City of Jackson v. Jordan, 2015-CA-00890-SCT
| Decision Date | 18 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2015-CA-00890-SCT,2015-CA-00890-SCT |
| Citation | 202 So.3d 199 |
| Parties | City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Willie B. Jordan |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
JAMES RICHARD DAVIS, JR., MONICA DAVIS JOINER, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
B. BLAKE TELLER, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN AND MAXWELL, JJ.
RANDOLPH
,
¶1. When the City of Jackson was unable to effect notice on Willie B. Jordan by certified mail that his property was subject to condemnation and demolition, the city sought to effect notice by publication. The hearing date was set twelve days after the first publication date, although the applicable statute required two weeks' notice.1 Jordan did not appear at the condemnation hearing. The property was declared condemned, and the house on the property was ordered demolished. After the house was demolished, Jordan filed a notice of tort claim with the city. When he filed his complaint, he alternatively asserted a constitutional claim for deprivation of property without due process. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Jordan $12,513.53. The city appealed.
¶2. Other than Jordan's ownership of the property (see infra Issue I), the facts are not in dispute. On September 15, 2006, the city sent a notice by certified mail to Jordan to inform him that his property was subject to condemnation and demolition as a menace to the public health. The letter provided a hearing date of October 3, 2006. The letter was sent to Jordan's address in Houston, Texas. However, it was returned. Neither the “refused” nor the “unclaimed” box was checked. A notice of hearing was then posted on the house and published in The Clarion-Ledger on October 26 and November 2, rescheduling the hearing date to November 7, 2006. On November 7, the Jackson City Council ordered the house demolished. The house was demolished on June 11, 2007.
¶3. Jordan sent the city a notice of claim pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act on May 20, 2008. He filed suit on November 6, 2008. In addition to various tort claims, Jordan averred the city had violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of his property without due process of law. The city filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming both discretionary-function immunity and immunity for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature. The city also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
, raising Jordan's failure to appeal the council's decision pursuant to Section 11-51-75. The trial court granted the city summary judgment based on discretionary-function-immunity grounds. Jordan filed a motion to reconsider, which was granted. This Court then denied an interlocutory review of that order. Subsequently, the city learned during Jordan's deposition that he had acquired the property from his nephew while the nephew was a minor. The city filed a second motion for summary judgment, claiming Jordan lacked standing, as his interest in the property was premised on a “void” deed. Jordan countered that the conveyance was voidable, not void, and submitted an affidavit from the nephew, now an adult, ratifying and confirming the conveyance. The trial court denied the city's motion, finding the conveyance voidable, not void. This Court again denied interlocutory review.
¶4. A bench trial was held. Jordan submitted receipts for materials used in repairing the house, including a new roof in 2001 and paint in 2007. Jordan also sought reimbursement for travel between Texas and Mississippi. The city submitted the tax appraisal values of the property, which ranged from $13,380 in 1999 (when Jordan acquired the property) to $6,000 in 2014.2 Jordan testified he had been slowly repairing the house since 1999. The city inspector testified the house had been boarded up for some time, had irreparable foundation issues, termites, rotted roof and floor joists, and rotted siding.
¶5. The trial court entered a judgment for Jordan in the amount of $12,513.53. The city filed a motion to amend judgment and/or for reconsideration, again claiming immunity for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature. The city also challenged the trial court's determination of damages. That motion was denied. The city appealed.
I. Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss because Jordan lacked standing.
II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss because Jordan failed to timely appeal pursuant to Section 11-51-75.
III. Whether the trial court erred in denying the city's motion for summary judgment based on the city's claim of immunity arising out of legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature.
IV. Whether the trial court erred in its calculation and assessment of damages.
¶6. Motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss receive de novo review. Borries v. Grand Casino of Miss., Inc. Biloxi , 187 So.3d 1042, ¶ 8 (Miss.2016)
; Meeks v. Hologic, Inc. , 179 So.3d 1127, 1131 (Miss.2015). This Court reviews a ruling on a motion to alter or amend a judgment for an abuse of discretion. Fulton v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. , 105 So.3d 284, 286–87 (Miss.2012).
¶7. “When an infant conveys land, the title to which is in him, in the eye of the law there is no conveyance—not void, it is true, but voidable ... and he is permitted to recover upon the idea that he never made any legal conveyance of the property.” Conn v. Boutwell , 101 Miss. 353, 58 So. 105, 107 (1912)
. “[H]is avoidance may be evidenced by any act clearly demonstrating a renunciation of the contract.” Brantley v. Wolf , 60 Miss. 420, 434 (1882). Upon majority, actions of the then-minor grantor may amount to a “ratification of his previously voidable contract.” Id. at 433.
¶8. A deed conveyed by a minor is voidable at his option, and he may by his actions affirm the deed upon majority. Not only has the now-of-age grantor not sought to avoid the previously executed deed, he has ratified it by affidavit. We find the trial court did not err in finding Jordan had standing to file his claim.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11–51–75
(Rev. 2012).
The ten-day statutory limit in which to appeal a decision rendered by [municipal authorities] is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Thence, when an appeal of a decision rendered by municipal authorities is not perfected within the statutory time constraint of ten days, no jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court, i.e., the circuit court.
McPhail v. City of Lumberton , 832 So.2d 489, 492 (Miss.2002)
.
¶10. Although McPhail filed a separate lawsuit against the city, this Court determined he was in effect seeking to appeal a board-of-aldermen decision and that “McPhail's claim should have been dismissed by the trial court as not being properly before the court.” Id.
However, lack of notice was not at issue in McPhail. Similarly, in Carthan v. Patterson, Carthan filed a takings claim against the Town of Tchula when it demolished his warehouse following a hearing, rather than appealing the decision pursuant to Section 11–51–75
. Carthan v. Patterson , 134 So.3d 374, 375–76 (Miss.Ct.App.2014). Relying on McPhail, the Court of Appeals held the filing of a separate claim did not cure the jurisdictional bar of Section 11–51–75. Id. at 377. Again, lack of notice was not at issue, for Carthan received notice of the hearing. Id. at 375.
¶11. When notice to appear at a hearing is deficient, the remedy of appeal provided for in Section 11–51–75
is not exclusive. See
Cook v. Bd. of Supervisors of Lowndes Cty. , 571 So.2d 932 (Miss.1990) ; Williams v. Walley , 295 So.2d 286 (Miss.1974). The Court of Appeals followed this principle in Scarborough v. City of Petal , 60 So.3d 193 (Miss.Ct.App.2010). In Williams, the board of supervisors canceled Walley's lease to sixteenth-section land without notice. Williams , 295 So.2d at 288. Walley filed suit in chancery court seeking an injunction. Id. at 287–88. This Court held the chancery court had jurisdiction because “[t]he remedy of appeal would not have afforded Walley adequate relief, especially since Walley had no notice of a hearing by the board of supervisors on the matter.” Id. at 288.
, the board of supervisors sought bids for its ambulance services. Cook , 571 So.2d at 933–34. Without holding a hearing, the board accepted Golden Triangle's bid. Id. Cook's Ambulance Service filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in circuit court seven days later. Id. at 934. This Court first found Section 11–51–75's ten-day limit inapplicable because that section “contemplates the circuit court sitting in an appellate capacity, which in turn contemplates the board having held a hearing on the matter in issue, [and n]othing here suggests the board held any such hearing.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court further held that, because Cook filed his...
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