City of Lynn v. Thompson

Decision Date10 May 2001
Docket NumberSJC-08487
Citation435 Mass. 54,754 N.E.2d 54
Parties(Mass. 2001) CITY OF LYNN vs. TERRANCE THOMPSON
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

County: Essex.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, & Cordy, JJ.

Summary: Arbitration, Judicial review, Police. Public Policy. Police, Discharge.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 10, 1996.

The case was heard by Robert H. Bohn, J., on motions for summary judgment.

After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

Michael J. Akerson for the defendant.

David F. Grunebaum (Joseph A. Sarno, Jr., with him) for the plaintiff.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae.

Marcelino La Bella for city of Boston & others.

Andrew M. Fischer for Police Practices Coalition & others.

SOSMAN, J.

The present appeal arises out of an arbitration award, which reinstated the defendant, Terrance Thompson, to his position as a police officer with the city of Lynn. Instead of the discharge sought by the city for Thompson's alleged use of excessive force, the arbitrator determined that Thompson's only infraction amounted to conduct unbecoming an officer, for which the arbitrator imposed a two-week suspension without pay. The city sought review of the arbitrator's award in the Superior Court, where a judge vacated the award on the ground that Thompson's reinstatement violated public policy. On appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Lynn v. Thompson, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 280 (2000). We granted Thompson's application for further appellate review. We now reverse, and order that judgment enter for the defendant affirming the arbitration award.

1. Facts. On May 11, 1994, the city discharged Thompson based on three charges stemming from an involuntary commitment of a patient on September 15, 1993. Those charges were (1) use of more physical force than was necessary in the application of handcuffs, resulting in injury to the person being handcuffed1; (2) failure to cooperate with the investigation of the incident2; and (3) conduct unbecoming an officer in connection with both the incident and the investigation.3 The parties submitted to arbitration the following issues: "Was there just cause for the discharge of the grievant, Terrance Thompson? If not, what shall the remedy be?" After six days of hearings, the arbitrator concluded that only the third charge (conduct unbecoming an officer) had been proved, and that the appropriate discipline for that infraction was a two-week suspension. The arbitrator's conclusion was based on the following factual findings.

Thompson was employed as a police officer with the city for nineteen years. A series of seven civilian complaints had been filed against him back in 1984. On one of those complaints, the police department "exonerated" Thompson of any wrongdoing; on five others, the department determined that the complaints were "unsubstantiated"; and on the remaining complaint, the department determined that the complaint was "part-substantiated," but imposed no discipline on Thompson.

Thompson was later named as a defendant in a civil rights action for injuries sustained by a civilian when Thompson used excessive force in applying handcuffs. In 1992, after jury trial, a judgment was entered against the city in the amount of $100,000.4 The city imposed a disciplinary suspension on Thompson based on this incident, but that suspension was reversed by an arbitrator.5

On September 15, 1993, Thompson was dispatched to the apartment of a woman (whom we shall refer to as "E.R.") following reports that E.R. had been threatening various family members. Thompson was accompanied by Officer Steven Anderson, and later joined by Sergeant John Karuzis. At the scene, Sergeant Karuzis determined that E.R. should be transported to a psychiatric hospital on an involuntary commitment. An ambulance was summoned.

While waiting for the ambulance to arrive, E.R. was sitting in a chair in the living room, smoking a cigarette. The family members whom she had been threatening had left the apartment, and she was no longer an imminent threat to them. However, the arbitrator found that E.R. was not "under control." E.R. told the officers that she would not go to the hospital, and threatened that she would not go "without a fight." At one point, E.R. grabbed a set of keys and a cigarette lighter from a nearby table. Thompson, of the view that these items were potential weapons, grabbed E.R.'s left arm and tried to pry her fingers open to remove the lighter. Meanwhile, Anderson took hold of E.R.'s right arm, and E.R. dropped the keys out of her right hand. Sergeant Karuzis ordered Anderson and Thompson to place E.R. in handcuffs.6

Anderson began placing a cuff on E.R.'s right arm, while Thompson was grappling with E.R.'s left arm and hand to remove the lighter. The arbitrator credited the officers' testimony that E.R. was thrashing about in the chair while they held her by the arms. Although he also credited E.R.'s testimony that she told Thompson he was hurting her,7 he credited the testimony of Thompson and Anderson that they did not hear any such statement. The arbitrator's assessment was that, in the "chaotic state of affairs," with the officers' "focus on controlling [E.R.'s] hands" and Thompson "concentrating on removing the objects from her hands," Thompson did not hear E.R.'s warning to the effect that he was hurting her arm. In the course of this struggle, while Thompson had a hold of E.R.'s left arm, E.R.'s left arm broke.8

Thompson introduced expert testimony from an orthopedic surgeon to the effect that E.R.'s medical condition (in particular, her medications) would likely cause "deterioration of a person's bone structure" and "loss of bone mass," affect her "fracture threshold," and make her bones "more susceptible to fractures." The arbitrator credited this testimony, noting that it "cast serious doubt" on the city's assertion that E.R.'s arm had broken from the application of excessive force.

The arbitrator concluded that the evidence did not support the charge of excessive force, and indeed that Thompson had been "exonerated of the charge of excessive force." He rejected the city's assertion that Thompson had "lost his self control," "intended to harm [E.R.]," or retaliated against her for her "verbal outbursts towards the police." Rather, he concluded that Thompson's "actions were solely motivated to take the items away from [E.R.'s] hand," and that Thompson had not used excessive force in doing so.

The arbitrator also addressed the city's concern that the continued employment of Thompson exposed the city to liability for civil rights violations. He noted that "[t]here may be a certain point where an employer decides that because an employee is often the defendant in civil rights actions and continuously places the City and Department in [sic] risk of civil right [sic] judgments, that the employer has the right to discharge an employee." However, he concluded that Thompson did not have such a record. The civilian complaints from 1984 had not been substantiated, and, while the 1992 civil rights action had caused monetary loss to the city, the arbitrator noted that the prior arbitration had found that Thompson's suspension for that earlier incident had been "unwarranted." Thus, Thompson's official personnel record reflected no prior discipline, and the arbitrator concluded that Thompson had a nineteen-year unblemished career. As such, in the arbitrator's view, there was no "pattern of callous rogue behavior" that would justify Thompson's discharge.

The arbitrator also rejected the charge that Thompson had failed to cooperate in the investigation of this incident. Characterizing Thompson's postincident report as "brief" and containing "grammatical errors," he found nothing untruthful in the report and noted that Thompson had never been asked to provide any "supplemental report."

The arbitrator did conclude that the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer had been proved, as Thompson's "handling of this mentally unstable woman was lacking in sensitivity." However, in the arbitrator's view, "[l]ack of sensitivity" on a single occasion was "not a dischargeable offense." Beyond that reference to "lack of sensitivity," the arbitrator did not identify any other conduct by Thompson that amounted to "conduct unbecoming an officer," nor did he identify with any further precision what acts or statements of Thompson he considered "lacking in sensitivity."9 For that conduct unbecoming an officer, the arbitrator imposed a two-week disciplinary suspension and ordered Thompson reinstated with back pay.

2. Events subsequent to the arbitration. The city filed an action in the Superior Court seeking to set aside the arbitrator's award. In its complaint, the city alleged that a Federal civil rights action had been filed against Thompson stemming from the incident involving E.R., and that that matter was still pending. The city later amended its complaint to state that, on or about January 16, 1997, the city had settled the civil rights suit for the amount of $350,000, which amount was to be paid entirely by the city. The amended complaint annexed a copy of the settlement agreement, which reflects that the named defendants in the action included Thompson, Anderson, Karuzis, and the city. In exchange for the payment of $350,000, E.R. and her husband agreed to release their claims against all defendants. The settlement agreement recites that "[a]ll parties agree that this is a compromise of disputed claims and that settlement of these claims does not constitute an admission of liability by any party."

The city and Thompson filed cross motions for summary judgment with respect to the enforceability of the award reinstating Thompson. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the city's motion and vacated the arbitration award on the...

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