City of Louisville v. Pirtle
| Decision Date | 24 March 1944 |
| Parties | City of Louisville v. Pirtle. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Municipal Corporations. — The procurement and maintenance of public parks by cities are governmental functions.
2. Municipal Corporations. — Generally, a city is not liable for negligence of its agents discharging governmental functions.
3. Municipal Corporations. — A municipality is liable for injury caused by its negligence in failing to perform its legal duty to maintain its public streets and ways in reasonably safe condition, though such duty appertains to performance of governmental functions.
4. Municipal Corporations. — Municipal liability for injuries sustained as result of defective conditions in walks or paths in public parks depends on whether such walks or paths are parts of public highways, and person injured because of defective condition of pathway constituting part of public park, but not of public highway, may be denied recovery under rule of municipality's immunity from liability for injuries caused by its agents' negligence in exercise of governmental functions.
5. Municipal Corporations. — A city is not liable for safe maintenance of traveled ways entirely within city park and forming no part of city's public ways passing through park.
6. Municipal Corporations. — A city was not liable for injuries to woman, thrown from horse when its foot broke through culvert or bridge over stream while she was riding along bridle path, which was entirely within city park and formed no part of street maintained by city in exercise of governmental function. Acts 1942, c. 34.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.
Hal O. Williams for appellant.
Gavin H. Cochran and Peter, Heyburn & Marshall for appellee.
Before Burrel H. Farnsley, Judge.
Reversing.
On September 28, 1941, the appellee and plaintiff below, and her husband were each riding horseback over the boulevards and bridle paths of Iroquois Park in the city of Louisville. While riding along one of the latter, and over a bridge or culvert across a small stream, a front foot of the horse on which plaintiff was riding broke through the culvert, or bridge, throwing her from her horse whereby she sustained painful and serious injuries.
At that time the parks of the city were managed, controlled and superintended by a Board of Park Commissioners which was provided for and established as a part of the charter of the city. But by Chapter 34 of the Acts of 1942 the charter of cities of the first class were amended in many respects, including the abolition of the theretofore corporate entity and municipal agency known as "The Board of Park Commissioners," and the title to all park properties was transferred from it to the city, to be managed by the "Department of Public Parks and Recreation" but which department was not made a corporate entity.
On September 26, 1942 (lacking two days of being a year from the sustaining of her injuries), plaintiff filed this action against the city as the successor of the former Board of Park Commissioners, in which she sought the recovery of damages against defendant which she placed at $10,000. The defenses interposed by the city — in addition to a denial of the material averments of the petition — were: (1) That the acquisition and maintenance of the city parks, including Iroquois Park, was the exercise of the governmental function for which the city would not be liable for negligence committed by its agents and servants having charge of the park, and (2) that plaintiff did not within 30 days of sustaining her injuries give notice to the old Board of Park Commissioners, as is directed in sec. 411.110, KRS, which was a part of an enactment of the Legislature at its 1940 session, c. 123, and applies to tort actions against cities. The court overruled defenses (1) and (2) and submitted the issue of liability of the defendants as based on negligence of its agents and servants in not maintaining the bridge or culvert along the bridle path upon which plaintiff was riding at the time in a reasonably safe condition. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff against the city for the sum of $4,000 which the court declined to set aside on its motion for a new trial and from the judgment and the verdict upon which it was based, the city prosecutes this appeal.
There is considerable authority — as well as logic — supporting ground (2) as based on the theory that the old Board of Park Commissioners, having charge of Iroquois Park at the time was nothing but a corporate agency of the city in performing its governmental functions, and that the fact that it was made a corporate agency did not convert it into a separate integral municipality, or in any wise detract from its being only a municipal agency for the management and maintenance of public parks, as well as title holder to the city's park property. But, since we have concluded that the old Board of Park Commissioners could not have been held liable under the facts of this case, even if...
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