City of Hildalgo v. Prado et al
| Decision Date | 24 June 1999 |
| Citation | 996 S.W.2d 364 |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999) CITY OF HIDALGO AND RUBEN DE LEON, Appellants, v. FRANCISCO PRADO, ADAN GOMEZ, MANUEL MARTINEZ, AND NOEL BORREGO, Appellees. NUMBER 13-98-596-CV |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Rodriguez
O P I N I O N
Opinion by Justice Hinojosa.
Appellees, Francisco Prado, Adan Gomez, Manuel Martinez, and Noel Borrego, are former City of Hidalgo police officers. They each sued appellants, the City of Hidalgo and Chief of Police Ruben De Leon, for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied appellants' motions for summary judgment which were based on a claim of official immunity.1 Appellants each raise two issues challenging the denial. We reverse and render.
Francisco Prado began working as a police officer for the Hidalgo Police Department in December 1990 and was terminated on May 5, 1991. Prado was a probationary officer at the time of his discharge. His petition alleged discharge for unjust cause and denial of a pre-termination hearing. Prado also claimed that De Leon ordered supervising officers to write him up for any reason and made statements to these officers that Prado had no business being a police officer because he was unfit for duty. He claimed De Leon ridiculed him in public to the point that working conditions were intolerable. Prado further contended De Leon used an investigation, based on the false accusation of theft from street vendors, as the basis for his termination.
Adan Gomez was employed as a police officer by the Hidalgo Police Department from November 1988 until his termination on May 7, 1991. His petition alleged termination without just cause and lack of a pre-termination hearing. Gomez asserted De Leon subjected him to public harassment, intimidation, and ridicule, thus making working conditions intolerable. Because De Leon allegedly wanted to discharge Gomez, he instructed supervising officers to document everything Gomez did. Gomez contended De Leon recommended him for several unpaid suspensions which were successfully appealed.
Manuel Martinez was an Hidalgo police officer from December 1988 until he resigned on August 24, 1991. He alleged wrongful constructive discharge because of De Leon's harassment, intimidation, and ridicule. Martinez claimed De Leon asked him to spy on other officers slated for termination and to report any misconduct he observed. Martinez refused this request. He contended De Leon then ordered supervising officers to document all his shortcomings in order to build a case for termination. On August 12, 1991, Martinez signed a letter of "no confidence" against De Leon.
Noel Borrego began working as a police officer with the Hidalgo Police Department in April 1990. He was promoted to the position of probationary sergeant for a period of six months on March 29, 1991, and demoted on August 15 of that year. Borrego resigned on August 24, 1991. He alleged wrongful constructive discharge caused by De Leon's public and intolerable harassment, ridicule, and intimidation. Borrego claimed that approximately May 1991, De Leon ordered him to write up certain officers, even for insignificant conduct. After receiving complaints from other officers about De Leon's unprofessional conduct, Borrego drafted and signed a letter of "no confidence" against De Leon on August 12, 1991. Borrego contended that De Leon responded by ordering Borrego's supervisor to find a reason for demotion.
The City and De Leon answered separately, denying all of appellees' allegations and raising various affirmative defenses. At appellants' requests, the trial court consolidated the four cases. The City's first motion for summary judgment, sought on several grounds, was denied. De Leon then moved for summary judgment against each of the appellees, in part on the ground of official immunity. The City filed a second motion for summary judgment claiming its entitlement to sovereign immunity derived from De Leon's official immunity. The trial court denied both motions. Appellants filed this appeal under section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
When a defendant relies on an affirmative defense in seeking a summary judgment, the proper inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant fulfilled his initial burden to establish his affirmative defense to the plaintiff's cause of action as a matter of law. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant must be taken as true, every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant, and any doubts resolved in his favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549.
Governmental employees, such as Chief De Leon, have official immunity for the performance of discretionary duties performed in good faith as long as they are acting within the scope of their authority. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994); City of Pharr v. Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). An official is protected by immunity whether his conduct was negligent or a mistaken exercise of public duties. Harris County v. Ochoa, 881 S.W.2d 884, 888 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex App.-San Antonio 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
A discretionary duty involves personal deliberation, decision, and judgment as opposed to a ministerial act which requires obedience to orders. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 654; Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d at 713. The issue is whether the person was performing a discretionary function, not whether the person had discretion to act in a certain manner. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653; Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d at 713. An official's decision to reprimand or terminate an employee requires personal deliberation and judgment and is, therefore, a discretionary function. City of Palestine v. Ramirez, 925 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ). Such a decision involves an ongoing analysis that includes investigating possible wrongful conduct, determining the severity of the alleged act, and deciding on the appropriate punishment, if required. Id.
Good faith in official immunity cases must be measured against a standard of objective legal reasonableness, without regard to the officer's subjective state of mind. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. We consider whether reasonable officials could have believed their conduct was justified based on the information possessed by the officials and the established law at the time of the conduct. Id.; Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d at 713. To controvert this element, the non-movant must establish that no reasonable official in the movant's position could have believed the conduct was justified. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657.
Officials act within the scope of their authority if they are discharging the duties generally assigned them. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 658. Even if the action is wrong or negligent, the official still acts within the scope of his authority. Medina County Comm'r Ct. v. The Integrity Group, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ); Koerselmen v. Rhynard, 875 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). Hiring, firing, and reprimanding police officers is generally within the scope of the authority of the police chief. See Ramirez, 925 S.W.2d at 252-53.
Where an employee is protected from liability under the doctrine of official immunity, the governmental entity's sovereign immunity remains intact. See City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1993); Murillo v. Vasquez, 949 S.W.2d 13, 17 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
By his first issue, De Leon contends the trial court erred in denying his motions for summary judgment against each one of the appellees because he is entitled to official immunity.
Summary judgment evidence included affidavits from De Leon and Hidalgo's current chief of police, Vernon Rosser, as well as the depositions and interrogatory answers of the appellee addressed by each motion. Rosser's affidavit was based on personal knowledge and stated that he had read all of appellees' pleadings and was familiar with the allegations. Rosser was a lieutenant when De Leon was chief of police. According to Rosser, all of the acts alleged by appellees against De Leon were within the chief's scope of authority, requiring personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. Rosser stated that the acts were justified and that any reasonable official in the same or similar circumstances would have so believed given the established law and the information possessed at the time.
De Leon's affidavit was similar to Rosser's. De Leon was familiar with appellees' pleadings and read their depositions.
Prado testified by deposition that he was a probationary officer and was terminated because he did not meet the minimum standards required for the position. Prado claimed De Leon falsely accused him of being unfit and that he was never written up or evaluated before the termination. On March 19, 1991, De Leon asked Prado to respond in writing to a complaint that he had stolen candy and gum from young vendors at the Hidalgo International Bridge. Prado denied the allegation, and De Leon assigned Lieutenant Rosser to conduct an internal investigation.
Rosser obtained statements from several Hidalgo...
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