City of Louisiana v. Bottoms

• Decision Date: 06 December 1927
• Docket Number: No. 19951.,19951.
• Citation: 300 S.W. 316
• Parties: CITY OF LOUISIANA v. BOTTOMS.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

300 S.W. 316

CITY OF LOUISIANA v. BOTTOMS.

No. 19951.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

December 6, 1927.

Appeal from Louisiana Court of Common Pleas; E. B. Woolfolk, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Grant Bottoms was convicted of a breach of the peace, and he appeals. Reversed, and defendant discharged.

F. D. Wilkins and Ras Pearson, both of Louisiana, Mo., for appellant.

Davis Benning and May & May, all of Louisiana, Mo., for respondent.

BENNICK, C.

This proceeding originated in the police or recorder's court of plaintiff city, by the filing therein by the city attorney of a complaint against defendant, charging that:

"The said Grant Bottoms was, on or about the 7th day of August, 1925, in the nighttime, guilty of loud and boisterous hollowing, yelling, and screaming, by which the peace of the citizens of the city of Louisiana, Mo., was disturbed."

From a conviction in said court, defendant appealed to the Louisiana court of common pleas, wherein, upon a trial de novo, he was again found guilty as charged, and the amount of plaintiff's recovery assessed at the sum of $1. Judgment was thereupon entered, from which, after an unavailing motion for a new trial, defendant has duly perfected this appeal.

Defendant, a colored man, 25 years of age, is the local pastor at Louisiana of the Church of God in Christ, a denomination national in its organization, having its general headquarters in Memphis, Tenn., and its state headquarters in St. Louis. The congregation at Louisiana numbered 24 souls, and regularly met for worship in a temporary structure located at the end of Ohio Street, near the western corporate limits, but yet in a thickly settled portion of said city.

The alleged offense of which defendant stands convicted was committed during the course of a religious service, attended by 15 members of his little flock, commencing at 7 o'clock, and ending about 9:20 on the evening in question. The particular conduct of defendant said to have disturbed the peace of the good citizens of Louisiana was his shouting "Amen," "Praise God," and "Glory Hallelujah," at intervals throughout the service, in a tone of voice which was actually heard by certain persons at a distance of two blocks from the church, although those of the witnesses for the city who seemed to entertain the greatest respect for defendant's vocal powers were frankly of the opinion that his shouts could have been heard even at a distance of six blocks.

It appears from plaintiff's own evidence that the particular meeting at which the disturbance was alleged to have occurred was graced by the presence of 100 or more white people, who stayed outside in their automobiles, and that on other similar occasions as many as 300 white people had attended. It is a further fact worthy of note that, eliminating the two police officers who testified in the case, of the remaining twelve witnesses called by the city, five of them were among those whose curiosity had prompted them to be present at this particular service.

Defendant first seeks to predicate error upon the action of the court in refusing, at the close of all the evidence, to direct the jury to find him not guilty.

The particular ordinance which defendant is charged to have violated provides that, if any person shall willfully disturb any lawful assembly of people by loud or indecent behavior, or shall give or make a false alarm of fire, or shall in the nighttime be guilty of loud and boisterous hallooing, quarreling, yelling, or screaming, by which the peace of the citizens may be disturbed, he shall be guilty of misdemeanor.

The power of plaintiff city to have enacted such ordinance for the maintenance of public peace and order throughout the municipality is not, and may not, be questioned. City of St. Louis v. Slupsky, 254 Mo. 309, 162 S. W. 155. 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 919; 43 C. J. 209. However, inasmuch as the same is penal in its nature, and in derogation of common right, it must be strictly construed in favor of defendant, at least in so far as the purpose of such construction is to relieve him from being held subject to its operation. Ex parte Lerner, 281 Mo. 18, 24, 218 S. W. 331; City of St. Louis v. Robinson, 135 Mo. 460, 470, 37 S. W. 110; City of St. Louis v. Goebel, 32 Mo. 295, 296; 43 C. J. 573. This does not mean that the language employed therein should be given the narrowest meaning of which it is susceptible, or that an unreasonable or forced construction should be put upon it, but only that, before the judgment of conviction may be upheld, the proof adduced must be found to have brought defendant clearly within its meaning.

In general terms, a breach of the peace is a violation of public order and decorum, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, by any act or conduct inciting to violence, or tending to provoke or excite others to break the peace. City of St. Louis v. Slupsky, supra; City of Plattsburg v. Smarr (Mo. App.) 216 S. W. 538; 9 C. J. 386; 8 R. 0. L. page 284, § 305. The same authorities hold that by the term "peace," as used in such connection, is meant the tranquillity enjoyed by the citizens of a municipality or community, where good order, which is the natural right of all persons in political society, reigns among its citizens. However,...