City of Litchfield v. Thorworth

• Decision Date: 20 December 1929
• Docket Number: No. 19296.,19296.
• Parties: CITY OF LITCHFIELD v. THORWORTH.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

337 Ill. 469

169 N.E. 265

CITY OF LITCHFIELD

v.THORWORTH.

No. 19296.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 20, 1929.

Commissioner's Opinion.

Suit by the City of Litchfield against Charles Thorworth to recover a fine for sale of intoxicating liquor. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from City Court of Litchfield; Harry C. Stuttle, judge.

Dryer & Brown, of Hillsboro (Omer Poos, of Hillsboro, of counsel), for appellant.

George P. O'Brien, City Atty., of Litchfield, for appellee.

PARTLOW, C.

Appellee, the city of Litchfield, began suit in the city court of Litchfield against appellant, Charles Thorworth, to recover a fine for the sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of an ordinance. Appellant filed a general and special demurrer to each of the five counts of the declaration, the demurrer was overruled, appellant elected to stand by his demurrer, a jury was selected, evidence was heard, a verdict for $175 was returned, motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, judgment was entered upon the verdict against appellant, and an appeal has been prosecuted to this court on the ground that the constitutionality of an ordinance and a statute is involved.

The title of the Prohibition Act is: ‘An act to restrict the manufacture, sale, transportation, possession and use of intoxicating liquor, aiding thereby in establishing uniformity in State and Federal laws in regard thereto.’ Section 38 of the act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 43, § 39) provides: ‘All cities and villages shall have full power to adopt ordinances embracing such provisions of this Act as are applicable, and further to prohibit the manufacture, giving away, dispensing, selling, bartering, transporting, delivering, furnishing, possessing, keeping, purchasing, storing, advertising or exposing for sale, of intoxicating liquor for any purpose whatsoever. No permit nor other authority to manufacture, store, sell, prescribe, or otherwise deal in the beverages or liquors for which a permit or other authority is required by this Act shall be issued to any person, or place, within the jurisdiction of any city or village which has duly enacted an ordinance prohibiting such act or acts; and any such permit shall become void upon the taking effect of such an ordinance.’

It is insisted by appellant that section 38 is unconstitutional, for the reason that the powers conferred by the section upon municipalities to pass ordinances with reference to intoxicating liquor are broader than the title of the act and are in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, and that this is the only section of the statute which confers jurisdiction upon municipalities to pass ordinances with reference to intoxicating liquor, and, if section 38 in unconstitutional, the ordinance is also invalid. In support of this contention it is insisted that the section gives municipalities full power to adopt ordinances embracing such provisions of the act as are applicable; that the delegation of this power does not follow the rule of law that a statute must be complete in all of its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government; that the word ‘prohibit’ as used in section 38 is broader than the word ‘restrict’ in the title of the act, hence the body of the act is broader than the title; that the title is an act to restrict 5 uses of intoxicating liquor while section 38 prohibits 14 uses, some of which cannot be reconciled with and are not synonymous of the expressions used in the title; that the last part of the section, which provides that any permit heretofore given shall become void upon the taking effect of an ordinance prohibiting such permit, is in conflict with sections 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 43, §§ 4, 6, 7, 8) because it gives municipalities the right to make void any permit issued by the Attorney General to a druggist, hospital, or physician, and that this is a delegation to the municipality of more power than is exercised by the Legislature itself.

The question as to the constitutionality of various provisions of the Prohibition Act has been before this court on several occasions and the act has been held to be constitutional as against the grounds urged. The general rule requiring the body of the act to be within the title was considered in those cases. People v. DeGeovanni, 326 Ill. 230, 157 N. E. 195;People v. Jabine, 324 Ill. 55, 154 N. E. 430;Swierczek v. Baran, 324 Ill. 530, 155 N. E. 294;People v. Alfano, 322 Ill. 384, 153 N. E. 729;State of Illinois v. Milauskas, 318 Ill. 198, 149 N. E. 294. It was held in those cases that the Prohibition Act, in the respects complained of, did not violate section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution by including in its provisions subjects not expressed in the title; that the act is regulatory as well as prohibitive; that the right to enact laws prohibiting the manufacture, sale, transportation, and possession of intoxicating liquor is inherent in the police power of a state and is not derived from the Eighteenth amendment to the federal Constitution nor from the state Constitution; that the state has power to prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquor and to adopt any means reasonably adapted to make prohibition effective, provided constitutional rights are not violated; that the constitutional provision with reference to the title of an act will be construed liberally in favor of the validity of the act; and that in order to render a provision void it must be incongruous with the title and must have no proper connection with or relation to the title. Where the general purpose is declared in the title, the means of accomplishing that purpose are presumed to be intended as necessary incidents thereto, and any means reasonably adapted to the purpose indicated may be included in the act. If by fair intendment the provisions in the body have a necessary or proper connection with the title the act is not open to this constitutional objection. If the title is general, any number of provisions may be contained in the act, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject-matter, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject.

The object of the Prohibition Act is not to entirely prohibit the sale, transportation, and use of intoxicating liquor at all times, at all piaces and under all circumstances. If such had been the purpose of the act, it would have been so stated in the title. The object of the statute is to prohibit the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, to impose prohibition, and to restrict, regulate, and even prohibit, their use for certain purposes. Therefore any means reasonably adapted to the purpose of restricting the manufacture, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquor may be included in the body of the act. One of the means of restricting the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquor is to prohibit its use and sale at certain times, places, and for certain purposes, or to prohibit its sale and use in certain places, at certain times and under certain circumstances for all purposes. A prohibition of the use of intoxicating liquor is necessarily a restriction on its use. The state has...