City of Lowell v. Comm'rs of Middlesex Cnty.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1890
• Citation: 25 N.E. 469,152 Mass. 372
• Parties: CITY OF LOWELL v. COMMISSIONERS OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY, (two cases.) MERRIMACK MANUF'G CO. v. SAME. TREMONT & SUFFOLK MILLS CO. v. SAME. MASSACHUSETTS COTTON-MILLS v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

152 Mass. 372

25 N.E. 469

CITY OF LOWELL

v.COMMISSIONERS OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY, (two cases.)

MERRIMACK MANUF'G CO.

v.SAME.

TREMONT & SUFFOLK MILLS CO.

v.SAME.

MASSACHUSETTS COTTON-MILLS

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Oct. 27, 1890.

Reserved from supreme judicial court, Middlesex county.

T.L. Livermore and C.S. Lilley, for the manufacturing companies.

L.T. Trull and W.S. Knox, for the City of Lowell.

FIELD, C.J.

In the first case it appears that the respondents, the county commissioners for the county of Middlesex, abated a part of the tax assessed on the real estate and machinery of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company, and the petitioner avers that the respondents in their proceedings erred in law in the following respects, to-wit: (1) In ruling that the question of disproportionate taxation was open in this proceeding, and in admitting evidence tending to show disproportionate taxation. (2) In ruling that there was any competent evidence before them to prove disproportionate taxation, and in finding that the said Merrimack Manufacturing Company was disproportionately taxed by the assessment aforesaid. (3) In ruling that the copper rolls were not parts of the machinery of said Merrimack Manufacturing Company, and taxable as such, and in abating the tax to the amount of their value. (4) In ruling that the mills and dies were not parts of the machinery of said Merrimack Manufacturing Company, and taxable as such, and in abating the tax to the amount of their value. The assessors of the city of Lowell, acting under Pub.St. c. 11, § 13, and section 20, cl. 2, valued, for the purpose of taxation, the real property and machinery of the Merrimack ManufacturingCompany on May 1, 1887, at $3,430,403, and assessed a tax upon this valuation. The tax commissioner of the commonwealth, acting under Pub.St. c. 13, §§ 39, 40, valued the same real estate and machinery on said May 1st, at $2,675,000. The manufacturing company thereupon, in pursuance of Pub.St. c. 13, § 41, made an application to the assessors of the city of Lowellfor an abatement, and the assessors refused to grant an abatement, whereupon an appeal was taken to the respondents in accordance with Pub.St. c. 11, § 71.

Pub.St. c. 11, § 71, is as follows: “If the assessors refuse to make an abatement to a person, he may, within one month thereafter, make complaint thereof to the county commissioners by filing the same with their clerk, and if, upon a hearing, it appears that the complainant is overrated, the commissioners shall make such an abatement as they deem reasonable.” The duty of the assessors when an application is made to them for an abatement is defined in Pub.St. c. 11, §§ 69, 72-74. Section 69 is as follows: “A person aggrieved by the taxes assessed upon him may apply to the assessors for an abatement thereof, and if he makes it appear that he is taxed at more than his just proportion, or upon an assessment of any of his property above its fair cash value, they shall make a reasonable abatement.” A person may be taxed at more than his just proportion, either because he is taxed at a disproportionate rate or for property which he does not own, or because his property is disproportionately valued. By Pub.St. c. 11, § 45, the assessors are required to “make a fair cash valuation of all the estate, real and personal, subject to taxation,” in the city or town. See sections 41, 59, Id.; St.1885, c. 355, §§ 1, 2. The provision that “all property liable to taxation in this commonwealth shall be assessed at its fair cash value,” was first enacted in St.1853, c. 319, § 1. The Revised Statutes, c. 7, § 30, provided that the list of the valuation and assessment of property should contain, among other things, the names of the inhabitants assessed, “the true valuation of their real estate, the reduced value of their real estate, the true value of their personal property,” and “the reduced value of their personal property;” and by section 30, the assessors were authorized to make an abatement to any person, “if he shall make it appear to them that he is taxed at more than his just proportion,” etc. The same language was used in Gen.St. c. 11, § 43. The meaning of the words, “reduced value,” found in the Revised Statutes, is explained in Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. 64. It is a matter of common knowledge that formerly the assessors of cities and towns often assessed property at a valuation less than its fair cash value, although the usage was not warranted by the statutes, and it was to prevent this that St.1853, c. 319, was passed. The effect of this statute upon the duty of county commissioners in hearing petitions for abatement was considered in Chicopee v. County Com'rs of Hampden, 16 Gray, 38, (decided in 1860.) The words “overrated,” or “more than his just proportion,” as applied to the valuation of the estate of a person for the purpose of taxation, and the abatement of his taxes, have come down from the early statutes. See Inhabitants of Newburyport v. County Comr's, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 211. The General Statutes, c. 11, § 43, were amended by St.1877, c. 160, § 2, by inserting the words “or upon an assessment of any of his property above its fair cash value,” which are now found in Pub.St. c. 11, § 69. It appears from the return of their proceedings by the respondents that the Merrimack Manufacturing Company contended before them “that, by the said assessment of taxes upon it by said assessors, it was taxed at more than its just proportion, and, in support of this contention, offered to show the valuation placed by said assessors for said year upon certain pieces of property in said Lowell, owned by other corporations and individuals, as compared with their valuation of certain like pieces of property of the complainant;” and evidence to show this was admitted. It is obvious from the statutes now in force, which have been referred to, that it was the duty of the county commissioners to value the real property and machinery of the company at its fair cash value, and that they would have no right to value it at less, even if the other similar real property and machinery in the city of Lowell had been valued by the assessors at less than their fair cash value. For the purpose of determining the “true value” of the corporate franchise of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company as the basis of the tax to be levied under Pub.St. c. 13, it is immaterial on what basis the property and machinery of other corporations in the city of Lowell had been assessed by the assessors, and, apart from this, it is a violation of the statutes knowingly to make a valuation of property for the purpose of taxation at less or more than its full and fair cash value. See St.1885, c. 355, §§ 1, 3. The just proportion intended by the existing statutes is attained by assessing the property of different persons at a uniform rate, and upon its fair cash valuation. Whatever may be the remedy, if there be any, when it is shown that the assessors have intentionally assessed the property of a part or all of the inhabitants at less than its fair cash value, we are of opinion that, in a petition for the abatement of taxes on the ground of the overvaluation of the property of the petitioner, and of disproportionate taxation arising from such overvaluation, the question is whether the property has been valued at more than its fair cash value, and not whether it has been valued relatively more or less than similar property of other persons. If, then, the respondents admitted the evidence objected to for the purpose of determining the proportionate value as distinguished from the actual cash value of the property of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company, we think that they erred in the rule of law which they adopted as the standard or test to be applied in determining whether the company had been overrated. If, however, the valuation of the assessors of similar pieces of property of other corporations and persons was admitted only as evidence of the actual cash value of the property of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company, then the admission of this evidence would not necessarily require that the proceedings should be quashed. If we assume that such evidence would be held incompetent in proceedings in court, still, the proceedings before county commissionersacting as a board of appeal from the decisions of the assessors are not in all respects subject to the same rules as trials of causes in court, and a writ of certiorari to quash their proceedings is not usually issued for mere mistakes in the admission of evidence when substantial justice appears to have been done. Upon an examination of the return of the respondents, we think that it appears that the question was distinctly raised whether overrating, within the meaning of the statute, did not include a valuation relatively greater than that put upon the property of other persons, as well as a valuation in excess of the fair cash value of the property, and that the commissioners ruled that it included both kinds of overvaluation, and therefore admitted the evidence objected to, and found that the property of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company had been overvalued for the purpose of taxation. This was the adoption of a double standard of value, and was erroneous; and we cannot say that substantial justice has been done, because it may be that the county commissioners found that the valuation of the assessors was not in excess of the fair cash value of the property, but only that the property had been disproportionately valued by the assessors. The result is that the abatement made by the county commissioners must be annulled, and they must proceed anew upon the complaint of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company to determine the fair cash value of its real estate and machinery according to law. See Lowell v. County Com'rs, 6 Allen, 131; Pub.St. c. 186, § 9.

It was a mixed question of law and fact whether the copper rolls...