City of Lubbock v. Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC

• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 07-14-00006-CV,07-14-00006-CV
• Parties: THE CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEXAS, APPELLANT v. COYOTE LAKE RANCH, LLC, APPELLEE
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

THE CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEXAS, APPELLANT v. COYOTE LAKE RANCH, LLC, APPELLEE

No. 07-14-00006-CV

Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

June 17, 2014

On Appeal from the 287th District Court

Bailey County, Texas

Trial Court No. 9245, Honorable Gordon Houston Green, Presiding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

The City of Lubbock, Texas, (the City) brings this accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction in favor of Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC (CLR).¹ The trial court's order prohibits the City from undertaking certain activities relating to further development of its proposed water well plan on land the remaining surface estate of which CLR owns and uses. On appeal, the City maintains that the legal basis underlying the trial court's temporary injunction iserroneously applied to this groundwater estate context. We agree and will dissolve the temporary injunction.

Factual and Procedural History

In 1953, the Purtell family conveyed to the City of Lubbock the groundwater rights associated with the land at issue. In pertinent part, the 1953 Deed conveyed to the City as follows:

[A]nd by these presents do Grant, Sell and Convey unto the said CITY OF LUBBOCK, a municipal corporation of Lubbock County, Texas, all of the percolating and underground water in, under, and that may be produced from the hereinafter described tracts of land, situated in Bailey County, Texas, together with the exclusive right to take such water from said tracts of land and to use the same for disposition to cities and towns situated in Bailey, Cochran, Hockley, Lamb and Lubbock Counties, Texas, together with the full and exclusive rights of ingress and egress in, over, and on said lands, so that the Grantee of said water rights may at any time and location drill water wells and test wells on said lands for the purpose of investigating, exploring[,] producing, and getting access to percolating and underground water; together with the rights to string, lay, construct, and maintain water and fuel pipelines and trunk, collector, and distribution water lines, power lines, communication lines, air vents with barricades, observation wells with barricades, if required, not exceeding ten (10) square feet of surface area, reservoirs, booster stations, houses for employees, and access roads on, over and under said lands necessary or incidental to any of said operations, together with the right to erect necessary housing for wells, equipment and supplies, together with perpetual easements for all such purposes, together with the rights to use all that part of said lands necessary or incidental to the taking of percolating and underground water and the production, treating and transmission of water therefrom and delivery of said water to the water system of the City of Lubbock only.

When, in 2012 and 2013, the City proposed a well field plan and began testing and development in furtherance of that plan, CLR sued the City, alleging a variety of causes of action. In November 2013, CLR obtained a temporary restraining order and, later, applied for a temporary injunction by which it sought to enjoin the City from takingcertain actions in furtherance of that proposed well plan. On December 23, 2013, the trial court signed its order granting CLR's application for temporary injunction pending trial on the merits. In its order, the trial court concluded as follows:

On considering the evidence received and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds and concludes that [CLR] will probably prevail on the trial of this cause; that pursuit of [the City]'s well field plan has caused damage to [CLR], and further damage to [CLR] will occur absent the use of reasonable means to ameliorate that damage; that [the City]'s proposed well field plan is likely accomplished through reasonable alternative means that do not unreasonably interfere with [CLR]'s current uses; and that [CLR] has suffered harm caused by [the City]'s activities and will likely suffer irreparable harm in the future.

The Court also finds and concludes that if [the City] carries out their intentions regarding the well field project, it will thereby alter the status quo and tend to make ineffectual a judgment in favor of [CLR] in that [CLR] will suffer harm and will probably be irreparably damaged thereby. Unless the [City] is deterred and prevented from carrying out its intentions, [CLR] will be without adequate remedy at law because monetary relief would be inadequate to make [CLR] whole.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that [the City], its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons who are in active concert or participation with it who receive actual notice of this temporary injunction by personal service or otherwise are hereby enjoined and prohibited from taking any of the following actions during the pendency of this cause.

a. Mowing, blading, or otherwise destroying the growing grass on the surface of [CLR land];

b. Proceeding with any test hole drilling or water well drilling without consulting [CLR] regarding potential impacts to the surface of [CLR land];

c. Erecting power lines to proposed well fields on [CLR land].

The trial court went on to set the cause for trial on November 12, 2014.

The City perfected its accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order and, on appeal, contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting atemporary injunction in favor of CLR when CLR's claims against the City rely on the misapplication of the accommodation doctrine to the instant case. We will sustain the City's point of error.

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

A temporary injunction's purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation's subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh'g). To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the applicant for such must plead and prove the following three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Id. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require that "[e]very order granting an injunction . . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained." See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.

Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court's sound discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. A reviewing court should reverse an order granting injunctive relief only if the trial court abused that discretion. Id.; Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). The reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment unless the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204 (citing Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), and Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. 1978)). A trial courtabuses its discretion when it misinterprets or misapplies the law. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) ("A trial court has no 'discretion' in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts."); see also In re M.N.G., 147 S.W.3d 521, 530 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). More specifically, a trial court abuses its discretion in granting or denying a temporary injunction when it misapplies the law to the established facts or when the record fails to reasonably support the conclusion that the applicant has a probable right of recovery. See State v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. 1975) ("recogniz[ing] the risk of injustice in the immobilization of a defendant from a course of conduct he may have the legal right to pursue"); see also ICON Benefit Adm'rs II, L.P. v. Abbott, 409 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied).

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the order and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision. See City of McAllen v. McAllen Police Officers Union, 221 S.W.3d 885, 893 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied). In an appeal such as this, from an order granting or denying a temporary injunction, our scope of review is restricted to the validity of the order granting or denying relief. See Frequent Flyer Depot, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). It is not this Court's duty to review the merits of the underlying case. See Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 861. When findings of fact are not requested or separately filed, a reviewing court must uphold the trial court's order on any legal theory supported by the record. See id. at 862; Mabrey v. SandStream, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

Analysis

Identifying Issues on Appeal

We acknowledge that CLR alleged four causes of action against the City in its First Amended Petition: inverse condemnation, breach of contract, negligence, and declaratory judgment. The City contends and CLR seems to agree somewhat that the sole principle underlying any or all of CLR's causes of action was the application of the accommodation doctrine. As is readily apparent, the trial court's order is silent as to other causes of action alleged by CLR and focuses exclusively on the concepts associated with the accommodation doctrine. And the parties seem to agree generally that the applicability of the accommodation doctrine is the sole issue before us.

Additionally, there is no other way through any other of CLR's alleged causes of action that the trial court could have arrived at its conclusions and enjoined the City's development activities as it did. In other words, the trial court could only arrive at its conclusion—that the...