City of Louisville v. Board of Education of City of Louisville

• Decision Date: 10 June 1913
• Citation: 154 Ky. 316,157 S.W. 379
• Parties: CITY OF LOUISVILLE et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF LOUISVILLE et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

157 S.W. 379

154 Ky. 316

CITY OF LOUISVILLE et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF LOUISVILLE et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 10, 1913

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Chancery Branch, First Division.

Action by the City of Louisville and others against the Board of Education of the City of Louisville and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Stuart Chevalier and Pendleton Beckley, both of Louisville, for appellants City of Louisville and others.

Kohn Bingham, Sloss & Spindle, of Louisville, for appellant Shuttleworth Clothing Co.

Clayton B. Blakey and Arthur M. Rutledge, both of Louisville, for appellees.

CARROLL J.

Section 170 of the Constitution provides in part that: "The General Assembly may authorize any incorporated city or town to exempt manufacturing establishments from municipal taxation, for a period not exceeding five years, as an inducement to their location." In pursuance of this constitutional provision, the General Assembly in 1898 enacted a law, now section 2980a of the Kentucky Statutes applicable to cities of the first class, providing that "the general council shall have power by ordinance to exempt from municipal taxation, for a period not exceeding five years, manufacturing establishments, as an inducement to their location within the city limits"; and by an ordinance approved in July, 1898, the general council of the city of Louisville, following the language of the Constitution and the statute, provided for the exemption for a period of five years of such manufacturing establishments as were entitled to the exemption. In 1913 this suit was brought for the benefit of the Board of Education of the City of Louisville against the assessor of the city and two manufacturing establishments located within the city, asking for a mandamus to compel the assessor to assess for the use and benefit of the Board of Education the property owned by these establishments and subject to taxation within the city. The assessor, as well as the manufacturing concerns, resisted this suit upon the ground that under the Constitution, the statute, and the ordinance the establishments that it was sought to compel him to assess were exempt from taxation for school purposes. In answer to this defense the Board of Education, which is a public corporation having charge of the public schools asserted that the exemption authorized did not apply to taxes levied for school purposes, and, this view of the question having been adopted by the circuit court, the writ of mandamus was awarded, and the assessor and the establishments sought to be assessed prosecute this appeal.

It will be observed that the exemption authorized is from "municipal taxation," and the controlling question in the case is whether or not a school tax levied by the municipal authorities for the benefit of the public or common schools of the city is a municipal tax within the meaning of these constitutional and statutory provisions. If the school tax so imposed is to be treated as a municipal tax, it is, of course, conceded by counsel for the Board of Education that the property sought to be assessed for the purpose mentioned is not subject to assessment. On the other hand, if the school tax levied by the municipal authorities is to be regarded as a state tax, then the property sought to be assessed is subject to the tax. This question is no longer an open one in this state. We have several times written, in substance and effect, that every common school in the state whether it be located in a populous city or in a sparsely settled rural district, is a state institution, protected, controlled, and regulated by the state, and that the fact that the state has appointed agencies such as fiscal courts, school trustees, and municipal bodies to aid it in the collection of taxes for the maintenance of these schools does not deprive them of their state character. City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488, 121 S.W. 411; Prowse v. Board of Education, 134 Ky. 365, 120 S.W. 307; Elliott v. Garner, 140 Ky. 157, 130 S.W. 997; Board of Education v. Townsend, 140 Ky. 248, 130 S.W. 1105; McIntire v. Powell, 137 Ky. 477, 125 S.W. 1087; City of Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607; Bamberger, Bloom & Co. v. City of Louisville, 82 Ky. 337. Therefore, when a municipal body, or a county, or a school district, levies taxes for school purposes, the tax so levied is a state, and not a municipal, county, or district, tax, although it be levied and collected by municipal or county or district officers. The fact that the tax is levied and collected for the state by these agencies of the state appointed for that purpose does not deprive it of its character as a state tax. Being a state tax as distinguished from a municipal, county, or district tax, the city, as well as the Legislature of the state, would be without power, even had it attempted to do so, to exempt property from the burden of...