City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 95-CA-00627-SCT
| Decision Date | 31 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-CA-00627-SCT,95-CA-00627-SCT |
| Citation | 697 So.2d 1179 |
| Parties | CITY OF JACKSON and James H. Robinson, v. Dell M. LUMPKIN. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Sarah A. O'Reilly-Evans, Jackson, William A. Gowan, Jackson, for appellant.
Orbie S. Craft, Jack B. Brenemen, Craft, Brenemen & Wilson, Brandon, for appellee.
Before PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and MILLS, JJ.
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1 The present case involves a lawsuit filed by a motorist against the City of Jackson and one of its police officers arising out of an automobile accident which allegedly resulted from negligent driving on the part of the officer. This Court holds that the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory requirements that notification of the lawsuit be granted to the "chief executive officer" of a governmental entity in order to maintain a lawsuit against such an entity and we accordingly vacate the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and dismiss the cause of action.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶2 On July 21, 1994, Dell Lumpkin (Lumpkin) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Hinds County against the City of Jackson and Officer James H. Robinson for injuries suffered in an automobile accident which occurred on October 10, 1993. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and/or in the alternative for summary judgment, alleging that Lumpkin had failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (1994 Supp), but the motion was denied by the circuit judge on April 2, 1995.
¶3 The case was tried on May 3, 1995 with the circuit judge serving as trier of fact. The court entered a judgment on May 10, 1995, finding that Robinson had acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well being of Lumpkin and that the City was therefore not immune from suit pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(c). The Court found that Lumpkin was 25% contributorily negligent with regard to the accident and ruled that the City was liable to Lumpkin for damages in the amount of $5,663.80. The City timely filed an appeal from the judgment.
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶4 On October 10, 1993, James H. Robinson, an officer with the Jackson Police Department, was attempting to enter East McDowell Road from a Shell service station. Robinson's view of East McDowell was blocked by a row of hedges, but, after stopping and looking, he nevertheless proceeded to enter the road, and a collision between Robinson's vehicle and a vehicle driven by Lumpkin resulted. At trial, the main disputed fact regarding the accident related to the issue of whether or not Lumpkin was in the outside or inside lane of East McDowell at the time of the accident.
IV. LAW
A. The trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff met the notice requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.1994), and therefore the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the claim.
¶5 The City argues that Lumpkin did not comply with the statutory requirements for notification in cases filed against a government entity. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (1994 Supp provides that:
(1) After all procedures within a governmental entity have been exhausted, any person having a claim for injury arising under the provisions of this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee shall proceed as he might in any action in law or in equity; provided, however, that ninety (90) days prior to maintaining an action thereon, such person shall file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity, and, if the governmental entity is participating in a plan administered by the board [Mississippi Tort Claims Board] pursuant to Section 11-46-7(3), such chief executive officer shall notify the board of any claims filed within five (5) days after the receipt thereof.
¶6 MCA § 11-46-11 thus requires that the "chief executive officer" of a governmental entity be granted notice of a pending suit at least ninety (90) days prior to filing the suit through the filing of a "notice of claim." Plaintiff Lumpkin notes that his attorney notified the City's claims department and submitted invoices of medical bills, but both parties agree that no notice of claim or other notice was ever given directly to the chief executive officer of the governmental entity in question.
¶7 In the view of this Court, the present appeal therefore involves a rather straightforward case of non-compliance with the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. Lumpkin offers a number of arguments as to why this non-compliance should not bar her claim, including the argument that the notice requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather only "directive." This Court finds this argument to be unpersuasive. The Legislature elected to waive sovereign immunity to a large extent in the Tort Claims Act statutes, but it saw fit to qualify this waiver with a number of procedural requirements which, it is logical to conclude, must be complied with for this waiver to take effect.
¶8 There are a number of valid reasons why the Legislature would require that the Chief Executive Officer of a governmental entity be given advance notice of planned litigation against it, and the Legislature saw fit to implement specific and detailed requirements for the granting of this notice. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2) requires that:
The notice of claim required by subsection (1) of this section shall be in writing, delivered in person or by registered or certified United States mail. Every notice of claim shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts upon which the claim is based, including the circumstances which brought about the injury, the time and place the injury occurred, the names of all persons known to be involved, the amount of money damages sought and the residence of the person making the claim at the time of the injury and at the time of filing the notice.
Given the specific requirements set forth by the Legislature for the granting of notice, it is clear that Lumpkin's actions in merely submitting invoices to the City's claims department did not suffice for the purposes of granting notice under § 11-46-11. 1
¶9 Lumpkin's other primary argument with regard to § 11-46-11 is that the record on appeal does not contain the transcript of the hearing at which the City argued for dismissal or, alternatively, summary judgment on grounds of non-compliance with the statute. Lumpkin thus argues that there is no evidence in the record that she did not in fact comply with the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. This argument is without merit. The record contains Lumpkin's response to the motion for dismissal/summary judgment, in which Lumpkin's arguments acknowledge that the statutory requirements of § 11-46-11 were not met. In the view...
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