City of Hillsboro v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-538,89-538
• Citation: 556 N.E.2d 1186,52 Ohio St.3d 174
• Parties: , 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2995, 1990 SERB 4-39 CITY OF HILLSBORO, Appellee, v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, OHIO LABOR COUNCIL, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 174

52 Ohio St.3d 174

556 N.E.2d 1186, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2995, 1990 SERB 4-39

CITY OF HILLSBORO, Appellee, v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, OHIO LABOR COUNCIL, INC., Appellant.

No. 89-538.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Highland County.

Submitted April 18, 1990.

Decided July 3, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

[1990 SERB 4-39] When a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and the parties to the contract have agreed to submit their contract interpretation disputes to final and binding arbitration, the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract, and not the interpretation of a reviewing court, governs the rights of the parties thereto. (Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. [1990], 49 Ohio St.3d 129, 551 N.E.2d 186, approved, applied and followed.)

The facts giving rise to the present appeal are not in dispute.

Pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. ("FOP"), appellant, and appellee, city of Hillsboro, Betty Griffith, a dispatcher for the Hillsboro Police Department, filed a grievance alleging a violation of the contract. In accordance with the contract, the dispute proceeded to arbitration.

At the arbitration, the issue before the arbitrator concerned the amount of overtime compensation Griffith was entitled to receive under the contract for the work week beginning July 4, 1986 and ending July 10, 1986. The arbitrator found that during this work week Griffith received a paid holiday on July 4. Further, Griffith worked eight hours each day on July 5, 6 and 7; twelve hours on July 8; eight hours on July 9, which was normally a day off; and on July 10, Griffith received a normally scheduled day off. ¹ For this work week, the arbitrator found that Griffith was paid eight hours of holiday pay at her regular hourly pay rate for the July 4 holiday although she did not actually work that day. Additionally, Griffith received forty hours of pay at her regular hourly pay rate ("straighttime pay rate") and four hours of pay at one and one-half times her regular hourly pay rate ("overtime pay rate").

The arbitrator determined that Griffith was entitled to eight hours of compensation at the overtime rate of pay for the work she performed on July 9, 1986, pursuant to Section 15.3, Article XV of the agreement, which provides:

"All hours actually worked in excess of eight (8) hours in one day or forty (40) hours in one week shall be paid at one and one-half (1 1/2) times the employees [sic ] regular straight-time hourly rate."

The arbitrator concluded that under Section 15.3, Article XV, the "eight (8) hours in one day or forty (40) hours in one week" could be comprised of any hours in the work week for which Griffith would be compensated including the eight hours of holiday pay. As Griffith was entitled to forty-four hours of compensation for the work week at issue before she "actually worked" the eight hours on July 9, 1986, the arbitrator awarded Griffith overtime pay for the work performed on July 9, 1986. ²

Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711, appellee filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of Highland County, a motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. FOP counterclaimed and moved that an order be granted confirming the arbitrator's award. Upon reviewing Section 15.3, Article XV of the contract, the court of common pleas granted appellee's motion to vacate on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her authority under the contract by substituting the term "hours in active pay status" for the contract language "hours actually worked." The court determined that Section 15.3, Article XV was unambiguous and that the "forty (40) hours in one week" must be "hours actually worked." The court of appeals affirmed.

[1990 SERB 4-40] Fred J. Beery, law director, and Jonathan J. Downes, for appellee.

Paul L. Cox, Kay E. Cremeans and Deborah L. Bukovan, for appellant.

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, John E. Gotherman and Stanley J. Dobrowski, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Mun. League.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

R.C. 2711.10 provides in pertinent part:

"In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if:

" * * *

"(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."

Recently, in Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 129, 551 N.E.2d 186, we discussed the degree of judicial restraint necessary for a court to exercise in reviewing an arbitrator's award. In Findlay, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, we held:

"1. Given the presumed validity of an arbitrator's award, a reviewing court's inquiry into whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority, within the meaning of R.C. 2711.10(D), is limited.

"2. Once it is determined that the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious, a reviewing court's inquiry for purposes of vacating an arbitrator's award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D) is at an end. * * * "

Our holding in Findlay was meant to foster the arbitration system of dispute resolution which " ' * * * provides the parties with a relatively speedy and inexpensive method of conflict resolution and has the additional advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets.' " Id. at 131, 551 N.E.2d at 189. The only way to give effect to the purposes of the arbitration system of conflict resolution is to give lasting effect to the decisions rendered by an arbitrator whenever that is possible. If a motion to vacate an arbitrator's award is granted, the arbitration method of conflict resolution becomes less speedy and more expensive and the advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets becomes less of an advantage (or no advantage at all). Hence, judicial inquiry for purposes of vacating an arbitrator's award is limited by Findlay and where a reviewing court exceeds the permissible scope of review such judgment will be reversed.

In the case at bar, the arbitrator reviewed Section 15.3, Article XV of the collective bargaining agreement, which provides:

"All hours actually worked in excess of eight (8) hours in one day or forty (40) hours in one week shall be paid at one and one-half (1 1/2) times the employees [sic ] regular straight-time hourly rate." (Emphasis added.)

The arbitrator concluded that the term "hours actually worked" applied only to those hours worked in excess of forty hours in one week. The arbitrator was then faced with an obligation to determine what type of hours could be used to calculate the "forty (40) hours." Since "hours actually worked" applied only to those hours worked in excess of forty hours, the arbitrator reasoned that the forty hours themselves could include those hours for which an employee is entitled to be paid regardless of whether actual work was performed. Griffith was entitled to be paid for eight hours of holiday pay for July 4, 1986 ³ and the arbitrator included those hours in the forty-hour computation to determine Griffith's overtime eligibility for the work she performed on July 9, 1986. The eight hours in which work was performed on July 9, 1986 were "hours actually worked in excess of" the arbitrator's forty-hour computation. As such, Griffith was awarded overtime pay for the work she performed on July 9.

The trial court and the court of appeals held that Section 15.3, Article XV of the contract was unambiguous and subject to but one interpretation. According to the trial court and a majority of the court of appeals, the "eight (8) hours in one day or forty (40) hours in one week" must also be hours "actually worked" and the arbitrator, in effect, substituted the term "hours in active pay status" for the contract language "hours actually worked," thereby exceeding her authority. ⁴

We do not agree. In the court of appeals, Presiding Judge Grey (dissenting) made the following observations:

"The trial court, and the majority opinion do the very thing they accuse the arbitrator of doing--re-writing the agreement under the guise of interpreting it.

" * * * The trial court decision subverts the whole purpose of arbitration under R.C. 2711.10.

" * * * The trial court, in effect, rewrote the contract so that Section 15.3 of the agreement would read as follows:

" 'SECTION 15.3 OVERTIME. All hours actually worked in excess of eight (8) hours [actually worked] in one day or forty (40) hours [actually worked] in one week shall be paid at one and one-half (1 1/2) times the employee's regular straight-time hourly rate.'

"The clear unambiguous intent of the language is that the police officer can get overtime only for overtime hours actually worked. An officer cannot get the overtime rate for hours or days credited but not worked. * * * "

Clearly,...