City of Lenoir City v. State ex rel. City of Loudon

• Decision Date: 02 October 1978
• Citation: 571 S.W.2d 297
• Parties: CITY OF LENOIR CITY and Lenoir City Utilities, Appellants, v. STATE of Tennessee ex rel. the CITY OF LOUDON, Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 297

571 S.W.2d 297

CITY OF LENOIR CITY and Lenoir City Utilities, Appellants, v. STATE of Tennessee ex rel. the CITY OF LOUDON, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Oct. 2, 1978.

Alfred Lee Hathcock, Jr., Terry G. Vann, Lenoir City, for appellants.

Arthur M. Fowler, Fowler & Gibson, Loudon, for appellee.

OPINION

BROCK, Justice.

This is a mandamus action by the City of Loudon to require the City of Lenoir City and Lenoir City Utilities Board to submit to arbitration as required by T.C.A., § 6-318, ¹ for the purpose of reaching an agreement for the transfer of utility functions and facilities to Loudon.

In 1977, the City of Loudon, by Ordinance No. 569, annexed a territory that is presently provided with electricity by Lenoir City Utilities. The annexed area includes the Union Carbide Corporation, an industrial park of approximately 280 acres and a road leading to the industrial park. After annexation, Loudon, pursuant to T.C.A., § 6-318, notified Lenoir City and its Utilities Board that it desired to purchase all utility functions and facilities in the area. Lenoir City rejected the offer to negotiate the transfer, contending that municipalities are not "affected instrumentalities" under T.C.A., § 6-318, and, therefore, that it does not have to comply with the provisions of that statute.

The City of Loudon filed a petition for mandamus in the Circuit Court of Loudon County to require Lenoir City to submit the issues to arbitration as required by the statute. The case was submitted to the trial court on a stipulation of fact. The trial court found that the City of Loudon had the exclusive right to provide utility services in the newly annexed territory. An alternative writ of mandamus was issued but a discretionary appeal under T.C.A., § 27-305, was granted on the following question, certified by the trial court: Whether a municipality is "any affected instrumentality of the state" within the meaning of T.C.A., § 6-318.

In support of its contention that a municipality is not an affected instrumentality of the state, Lenoir City relies on the case of Hamilton County v. City of Chattanooga, 203 Tenn. 85, 310 S.W.2d 153 (1958), wherein it is stated concerning T.C.A., § 6-318 ". . . Now it seems to us that the draftsman of the act in question has simply condensed his thoughts to include every State instrumentality Other than a municipality by the expression 'any affected instrumentality of the State of Tennessee, . . .' " (Emphasis supplied.) 310 S.W.2d at 155.

It is our opinion that this language is not controlling of the issue presented. The question in the Hamilton County case was whether counties are "affected instrumentalities" under T.C.A., § 6-318. The holding of this Court was that counties are such instrumentalities. The reference to municipalities, however, was a dictum and has no authoritative value here.

T.C.A., § 6-318, provides in part:

". . . an annexing municipality and Any affected instrumentality of the state of Tennessee, such as, but not limited to, a utility district, . . . or other public service district, shall attempt to reach agreement in writing for allocation and conveyance to the annexing municipality of any or all public functions, . . ." (Emphasis added.)

The words of a statute must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. Hall Contracting Corp. v. Tidwell, Tenn., 507 S.W.2d 697 (1974); Partee v. Memphis Concrete Pipe Co., 155 Tenn. 441, 295 S.W. 68 (1927). The draftsman of the statute in question lists some state instrumentalities in order to give the general focus of the legislation. The inclusion of the phrase "but not limited to" indicates that the statutory listing is not exclusive. Clearly the statute encompasses state instrumentalities other than those listed.

It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the Legislature's reasonable intent. Franklin Power & Light Co. v. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corp., 222 Tenn. 182, 434 S.W.2d 829 (1968). The meaning of the statute is determined by viewing the statute as a whole and in light of its general purpose. The general purpose of T.C.A., § 6-318, is to provide an outline of the procedure for transferring utility functions to an annexing municipality. When read in its entirety, it becomes clear that the Legislature means municipalities and any other instrumentality by the expression "any affected instrumentality of the state . . ." For example, T.C.A., § 6-318, provides that an annexing municipality shall have the exclusive right to provide utility functions and services to any territory which it annexes. To hold that municipalities are exempt from T.C.A., § 6-318, would defeat the clear intent of the Legislature...