City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn

• Decision Date: 16 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 78-2438,78-2438
• Parties: CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, a Florida municipal corporation, Howard Craft, Mayor of the City of Lauderdale Lakes; Alfonso Gereffi, Jerome J. Cohan, Morris Klein, Lyman L. Allen, Louis Greenwald, Harry Kaufman, City Councilmen; and Ben Eigner, Building Official, Appellants, v. Herman CORN, Trustee, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 239

427 So.2d 239

CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, a Florida municipal corporation, Howard Craft, Mayor of the City of Lauderdale Lakes; Alfonso Gereffi, Jerome J. Cohan, Morris Klein, Lyman L. Allen, Louis Greenwald, Harry Kaufman, City Councilmen; and Ben Eigner, Building Official, Appellants, v. Herman CORN, Trustee, Appellee.

No. 78-2438.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Feb. 16, 1983.

James C. Brady, Fort Lauderdale, and Mallory H. Horton of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Miami, for appellants.

Gary M. Farmer of Abrams, Anton, Robbins, Resnick, Schneider & Mager, P.A., Hollywood, for appellee.

HERSEY, Judge.

The city appeals from a final judgment invalidating certain zoning ordinances as they refer to appellee and to specific real property owned by appellee, requiring the city to approve a site plan (conditioned upon the correction by appellee of three specified deficiencies) and, ultimately, to issue a building permit.

Prior to June, 1966, appellee acquired 261 acres of real property in the unincorporated area of Broward County. After preliminary negotiations with the city (there is a conflict of testimony, unresolved in the circuit court, as to which party initiated these negotiations), appellee presented the city with a proposed development plan. The parcel was then annexed by the city and three ordinances were adopted zoning the property in accordance with the previously approved development plan. Appellee proceeded over the next several years to develop the property as permitted by the ordinances and as contemplated by the plan.

In 1969 the city attempted to change the zoning of a portion of appellee's property to prohibit a contemplated project permitted by the original zoning. Litigation ensued resulting in a judgment holding that the city was estopped from changing the zoning. No appeal was taken from that judgment.

The next activity of consequence concerns the portion of the property specifically in issue here. That parcel is zoned C-1A, a commercial use zone, and lies immediately north of a canal designated as C-13. According to appellee the canal was so located to insulate residential areas from this commercial property. Pursuant to applicable ordinances appellee filed, for approval, a proposed set of preliminary site plans for a shopping center in one area of the commercial property and a mini-warehouse complex on the westernmost portion of that parcel. The various city departments and officials processed the site plans and after sundry amendments and recommendations, the site plan along with the Planning and Zoning Board's recommendation of approval was presented to the City Council, at a public meeting on May 31, 1977. After discussion about the assessed valuation of the land and a comment directed toward aesthetics the matter was tabled. It was reconsidered and again tabled at meetings on June 14, 1977, and June 21, 1977, and at the latter meeting was rescheduled to be considered on July 12, 1977.

At the meeting of July 12, 1977, the City Council for the first time discussed changes in the zoning code to eliminate mini-warehouses as a use permitted in property zoned C-1A (Ordinance # 548) and to change the classification of appellee's parcel from C-1A to B-3 (Ordinance # 549). These ordinances were adopted. Another ordinance, # 552, imposing a building moratorium on appellee's property was also proposed and it was adopted at a subsequent meeting. After adoption of the two ordinances the council took up the matter of appellee's preliminary site plan. The council voted unanimously to deny approval. This litigation ensued.

The circuit court ultimately entered a final judgment which contained findings of fact concluding that events transpired much as recorded in the foregoing synopsis and including the following specific findings which are particularly pertinent to this appeal.

The evidence presented in this case indicates that the Plaintiff's efforts were in accordance with the development plan submitted to and approved by the City, and further, that the entire cost of the initial land development was borne by the Plaintiff. These costs included, but were not limited to, land clearing, demucking, filling and grading of the land and the construction of a system of canals and waterways throughout the 261-acre parcel of land. This system of canals and waterways specifically included the canal known as the C-13 canal, which separated the C-1A property from other residentially-zoned acreas [sic] within the 261 acres.

....

The evidence further establishes that the Plaintiff in this cause has expended in excess of $100,000.00 in preparing the C-1A property to be developed in accordance with the previously approved Ordinances # 103 and # 105. These sums were expended in reliance upon the City's action with reference to the assignment of the C-1A classification to the property in question. They would have not been expended had it not been for the action of the City in designating the property under the zoning classification of C-1A.

....

Prior to July 12, 1977, the City of Lauderdale Lakes sent or published no notices to the Plaintiff of any public hearing to be held on the question of whether or not Plaintiff's C-1A property should be re-zoned or that a hearing would be held on any specific re-zoning proposal. In fact, the City of Lauderdale Lakes had made no effort whatever to re-zone Plaintiff's C-1A property from July 12, 1966, to July 12, 1977, a period of 10 years.

....

The Court finds from the evidence presented that Ordinances # 548, # 549 and # 552 were enacted by the City improperly and not in accordance with the requirements of the City Charter. Further, the evidence specifically indicates that the City Council was reacting to the demands of the residents of the near-by condominium building (the Amicus Curiae herein) and was attempting to satisfy the demands of these residents without consideration for the rights of the Plaintiff herein pursuant to the Ordinances of the City of Lauderdale Lakes.

Finally, the Court finds from a review of all of the evidence that the preliminary site plans presented by the Plaintiff with reference to the proposed mini-warehouse/shopping center development contained 3 specific deficiencies. It is the further finding of the Court that these deficiencies were before the City Council, but the City Council did not provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in question. The evidence establishes that the City Council was required to give the Plaintiff the opportunity to correct the deficiencies; and when the corrections were made, the Ordinances of the City of Lauderdale Lakes would require the City Council to approve final site plans.

The final judgment determined that because appellee not only expended money but also made substantial physical changes in the land in reliance upon the city's undertaking in adopting the original zoning ordinances, it would be grossly unfair at this late date to permit the city to change the zoning. The trial court further declared ordinances numbered 548, 549 and 552 invalid and unenforceable for failure of the city to follow its own notice and procedure requirements and for lack of evidence to support a showing that these ordinances "were enacted as a result of compelling reasons or [of--sic?] public health and safety."

The trial court held that the city was "estopped to deny Plaintiff's [appellee's] rights in [the original] zoning classification." The court then directed the city to approve the site plan when the designated deficiencies had been corrected and in due course to issue an appropriate building permit.

The city suggests four impediments to the validity of the final judgment. We address the issues as presented by appellant ...