City of Laurens v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 13 August 1906 |
| Parties | CITY OF LAURENS v. ANDERSON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Laurens County; Prince Judge.
John Wade Anderson was convicted of a violation of a city ordinance, and from a judgment of the circuit court affirming judgment of the mayor, he appeals. Affirmed.
Ferguson & Featherstone, for appellant. Dial & Todd, for respondent.
The exceptions assign error on the part of his honor, the presiding judge, in declaring the following statute unconstitutional to wit: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of South Carolina, that all soldiers and sailors of the Confederate States, who enlisted from this state, and who were honorably discharged from such service shall hereafter be exempt from any license for the carrying on of any business or profession within this state, or any city, town or village therein: Provided, that such soldiers and sailors shall file with the clerk of the court of the county in which he resides, the proper evidence of his service in the Confederate War: Provided, further that no partnership shall exist in any such business or profession with any person not a bona fide soldier or sailor of the said Confederate States." 24 St. at Large, p. 441. The defendant was tried in the mayor's court upon the charge of running a beef market and grocery store without license. He pleaded that he was exempt from the payment of a license tax under the provisions of said act. The mayor ruled that the statute was unconstitutional, and imposed a sentence upon the defendant, from which he appealed to the circuit court.
The respondent contended that the statute was in violation of the following constitutional provisions: Section 5, art. 1, Const. S. C., which provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits any state from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. Section 1, art. 10, Const. S. C., which contains the provisions that: "The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property: *** Provided, that the General Assembly may provide *** for a graduated license on occupations and business." Section 2, art. 4, Const. U.S., which is as follows: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states." The presiding judge ruled that the act was in violation of the first and second, but not of the third and fourth, of said provisions. The respondent gave notice that, in case it was necessary, it would rely upon the additional grounds that there was error in overruling the third and fourth of said objections.
We will proceed first to state the general principles touching the subject of classification under the state and federal Constitutions. The case of Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155, 165, 17 S.Ct. 255, 257, 41 L.Ed. 666, decides that the classification must not be arbitrary--that is, ""must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed"--also, that such classification must be "based upon some reasonable ground, some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a merely arbitrary selection." In Am. Sug. Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 21 S.Ct. 43, 45, 45 L.Ed. 102, the court, in discussing the provisions of the Constitution as to the equal protection of the laws, says: "The power of taxation under this provision was fully considered in Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 233, 10 S.Ct. 533, 33 L.Ed. 892, in which it was said not to have been intended to prevent a state from changing its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property, altogether; may impose different specific taxes upon different trades or professions; may vary the rates of excise upon various products; may tax real and personal estate in a different manner; may tax visible property only, and not securities; may allow or not allow deductions for indebtedness. 'All such regulations and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the state Legislature or the people of the state in framing their Constitution." D' The court, in Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S.W. 697, 33 L. R. A. 589, says that legislation to be constitutional "must possess each of two indispensable qualities: First, it must be so framed as to extend to and embrace equally all persons who are or may be in the like situation and circumstances; and, secondly, the classification must be natural and reasonable, not arbitrary and capricious." In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 482, we find the following statement of the principle: "Privileges may be granted to particular individuals, when by so doing the rights of others are not interfered with; *** but every one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute,...
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