City of Littleton v. Board of County Com'rs of Arapahoe County, 89SA46

Decision Date20 February 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89SA46,89SA46
PartiesThe CITY OF LITTLETON, Colorado, a Colorado Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ARAPAHOE COUNTY, Colorado; The Honorable Joseph R. Quinn, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court; James D. Thomas, State Court Administrator; James Stroup, State Controller; Gail Schoettler, State Treasurer; The Honorable Robert F. Kelley, John P. Gately, Joyce S. Steinhardt, Kenneth K. Stuart, George B. Lee, Jr., and Thomas Levi, District Court Judges within the Eighteenth Judicial District regularly assigned to Arapahoe County, Colorado; and Jane K. Klimke, County Court Clerk of Arapahoe County, Colorado; all in their official capacities only, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

James Stroup, State Controller; Gail Schoettler, State

Treasurer; The Honorable Robert F. Kelley, John P. Gately,

Joyce S. Steinhardt, Kenneth K. Stuart, George B. Lee, Jr.,

and Thomas Levi, District Court Judges within the Eighteenth

Judicial District regularly assigned to Arapahoe County,

Colorado; and Jane K. Klimke, County Court Clerk of

Arapahoe County, Colorado; all in their official capacities

only, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89SA46.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Feb. 20, 1990.

Berkowitz, Berkowitz & Brady, Larry W. Berkowitz, William J. Brady and Richard J. Gleason, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Downey, Stuart & Knickrehm, P.C., James E. Heiser, Englewood, for defendant-appellee Bd. of County Com'rs of Arapahoe County.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Neil L. Tillquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for all other defendants-appellees.

Justice LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This case arises out of the 1987 relocation of the Arapahoe County district courts to the "Judicial Complex" in unincorporated Arapahoe County. The City of Littleton (Littleton) filed an action in Denver District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the relocation. After a hearing on Littleton's motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court denied relief and dismissed the case, concluding that section 13-5-119(2), 6A C.R.S. (1987), authorized the relocation. We affirm the trial court's judgment. 1

I.

The eighteenth judicial district consists of the counties of Arapahoe, Douglas, Elbert and Lincoln. Prior to 1987, two of the district court judges for the eighteenth judicial district assigned to Arapahoe County sat in the City of Aurora (Aurora) and the others sat in Littleton. In May 1985, construction began on the Judicial Complex near Centennial Airport in unincorporated Arapahoe County. On June 24, 1985, the Board of County Commissioners adopted a plan to locate six of the district judges assigned to Arapahoe County at the Judicial Complex and two in Littleton. In September 1985, Chief Justice Joseph R. Quinn wrote a letter to the county commissioners, disapproving this plan because the statutes required district courts to sit in Littleton and Aurora and because consolidating all the county and district courts in one location, or at most two, would be more efficient and cost effective. As a result of this letter, the commissioners halted construction of the Judicial Complex. In October 1985, the Board of County Commissioners submitted a new proposal to Chief Justice Quinn calling for the relocation of all the district courts to the Judicial Complex. 2 Chief Justice Quinn approved this plan, contingent on the necessary statutory changes. Construction was resumed in 1986 after the passage of Senate Bill 32, Ch. 105, sec. 1, § 13-5-119, 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 674, modifying section 13-5-119, 6A C.R.S. (1987).

Littleton filed an action in Denver District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the relocation of the district courts to the Judicial Complex. On October 30, 1987, the trial court issued a written order denying Littleton's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing the case. 3 In November 1987, the district courts for Arapahoe County were relocated to the Judicial Complex, and the courts have been operating there since that time.

On appeal, Littleton argues that sections 13-1-116, 13-5-119(2) and 13-5-101, 6A C.R.S. (1987), require the Arapahoe County district courts to be located in Littleton, the county seat, and that a contrary interpretation of the statutes would violate the state constitution's prohibitions against special legislation and delegation of legislative authority. We take up these challenges in turn in parts II, III and IV of this opinion.

II.
A.

Section 13-1-116, 6A C.R.S. (1987), states:

Every court of record shall sit at the county seat of the county in which it is held, except as may be otherwise provided by law.

Section 13-5-119(2), 6A C.R.S. (1987), states:

The number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be ten. The district judges regularly assigned to Arapahoe county shall maintain their offices in one location within Arapahoe county.

When read together, these sections are subject to two possible interpretations. The first is that the requirement of section 13-5-119(2) that district judges assigned to Arapahoe County maintain their offices in one location within Arapahoe County is an exception to the general requirement of section 13-1-116 that courts sit at the county seat. Under this interpretation, the exception is authorized by the language of section 13-1-116 qualifying its mandate that every court of record sit at the county seat by the phrase "except as may be otherwise provided by law." The second possible interpretation is that section 13-5-119(2) simply requires all district judges assigned to Arapahoe County to sit at one location and section 13-1-116 further requires that location to be at the county seat. Littleton advocates the second interpretation. We find the first to be more consistent with the statutory language and the legislature's intent.

In interpreting statutes, the legislature's intent is our primary consideration. Kane v. Town of Estes Park, 786 P.2d 412, 415 (Colo.1990); Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 793 (Colo.1985). To determine the legislature's intent we first look to the language of the statute. Kern v. Gebhardt, 746 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo.1987). Section 13-5-119(2) permits the district judges regularly assigned to Arapahoe County to sit at a single location in Arapahoe County. If this were not meant to be an exception to the requirement of section 13-1-116 that every court of record sit at the county seat, the phrase "within Arapahoe county" in section 13-5-119(2) would be superfluous. 4 Because statutes should be interpreted to avoid making phrases superfluous or insignificant, Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 517 (Colo.1985); Johnston v. City Council of City of Greenwood Village, 177 Colo. 223, 228, 493 P.2d 651, 654 (1972), we conclude that section 13-5-119(2) was intended to establish an exception to the county seat requirement of section 13-1-116.

To the extent that this statutory language remains ambiguous, we must look to the legislature's intent and purpose. Engelbrecht v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 680 P.2d 231, 233 (Colo.1984). When possible, a statute should be construed to accomplish the purposes for which it was enacted. B.B. v. People, 785 P.2d 132, 137-38 (Colo.1990). A review of the legislative history of section 13-5-119(2) convincingly demonstrates that the section was amended to authorize the relocation of the Arapahoe County district courts to the new Judicial Complex in unincorporated Arapahoe County.

Prior to 1986, section 13-5-119(2) provided in pertinent part:

The number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be ten, two of whom shall maintain their offices and courtrooms in the Arapahoe County portion of the City of Aurora.

Ch. 123, sec. 1, § 13-5-119(2), 1985 Colo.Sess.Laws 569, 569. In 1986, Senate Bill 32 was proposed to authorize the relocation of the district courts to the Judicial Complex pursuant to the Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners' relocation proposal. See Representative Chris Paulson, Remarks before the House Education Committee (Feb. 6, 1986), an exhibit in this case. The preamble to Senate Bill 32 describes the bill as "[c]oncerning the authority of district judges for the eighteenth judicial district assigned to Arapahoe county to maintain their offices anywhere within such county." Ch. 105, sec. 1, § 13-5-119, 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 674; see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo.1988) (title of legislation may be considered as an aid in determining legislative intent); Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 P.2d 308, 313 (Colo.1986) (same).

We conclude, therefore, that section 13-5-119(2) authorizes district court judges regularly assigned to Arapahoe County to sit at a single location anywhere in Arapahoe County.

B.

Littleton argues, however, that at most section 13-5-119(2) authorizes judicial offices to be maintained at the new Judicial Complex, but does not authorize courtrooms outside the county seat. In support of that argument, Littleton points out that prior to Senate Bill 32, section 13-5-119(2) specified that two district judges would maintain their "offices and courtrooms" in Aurora and that the original version of section 13-5-119(2) in Senate Bill 32 also referred to "offices and courtrooms." Littleton then points out that in its present form that section speaks only of maintaining judges' "offices" in one location in Arapahoe County. Littleton presents no explanation for the change, and it may have resulted from nothing more than an effort to eliminate unnecessary language. We conclude that "offices" must be read broadly to mean "a place where a particular kind of business is transacted," Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 820 (9th ed.1989), and therefore to include the courtrooms, chambers and clerks' offices of the district courts. We decline to adopt a restrictive interpretation that could lead to the judges' chambers being in one location and their courtrooms in another. In so construing the statute we give effect to the presumption that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result, § 2-4-201(1)(c), 1B C.R.S. (1980), one consistent with the object sought to be attained and the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, see § 2-4-203(1)(a), (b), 1B C.R.S. (1980). Nothing...

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