City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 76-259
Decision Date | 17 September 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 76-259,76-259 |
Citation | 42 Or.App. 223,600 P.2d 478 |
Parties | CITY OF KLAMATH FALLS, Respondent, v. Thomas M. WINTERS and Elena Winters, Appellants. C; CA 12533. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Rex E. H. Armstrong, Portland, and Jerry A. Jacobson, Klamath Falls, argued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs were Carl R. Neil, Portland, and Richard B. Thierolf, Jr., Klamath Falls.
B. J. Matzen, City Atty., Klamath Falls, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before SCHWAB, C. J., and GILLETTE and CAMPBELL, JJ.
Defendant Elena Winters was convicted by the Klamath Falls municipal court of violating a city ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct. Defendant Thomas Winters was convicted in municipal court of disorderly conduct and of resisting arrest, in violation of city ordinances. Both defendants sought trials de novo in the circuit court pursuant to ORS 221.350 and they were again convicted. The circuit court judge imposed the same sentence on Elena Winters as had the municipal court, but imposed a greater sentence on Thomas Winters than had the court below. The defendants appeal from the circuit court judgments.
On appeal, defendants do not challenge the constitutionality of the Klamath Falls ordinances they were convicted of violating. The city moves to dismiss the appeals on the grounds that this court does not have jurisdiction.
ORS 221.350 provides:
ORS 221.360 provides:
ORS 221.360 was interpreted in City of Salem v. Polanski, 202 Or. 504, 276 P.2d 407 (1954), and in numerous later decisions by the Supreme Court and this court, as limiting appellate court review to issues involving the constitutionality of the city charter provisions or ordinances the appellants had violated.
The defendants here contend that, to the extent it forecloses them from taking a full, rather than a limited, appeal, ORS 221.360 violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. (U.S.Const. Amend. XIV; Or.Const. Art. 1, § 20). They argue further that this court has jurisdiction over their appeals under ORS 138.040, the general statute which provides for appellate court review of judgments of conviction.
Defendants advance two basic theories in support of the proposition that ORS 221.360 denies them equal protection. First, they contend that the municipal offenses of which they were convicted substantially duplicate offenses defined by state statutes. See ORS 166.025 and ORS 162.315. Hence, persons initially convicted under those state statutes by a circuit or district court have a statutory right to a plenary appeal to this court, while persons who are initially tried in municipal courts for identical conduct which violates city charter or ordinance provisions can obtain appellate court review only of the constitutionality of the charter or ordinance provisions. More generally, defendants argue that the limited appeal right under ORS 221.360 discriminates between persons convicted of municipal offenses and persons convicted of state offenses whether or not the conduct proscribed by the municipality is the same or similar to conduct prohibited by the state.
The second way in which the defendants contend ORS 221.360 deprives them of equal protection is by limiting the appeal rights of persons convicted of municipal violations in cities where such violations are initially triable in municipal courts, while persons charged with municipal violations in certain other cities are tried in district courts pursuant to ORS Chapter 46 and, if convicted, have a right of plenary appeal to the Court of Appeals under ORS 46.047. See, e. g., City of Portland v. Poindexter, 38 Or.App. 551, 590 P.2d 781 (1979). Because we agree with this second proposition, we are not required to rule on the first.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77, 92 S.Ct. 862, 876, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); See State v. Endsley, 214 Or. 537, 331 P.2d 338 (1958).
The test for determining whether disparity in the substantive or procedural treatment of different persons charged with criminal offenses denies equal protection has been stated in a great variety of ways. The best articulation we find is that of the Oregon Supreme Court in State of Oregon v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955):
" * * *
203 Or. at 703, 281 P.2d at 701. (cites omitted)
The foregoing and other formulations of the methodology for resolving equal protection challenges are sometimes summarized as establishing a "rational basis" test for legislative classifications. We are unable to identify any rational basis for differentiating between similarly situated defendants' appeal rights as the statutory scheme now does. We hold that ORS 221.360, to the extent it provides for a reduced scope of appellate court review for municipal offenders tried in cities where the initial trial is in the city's municipal court rather than a district court, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 20 of the...
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City of Klamath Falls v. Winters
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