City of Jackson v. Rhaly
| Decision Date | 23 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009–CA–00350–COA.,2009–CA–00350–COA. |
| Citation | 95 So.3d 657 |
| Parties | CITY OF JACKSON, Mississippi, Appellant v. Myrt Naylor RHALY, and Sons, Henry Crawford Rhaly, Jr., John Thomas Rhaly, William DeWitt Rhaly, Bill Alan Wilson, and Wife, Linda Gay Wilson, Mary Sue Creel, Hilda Louise Ferron and Amy Jo Baxter, Appellees. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pieter John Teeuwissen, Claire Barker Hawkins, attorneys for appellant.
William Joseph Kerley, John G. Clark, Pascagoula, attorneys for appellees.
EN BANC.
ISHEE, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Myrt Naylor Rhaly, Henry Crawford Rhaly Jr., John Thomas Rhaly, William DeWitt Rhaly, Bill Alan Wilson, Linda Gay Wilson, Mary Sue Creel, Hilda Louise Ferron, and Amy Jo Baxter (collectively, the Rhalys) were owners of property in Jackson, Mississippi, located near Eubank's Creek, an improved drainage ditch. The Rhalys brought suit against the City of Jackson, alleging that its failure to maintain the ditch had caused their properties to flood on two separate occasions. Shortly before trial, the trial court struck the City's answer for a discovery violation. The Rhalys were awarded a default judgment, and the City appeals.
FACTS
¶ 2. The Rhalys' homes were flooded twice—first on July 30, 2002, and again on April 6, 2003. After the first flood, the Rhalys brought suit against the City, alleging that the ditch had not been properly maintained, and against BFI, Inc. and Waste Management of Mississippi, Inc., alleging that they each negligently placed a dumpster too close to the ditch. The Rhalys alleged that both dumpsters had been carried into the ditch by runoff, where they had combined with silt, vegetation, and debris to obstruct the ditch at the State Street bridge. The obstruction, the Rhalys alleged, had caused the ditch to overflow and flood their nearby properties. After the 2003 flood, the Rhalys brought another suit, alleging that the second flood had been caused the same way, except that it involved only a single dumpster owned by Waste Management. The trial court consolidated the two cases.
¶ 3. The City timely filed answers to the Rhalys' suits, but the trial court struck the answers as a sanction for a discovery violation. In their discovery requests, the Rhalys had asked for the production of “[a]ny standard operating procedure[s] (SOPs) which govern the site of the subject incident.” The City's response was that none existed. About a week before the scheduled trial date, the Rhalys discovered that the City had been operating under a manual, titled as “Streets, Bridges, and Drainage Division of the Public Works Department/City of Jackson, Mississippi/Operations and Maintenance/Policy Manual.” 1 The Rhalys found the manual while reviewing the trial court record in another flood case, City of Jackson v. Internal Engine Parts Group, Inc.2 ¶ 4. In the Internal Engine Parts case, the City originally intended to use the manual as part of its defense. The manual was first produced in that action as an exhibit to the testimony of a proffered witness for the City. However, the City did not disclose that witness (and six others) until approximately one week before trial, and the trial court did not allow the newly identified witnesses to testify. The trial court did, however, allow the plaintiffs to introduce the manual into evidence at the trial. A city employee, who had previously been designated as the City's Rule 30(b)(6) representative,3 testified that the manual had been in use by the City at the time of the August 9, 2001, flood at issue in that case. The manual's use in the Internal Engine Parts case was a contested issue both in the trial and the subsequent appeal. In short, the record from that case demonstrated that the manual had been in use by the City prior to both floods in the Rhaly case and that the City—both its employees and its counsel—had been aware of the manual at the time it made the false discovery responses to the Rhalys.
¶ 5. After uncovering the manual, the Rhalys sought sanctions against the City for the discovery violation. The trial court found that no evidence had been produced that the City intentionally concealed the manual from the Rhalys. The trial court concluded, however, that the City's false responses reflected at least a “gross indifference” to its discovery obligations. The trial court sanctioned the City by striking its answer and entering a default judgment for $149,872.10. The Rhalys were also awarded $31,226.84 for attorneys' fees and $3,862.54 for expenses.
¶ 6. Appeals were taken by the City from the default judgment entered against it and by the Rhalys from the summary judgment granted to Waste Management. This Court deconsolidated the case on appeal. In the Waste Mgmt. appeal, we reversed the summary judgment granted to Waste Management, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether the dumpster had been negligently left unsecured near the ditch and whether it had been a substantial factor in causing the floods. Rhaly v. Waste Management of Miss., Inc., 43 So.3d 509 (Miss.Ct.App.2010). The present case concerns only the default judgment granted against the City.
DISCUSSION
¶ 7. Whether to impose sanctions for discovery abuses is entrusted to the trial court's discretion. Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942, 948 (¶ 24) (Miss.2000). “The power to dismiss is inherent in any court of law or equity, being a means necessary to the orderly expedition of justice and the court's control of its own docket.” Id. The trial court has great latitude in determining what sanctions are appropriate. Pierce v. Heritage Props., Inc., 688 So.2d 1385, 1388 (Miss.1997). Nonetheless, “the trial court should dismiss a cause of action for failure to comply with discovery only under the most extreme circumstances.” Id.
¶ 8. “Rule 37 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure is designed to vest with the trial court great latitude in deciding when and what sanctions will be imposed for a discovery violation.” Marshall v. Burger King, 2 So.3d 702, 706 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2008). Consequently, we review the trial court's decision to grant discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1388. If the trial court applied the correct legal standard, we will affirm unless we have a “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors.” Id.
¶ 9. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that:
[D]ismissal is to be used as a sanction only as a last resort. Lower courts should be cautious in either dismissing a suit or pleadings or refusing to permit testimony.... The reason for this is obvious. Courts are courts of justice not of form. The parties should not be penalized for any procedural failure that may be handled without doing violence to court procedures.
Robert v. Colson, 729 So.2d 1243, 1247–48 (¶ 28) (Miss.1999) (internal quotations omitted). The Court has outlined four factors to assist in evaluating whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation. These factors “are considerations and not four absolute requirements.” Marshall, 2 So.3d at 706 (¶ 9). They are:
First, dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court's order results from wilfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply. Dismissal is proper only in [a] situation where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Another consideration is whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party's simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders.
Id. (quoting Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1389).
¶ 10. The City contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the “death penalty” sanction. Its principal argument is that the discovery response at issue was not, in fact, false. It also claims that the manual was disclosed in discovery and promised to be produced, but, as a result of a simple oversight, was never actually produced.
¶ 11. The full text of the Rhaly's request for production of documents and the City's responses are as follows:
¶ 12. The City admits that the manual was a “standard operating procedure” and that it should have been produced. It also admits that the manual was not actually produced. The contention, however, is that the manual was disclosed and a copy was promised, but inadvertently, it was not produced. The City accuses the Rhalys of ignoring a “clear reference” to the manual in discovery and “playing gotcha games” on the eve of trial.
¶ 13. We are satisfied that is not the case. Clearly, the City's initial response falsely stated that there were no standard operating procedures. It was followed by a supplemental response that specifically and unequivocally stated: “There was no standard operating procedure which governed water quantity control in the City of Jackson at the time of the incident.” This was also false. Acknowledging this, the City contends that the supplemental response must be considered in...
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City of Jackson v. Rhaly
...and entered a default judgment in favor of the Rhalys. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. See City of Jackson v. Rhaly, 95 So.3d 657, 2011 WL 1486624 (Miss.Ct.App. April 19, 2011). As the circuit court's finding that the City exhibited “gross indifference to its discovery obligation......
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