City of Jacksonville v. Stokes
| Decision Date | 06 July 1954 |
| Citation | 74 So.2d 278 |
| Parties | CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. STOKES et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William M. Madison and Inman P. Crutchfield, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Noble & Searcy and Henry M. Searcy, Jacksonville, for appellees.
Marian Stokes, a 12 year old girl, fell as a result of a hole in the sidewalk of a Jacksonville street. She sued the city alleging negligence. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the city moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the little girl was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The motion was denied. The issue of contributory negligence was submitted to the jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000.
The sole question on appeal is whether there was contributory negligence as a matter of law. The city concedes that it was negligent in permitting the sidewalk hole to stay unrepaired.
There was not a particle of evidence on the plaintiff's side that the girl knew of the hole; on the contrary, the testimony is repetitious and emphatic that she did not. Even an adult is not careless in failing to avoid harm unless he is actually warned or the circumstances warn him. The mere fact that a hole is big enough to see does not settle the question whether one should have avoided stepping into it. If visibility alone settled contributory negligence every case of slipping on a floor or of encountering any stationary object would automatically be a case of non-liability for in all these cases the condition which caused the harm was visible. The question always is whether the plaintiff used due care for his own safety, taking into account all the circumstances, of which the visibility of the object encountered is an important one, but still only one of the circumstances.
The question is whether one should be aware of the danger. This depends largely upon the likelihood of encountering danger. Very rarely do objects from above cause us harm, so persons are not careless who do not go about examining the sky. One need not look for danger unless there is reason to expect it.
It takes more indication of danger to alert a child than to alert an adult. Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 140 So. 798, 800. As applied to the class of action here involved, the general statement in 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 849, p. 195, suffices:
Even if the plaintiff here were an adult, the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury, but the question of the child's prudence and judgment is itself a question of fact. 38 American Jurisprudence 887.
The city's counsel have cited no case and we are aware of none in which the contributory negligence of a child has been decided as a question of law.
In whatever situation the law finds children, it usually deals with them differently than it does with adults.
Affirmed.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered pursuant to a verdict by a jury. A pedestrian was hurt by reason of a fall on a sidewalk immediately in front of her home on Silver Street in the City of Jacksonville. The sole question presented is whether or not she was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar recovery.
For some reason there is no assignment of error with reference to negligence of the city and the burden of proof on the part of the plaintiff concerning such negligence. The case was apparently tried on the assumption that the city was negligent but that the city claimed that the pedestrian was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar recovery.
The undisputed facts are: the injured person was a girl between twelve and thirteen years of age; she lived with her sister in a home on Silver Street in Jacksonville, Florida; Silver Street is in Springfield, the oldest part of the City of Jacksonville; the sidewalk was an old one and was constructed of brick and was immediately in front of the home of the pedestrian; the bricks were uneven and the sidewalk was very bad and rough because of the unevenness of the bricks; it was only a few feet from the steps of the home to the sidewalk. The minor and her sister with whom she lived used this sidewalk daily; a large tree was growing close to the edge of the sidewalk and a root from such tree and displaced a brick and there was a hole partly filled with dirt and the root from the tree where this brick was from. The minor and her sister had lived in this home for two months and the sidewalk was used daily. The sister had seen this hole but had never complained to anyone about it. The injured pedestrian, a minor, had used the sidewalk several times a day and had observed the rough, uneven and had condition of the sidewalk but had never actually seen this hole from which a brick had been displaced, immediately in front of her home. The accident happened between six and seven o'clock in the evening on October 28, 1952. It was dusk but all parties testified that they could see the condition of the sidewalk and the two star witnesses testified that they saw clearly the pedestrian when she stumbled and fell when they were standing 175 feet from where the accident occurred. These two witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Wetherington, gave uncontradicted testimony that the pedestrian was not running but was walking slightly fast when she fell. After she fell she did not get up until the Wetheringtons could walk the 175 feet to the place of the accident. The child's toe was not wedged in the hole but was still in it. She was a normal child but was very active, 'more active than normal', and she had visited in the home of the Wetheringtons two or three times each week.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the city moved the Court for a directed verdict as follows:
'* * * on the ground that the testimony of all the witnesses shows that the plaintiff, Marian Stockes, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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(Emphasis supplied.)
The motion for new trial, which was denied, contained the following grounds:
case.
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We have referred to the testimony put on by the plaintiff. There is no conflict in...
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Maas Bros., Inc. v. Bishop, 7446
...there may have been was patent. The test applicable here was lucidly enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court in City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 278, as '* * * If visibility alone settled contributory negligence every case of slipping on a floor or of encountering any stat......
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Dvorak v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc.
...of restaurant; Kagan v. Eisenstadt, supra notes 4 and 5. 9 Kagan v. Eisenstadt, supra note 4, 98 So. 2d at 371. 10 City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, 74 So.2d 278 (Fla.1954) — 12 year old child did not know of a hole in the sidewalk. The Supreme Court of Florida observed, "if visibility alone ......
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Grossnickle v. Village of Germantown
...not careless who do not go about examining the sky. One need not look for danger unless there is reason to expect it.' City of Jacksonville v. Stokes (Fla.), 74 So.2d 278. The rule is not abrogated because the pedestrian might have been familiar with the condition of the sidewalk on prior o......
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Isenberg v. Ortona Park Recreational Center, Inc.
...to be seen, it is deemed, in law, to have been seen.' 1 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of the City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, 74 So.2d 278, 'If visibility alone settled contributory negligence every case of slipping on a floor or of encountering any stationary o......