City of Humphrey v. Woodward, CA

• Decision Date: 03 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. CA,CA
• Citation: 4 Ark.App. 64,628 S.W.2d 574
• Parties: CITY OF HUMPHREY, et al., Appellants, v. Charles WOODWARD, Appellee. 81-315.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Page 574

628 S.W.2d 574

4 Ark.App. 64

CITY OF HUMPHREY, et al., Appellants, v. Charles WOODWARD, Appellee.

No. CA 81-315.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

Feb. 3, 1982.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1982.

Givens & Buzbee by J. R. Buzbee, Little Rock, for appellants.

Public Employee Claims Division, Arkansas Ins. Dept. by Jerry G. James, Little Rock, for appellee.

GLAZE, Judge.

This is a Workers' Compensation case wherein (1) appellant contends the Commission erred in finding appellant controverted disability benefits, and (2) appellee contends, on cross-appeal, the Commission erred in not finding appellee permanently totally disabled.

Concerning appellee's argument on cross-appeal, we believe this court's holding in Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (Ark.App.1980), is dispositive of the issue raised by appellee here. In Sunbeam, we held the claimant was entitled to benefits "so long as he remains totally disabled." In the instant case, the Commission, based on substantial medical evidence, found appellee "currently totally disabled" and awarded him benefits indefinitely. The medical testimony obviously was conflicting on whether appellee was either permanently partially or totally disabled or currently totally disabled. We have held that the resolution of such a conflict is a question of fact for the Commission. Jones v. Scheduled Skyways, Inc., 1 Ark.App. 44, 612 S.W.2d 333 (1981).

It is settled law that we must affirm if we find any substantial evidence to support the Commission's ruling. Jones v. Scheduled Skyways, Inc., supra. A review of the record reflects the evidence is more than sufficient to support the "limited or Next, we consider appellant's contention that it never controverted any disability benefits awarded by the Commission over a 30% anatomical rating. Appellant argues: (1) that it agreed to pay appellee permanent partial disability equivalent to 30% to the body as a whole, which represents the highest anatomical rating received by appellant; and (2) that it was entitled to have a complete vocational rehabilitation evaluation performed on appellee before any hearings were conducted on the issue of permanent total or partial disability.

restricted" total disability finding and award made by the Commission. Therefore, in accordance with our decision in Sunbeam and the rules on review to which we are bound, we find no merit in the argument urged by appellee in his cross-appeal.

At oral argument, appellant studiously and correctly recognized that the progress of the instant case also tracked the development of law in the Workers' Compensation field as it pertained to vocational rehabilitation and total disability awards. No doubt, this period of development of law regarding rehabilitation and total disability benefits made it difficult for appellant to decide how to proceed in the payment of benefits to the appellee. For instance, now when we speak of total disability, such benefits may be denominated further in terms of "current" total, "limited" total or total disability benefits "until such time as total disability ceases." See Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, supra. Obviously, in making such an award, the Commission remains hopeful that the claimant's disability is not permanent and that he will eventually return to work.

Vocational rehabilitation is another area in workers' compensation cases which has changed. Although the Commission's own decisions, cited by appellant, indicate the Commission decided it had a duty to direct a full investigation into the vocational rehabilitation of a claimant, the Arkansas General Assembly, in 1979, restricted or limited such an investigation or inquiry if the claimant so chose. ¹ To this effect, the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act 253 of 1979, compiled as Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1310(f)(Supp.1979), which provides:

(f) Rehabilitation.... The employee shall not be required to enter any program of vocational rehabilitation against his consent. A request for such program, if elected by the claimant, must be filed with the Commission prior to a determination of the amount of permanent disability benefits payable to such employee.

Subsequent to the passage of Act 253 of 1979, our court decided the case of Hunter Wasson Pulpwood v. Banks, 270 Ark. 404, 605 S.W.2d 753 (Ark.App.1980). In Banks, the employer and its insurance carrier argued the Commission erred in finding total disability without the benefit of the rehabilitation evaluation evidence. As is true in the facts at bar, the claimant in Banks...