. Smith, 266 Ill.App.3d 362, 366, 203 Ill.Dec. 727, 640 N.E.2d 647 (1994). In the absence of a seizure, a defendant's fourth amendment rights are not implicated. People v. Crocker 267 Ill.App.3d 343, 345, 204 Ill.Dec. 618, 641 N.E.2d 1237 (1994). This function is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 388, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309. The community caretaking encounter was differentiated from a "Terry " stop, a brief seizure, which must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause. See Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 387, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309.

In Murray, two police officers approached a parked vehicle in which the defendant was slumped over the wheel. The officers knocked on the car window to awaken the defendant and asked the defendant to exit the vehicle and produce his identification. After the defendant exited, one of the officers saw a handgun in plain view inside the vehicle, and the defendant was charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence. Our supreme court affirmed, ruling that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that no seizure occurred until after the gun was seen, at which time probable cause for arrest arose, and that the officers were appropriately performing a community caretaking function when they approached the vehicle to check on the well-being of the defendant. Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 387, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309.

Illinois courts have found police officers to be engaged in community caretaker functions when they have approached citizens in parking lots (People v. Todd, 249 Ill.App.3d 835, 189 Ill.Dec. 304, 619 N.E.2d 1353 (1993); People v. Bauman, 204 Ill.App.3d 813, 149 Ill.Dec. 872, 562 N.E.2d 336 (1990); People v. Salome, 201 Ill.App.3d 1081, 147 Ill.Dec. 789, 559 N.E.2d 1129 (1990)), on the street (People v. Crocker, 267 Ill.App.3d 343, 204 Ill.Dec. 618, 641 N.E.2d 1237 (1994); People v. Zamora, 203 Ill.App.3d 102, 148 Ill.Dec. 456, 560...