City of Lexington v. Rennick

• Decision Date: 25 February 1899
• Citation: 105 Ky. 779,49 S.W. 787
• Parties: CITY OF LEXINGTON v. RENNICK. SAME v. CRANE. SAME v. JACKSON. SAME v. SULLIVAN. SAME v. HENRY. SAME v. OVERLY. SAME v. BURKE. SAME v. MURPHY.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

49 S.W. 787

105 Ky. 779

CITY OF LEXINGTON v. RENNICK.

SAME v. CRANE.

SAME v. JACKSON.

SAME v. SULLIVAN.

SAME v. HENRY.

SAME v. OVERLY.

SAME v. BURKE.

SAME v. MURPHY. ^[1]

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 25, 1899

Appeals from circuit court, Fayette county.

"To be officially reported."

Separate actions by William Rennick and others against the city of Lexington to recover balance on salaries as policemen. Judgments for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Geo. B Kinkead and Geo. R. Hunt, for appellant.

Webb &amp Farrell, for appellees.

HOBSON J.

The above eight appeals involve the same questions, and have been heard together. They all grow out of the same state of facts. By an ordinance approved March 22, 1895, it was enacted by the general council of the city of Lexington that the city auditor should retain each month 20 per cent. of the salary due each policeman, beginning with May 1, 1895, until the whole amount of fees and commissions received by the police and due the city, as reported by them to the general council, amounting to $3,201, should be covered into the city treasury. The ordinance recites that it was passed because the amount was due the city from the policemen, and it would impose a hardship upon them if payment of the whole sum were required at once. At this time the lieutenant and patrolmen received a salary of $52.50 per month, and the captain, $55. On April 29, 1895, another ordinance was passed, fixing the salaries of the police after their election for the ensuing term, beginning with May 1, 1895, at $75 per month for patrolmen, $80 for lieutenant, and $85 for captain. In this ordinance it is recited that the salaries were raised because the fees and commissions which the police had before received were now, under the charter, payable to the city; and the two ordinances seem to have been part of one plan, as they both were effective, "beginning with May 1, 1895." On March 7, 1896, after, it seems, the debt to the city was paid, an ordinance was adopted fixing the salaries of the police after April 1, 1896, as follows: Patrolmen, $60 per month; lieutenant $65; captain, $75. Appellees constituted the police force of the city, and were paid their salaries pursuant to these ordinances until May 27, 1897, when they were discharged. They then filed these suits to recover of the city an alleged balance due them from April 1, 1896, to May 27, 1897, on the ground that the city had no right to cut their compensation down, and that they were entitled to the full pay, as fixed by the ordinance of April 29, 1895, for the whole time that they had served.

The contention that the ordinance of March 7, 1896, cutting down the salary of the police force, was void, is based on section 161 of the constitution, which reads as follows: "The compensation of any city, county, town, or municipal officer shall not be changed after his election or appointment or during his term of office, nor shall the term of any such officer be extended beyond the period for which he may have been elected or appointed." By section 3138 of the Kentucky Statutes it is provided that the police of the city of Lexington may be removed at pleasure, with or without cause, by the board of police commissioners. They have no term of office. In Mechem, Pub. Off. § 385, it is said: "The word 'term,' when used in reference to the tenure of office, means ordinarily a fixed and definite time, and does not apply to appointive offices held at the pleasure of the appointing power." See, to same effect, Speed v. Crawford, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 213; Kane v. Johnson, 123 Mo. 43, 27 S.W. 399; Somers v. State, 5 S. D. 321, 58 N.W. 804.

It is insisted for appellees that although they had no term of office, and were removable at pleasure by the board of police commissioners, they are within the protection of the above section of the constitution. They contend that the section inhibits any change in the compensation of an officer after his election or appointment, and that it is immaterial whether he has a term of office or not. On the other hand, it is insisted for the city that inhibition of the section relates to a change in the compensation of the officer after his election or appointment, and before his term begins, or during his term of office, and that only officers having terms are referred to. In determining this question, which is not free from difficulty, we should look, not only at the words of the section, but its aim and purpose. It will be observed that appellees had been in office about a year when the change in their compensation was made; and, if the words "after his election or appointment" apply to them then the words "during his term of office" are meaningless, and might have been omitted from the section altogether. If the makers of the constitution had intended to provide that no change should be made in the compensation of any city officer, the section might have read: "The compensation of any city, county, town, or municipal officer shall not be changed after his election or appointment." If appellees' contention is right, then these words would have expressed the entire sense, and the words "during his term of office" are meaningless. As all the words in a constitution must be presumed to have some meaning, it seems to us that the words "after his election or appointment" must refer to the interval elapsing before the beginning of the term of office, and that the purpose of the section is to prohibit a change in the compensation of the officer during this interval or during his term of office. This conclusion is confirmed by the phraseology of the succeeding clause: "Nor shall the term of any such officer be extended," etc. It is very clear that this last clause only refers to officers having terms. The words "nor shall the term of any such officer be extended" must refer to the officers named in the preceding clause, and indicate that only officers having terms of office were in the mind of the framers of the section. The same result will be reached if we look at the...